Forensic Analysis of a Windows 95 System
GIAC Practical Assignment
Version 1.0

Completed in partial fulfillment of
GIAC Forensic Analyst Certification (GCFA)

Gregory Leibolt
SANS – Orlando, FL
April 3 – 7, 2002
# Table of Contents

Part 1, Option 1 – Perform Forensic Analysis of a System .................................................. 3
  Synopsis of Case Facts ........................................................................................................ 3
  System Description, Hardware and Evidence Handling ....................................................... 3
  Setting Up the Forensic Toolkit ......................................................................................... 5
  Imaging of the Media and Media Analysis of a System ..................................................... 7
    Image Mounting ................................................................................................................... 8
    Autopsy Software Setup ................................................................................................... 9
    Operating System Identification ..................................................................................... 11
    Y2K Compliance .............................................................................................................. 13
  MACTime Analysis ............................................................................................................ 14
    Operating System Installation Date ............................................................................... 14
    The Registry .................................................................................................................... 17
      Interesting Registry Information ................................................................................. 18
        HKEY_CURRENT_USER/ Entries ............................................................................. 18
        HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/SOFTWARE/ Entries ......................................................... 20
  Recover Deleted Files ....................................................................................................... 20
  Interesting Files ............................................................................................................... 22
  String Searches ............................................................................................................... 28
  Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 28
    User Activity ................................................................................................................... 28
    Software .......................................................................................................................... 30
    User Files ....................................................................................................................... 31
    Viruses ............................................................................................................................. 31
    Network ............................................................................................................................ 33
  Summary ............................................................................................................................ 35

Part 2 – Analyze an Unknown Binary .................................................................................. 37
  Binary Details Summary .................................................................................................... 37
  Program Identification ....................................................................................................... 37
    Strings Analysis ............................................................................................................... 38
    Binary Duplication ......................................................................................................... 38
  Program Description ......................................................................................................... 41
  Forensic Details ............................................................................................................... 42
  Legal Issues ....................................................................................................................... 43
    Proof that ADMsniff was run ....................................................................................... 43
    No Proof that ADMsniff was run ................................................................................. 45
  Interview Questions .......................................................................................................... 46
  Additional Information ...................................................................................................... 47
  Summary ............................................................................................................................ 47

Part 3 – Legal Issues of Incident Handling – Wiretap Statute ............................................ 49
  List of References .............................................................................................................. 55
  Appendix A: Windows 95 file attribute tests .................................................................... 56
  Appendix B: Y2K Windows 95 Issues .............................................................................. 58
Part 1, Option 1 – Perform Forensic Analysis of a System

This section of the document is a step-by-step description of the forensic evaluation of a laptop computer. The proprietary information contained in this “real world” case within a corporation has been sanitized by replacing sensitive information with the letter “X” or a descriptive string such as “girl’s first name.”

Synopsis of Case Facts

The president of an employee club within a large company suspected the treasurer of taking money from the club’s funds. As a result, the president demanded that the treasurer return the club’s laptop on October 12, 2001. The president received the laptop on October 23rd, 2001. At that time, he locked it up securely for several months. In February, the president turned on the laptop and took two actions. He looked at the “start menu” for “RECENT” document listings and started up Excel to look at Excel’s “RECENT” listings. He stated that he took no other actions. He had the computer turned on for about 15 minutes and then shut it down properly. Once again he locked it up securely. In April, 2002 the president shipped the laptop to the forensics team for review. Since the president suspected misuse of funds, he hoped the forensics team would find files related to funds and lists of contributors or sponsors.

System Description, Hardware and Evidence Handling

The system was shipped to the forensic lab via Airborne Express. The sanitized Airborne Express shipping information read as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Airborne Express Tracking Number: XXXXXXXXXX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shipment Summary:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Status: Delivered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivered on: Apr XX 2002 9:59 am</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivered to: Left at Shipping Dock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed for by: Greg Leibolt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| Shipment History:                          |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time*</th>
<th>Activity*</th>
<th>Location**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr XX 2002</td>
<td>9:59 am</td>
<td>Delivered.</td>
<td>Orlando, FL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6:52 am</td>
<td>Arrived at Airborne.</td>
<td>Orlando, FL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr YY 2002</td>
<td>5:00 pm</td>
<td>Left Airborne.</td>
<td>Tempe, AZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3:36 pm</td>
<td>Picked up by Airborne.</td>
<td>Shipper's Door</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* status times reflect the time zone where the update took place. 
** cities reflect the Airborne terminal servicing the area.

Shipment Detail:
Service: Second day  
Ship Type: Package  
Weight:  
Description:  
Pieces: 1  
Shipper's Reference: XXXXXXXXXX

Tracking request generated on 4/25/02 at 1:21:17 PM. 
If you have any further questions, please contact Customer Service at 1-800-AIRBORNE (1-800-247-2676) or write to us.
The exact dates and times are noted for each step performed while handling evidence and making an image of the hard disk. These time frames may be of some value to the reader for planning and preparation purposes.

**DATE: 4/24/02**

09:59 AM EDT on 4/24/02
The evidence was delivered, signed for and remained in the locked forensics lab while preparations were made to begin analysis.

11:00 AM EDT on 4/24/02
The system was packed in a cardboard box, which was reviewed for signs of tampering. None were found. The box was opened and another taped up box was inside. This box was also reviewed for signs of tampering. None were found. This second box was opened and the contents were removed while wearing latex gloves to limit contamination of the physical evidence.

14:14 PM EDT on 4/24/02
In order to follow proper procedures for evidence handling, the different components were logged as follows:
- Logged 1 Acer Laptop model no. 950C serial no. 1600017384.
- Logged 1 Delta electronics battery/power supply unit S/N A9730005202.
- Logged 1 Nickel Metal Hydride rechargeable Battery S 063124.
- Logged one [EMPTY] floppy drive (plugged into the Laptop).
- Noted 2 [EMPTY] PCMCIA ports.

14:16 PM EDT on 4/24/02
- The hard drive caddy was removed from the laptop by releasing a latch and sliding the unit out.

14:20 PM EDT on 4/24/02
- The hard drive was extracted from the caddy to allow it to be placed in a different caddy for attachment to the forensic system. The following information about the hard drive was recorded from the unit label:
  Hard drive: Seagate model ST9816AG, Serial #: 1600017384
  810 MB, 1571 CYL, 16 HEADS, 63 SECTORS.

14:22 PM EDT on 4/24/02
- **Established case number 42402.**
- Tagged all evidence components as follows:
  **Tag # 42402-1**
  Acer Laptop Model No. 950C Serial #: 160001738.
  **Tag # 42402-2**
  Delta Electronics Battery / Power Adapter SN: A9730005202.
Tag # 42402-3
Seagate IDE hard drive, Model: ST9816AG, Serial Number: 1600017384 Size: 810 MB.

Tag # 42402-4
Nickel Metal Hydride rechargeable battery, S 063124.

Tag # 42402-5
Floppy Drive (installed in the laptop pictured below).

The following picture shows latex gloves and the different computer components with evidence tags attached:

Setting Up the Forensic Toolkit

14:34 PM EDT on 4/24/02
- The forensic laptop used to image the evidence hard drive was a Toshiba Tecra 8000 with 256 MB RAM and an 18 GIG Hard Drive using RedHat 7.0 operating system with the 2.2.16-22 kernel. The hda11 partition on the forensic laptop was repartitioned and reformatted to correct a partition.
problem created by accidentally writing to the superblock using a `dd if=/dev/zero` command. This partition was considered sterile and mounted as `/mnt/image`. The disk image collected from the imaging process was collected in the `/mnt/image` directory.

- The evidence hard disk was connected to the forensic laptop using an EZ-GIG expansion PCMCIA card by Apricorn.

- The evidence hard disk device was identified as `/dev/hde` by looking in the `/proc/partitions` file for newly added partitions.

**The following picture shows the forensic laptop connected to the evidence hard disk with the EZ-GIG expansion PCMCIA card by Apricorn:**

15:12 PM EDT on 4/24/02
- To ensure that a valid copy was obtained from the evidence hard disk, an MD5 sum was obtained from the original evidence by performing `md5sum /dev/hde1`. The calculation completed at 15:27 PM.
  MD5sum=07C33BC04D8A5700495892C5EC555CB8.
15:30 PM EDT on 4/24/02

- The file system type was identified by using the `fdisk -l /dev/hde`. The command reported `/dev/hde1` bootable FAT16, with this one partition using all of the drive.

**Output of the fdisk command:**

```
Disk /dev/hde: 32 heads, 63 sectors, 785 cylinders
Units = cylinders of 2016 * 512 bytes

Device              Boot Start  End   Blocks   Id  System
/dev/hde1*          1 784   790240+   6   FAT16
```

**Imaging of the Media and Media Analysis of a System**

15:40 PM EDT on 4/24/02

- The `dd` utility is a long established and powerful tool used to do bit by bit copies of media. Its reputation for accuracy and reliability has also been established in the courts. An image of the `/dev/hde1` partition was obtained using the `dd if=/dev/hde1 of=hde1.img` command. This process completed at 15:56 PM.

16:09 PM EDT on 4/24/02

- An MD5 sum of the captured image, `hde1.img` was obtained and compared against the original hard disk image to verify an exact copy. This calculation completed at 16:13 PM.

```
MD5sum=07C33BC04D8A5700495892C5EC555CB8.
```

- It was noted that both of the MD5 sums were the same.

- A final re-check of the MD5 sum of the original hard disk, `/dev/hde1`, was performed after obtaining a copy of the image to prove that imaging the hard disk did not alter the original in any way. The re-check test completed successfully as shown in the following screen shot:
Image Mounting

16:39 PM EDT on 4/24/02
- The image, hde1.img was mounted in read-only mode, not allowing execution of binaries, not allowing the update of inode access time, not interpreting character or block special devices and not allowing set-user-identifier or set-group-identifier bits to take effect. These mount options were used to ensure safe access to the evidence hard drive. The command used was: `mount --t vfat --o,ro,noexec,loop,noatime,nodev,nosuid /mnt/image/hde1.img /mnt/evidence`.

16:40 PM EDT on 4/24/02
- A read-only validation test to verify that the hard drive could not be altered in any way was performed by using the touch command to write a file. The test completed successfully.

Fdisk information, mount command and read-only test verification:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File</th>
<th>Edit</th>
<th>Settings</th>
<th>Help</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[root@p40 image]# cat hde1.img,MD5sum 07c33be0fde570049992c58256563b8 hde1.img</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[root@p40 image]# cat fdisk*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Disk /dev/hde: 32 heads, 63 sectors, 785 cylinders
Units = cylinders of 1024 * 512 bytes
/dev/hde1 * 1 784 790240+ 6 FAT16

16:45 PM EDT on 4/24/02
- The time zone used on the evidence computer needed to be identified so analysis tools, specifically “mactime,” would report times in the correct time zone. The file windows\win.ini contained the time zone setting as Mountain Time.

- Each Linux window used for analysis work was set to use Mountain Time. The set command was used: `SET TZ=MST7MDT export TZ`.
16:49 PM EDT on 4/24/02

- The forensic laptop was set to the correct Florida date and time using the date command: `date --set '2002-04-24 16:49:00'.`

Time zone verification:

```
File   Edit   Settings   Help

GrayText=79 101 125
ButtonText=0 0 0
InactiveTitleText=135 204 217
ButtonHiLight=193 204 217
ButtonDKShadow=0 0 0
ButtonLight=131 163 177
InnerText=9 0 0
InfoWindow=255 255 255

[MSCharMap]
Font=Symbol

[MAPI 1.0 Time Zone]
ActiveBias=1a4
StandardName=US Mountain Standard Time
DaylightName=US Mountain Daylight Time
Bias=1a4
StandardBias=0
DaylightBias=ffffff0d
StandardStart=00000000000000000000000000000000
DaylightStart=00000000000000000000000000000000
DaylightFlag=1

(END)
```

At this point the forensics work stopped for the day. All of the equipment was locked up securely in the forensics lab. This was the standard procedure followed at the end of each day’s work.

DATE: 04/25/02

Autopsy Software Setup

09:20 AM EDT on 4/25/02

The next morning the forensics work resumed. Autopsy version 1.5 software was the primary tool used in the analysis phase. Basic Linux tools such as vi, grep, sort and others provided assistance on occasion. Autopsy is a powerful, easy to use HTML-based graphical interface to the suite of forensic tools called “Task, version 1.0.” These tools have been widely used for forensic analysis and have also shown their value and reliability in the courts.
It should be pointed out that Autopsy uses a particular convention that might be confusing if it was not explained. The standard way to refer to a Windows operating system file is with a backwards slash, for example: `\WINDOWS\SYSTEM.DAT`. However, Autopsy reports its output files using a forward slash. As a result, this same file would be shown, if it were output from Autopsy, as: `/WINDOWS/SYSTEM.DAT`. In contrast to the Windows operating systems, Linux uses the convention of a forward slash to refer to a file, such as `/etc/passwd`. Since both Autopsy and Linux tools were used in the analysis, the reader will see files referred to with both backward and forward slashes.

- The Autopsy software was installed in `/home/install`. Because Autopsy expects the image to be in the local directory, the link command was used to link the `/mnt/image/hde1.img` to `/home/install/hde1.img` (`/home/install` is the working directory of Autopsy software). The image file was in `/mnt/image`). The command used was:
  ```
  ln –s /mnt/image/hde1.img /home/install/hde1.img.
  ```

- Autopsy uses a configuration file called `fsmorgue`. It was edited to include the appropriate file system and time zone information:
  
  **Fsmorgue entry:**
  
  ```
  hde1.img  fat16  /  MST7MDT
  ```

09:22 AM EDT on 4/25/02
- Autopsy was used to create the body file, which contains file attribute data for analysis. The Autopsy/Create, data file: `/home/install/body` created the file.

09:25 AM EDT on 4/25/02
- An MD5 sum of the body file was obtained using Autopsy:
  Autopsy/Calculate MD5 sum of `/home/install/body`
  MD5 sum = 3B0693DEC4FBDBEBF9FC9E1EDAF5EEDF
  Recorded in `/home/install/md5.txt`.

**MD5 value of `/home/install/body`:**

![MD5 calculation image](image-url)
09:32 AM EDT on 4/25/02

- A MAC timeline was then created using Autopsy by using the Autopsy/Create timeline function. This used /home/install/body as the source file and output was placed in /home/install/010199-042402timeline using the MST5MDT time zone.

09:36 AM EDT on 4/25/02

- Next, an MD5 sum was obtained for the timeline file: Autopsy/Calculate MD5 sum of /home/install/010199-042402timeline
  MD5 sum = 4763F75CC31ECBAF4F0432AFE91824A4
  Recorded in /home/install/md5.txt.

**Timeline MD5 value:**

<p align="center"><img src="image.png" /></p>

**Operating System Identification**

09:50 AM EDT on 4/25/02

- The operating system of the evidence laptop was identified by using "strings" on the Windows\system.dat file. This showed the following strings:
  - ProductNameMicrosoft Windows 95
  - VersionWindows 95
  - VersionNumber4.00.950
Strings output of Windows\system.dat showing Windows 95 as the operating system:

At this point, the original physical evidence was locked up securely in the forensics lab and not used any further.

The remainder of the analysis proceeded over a period of several weeks. The steps taken are presented and discussed in the same order as the outline shown in the GIAC Practical Assignment available at: [http://www.giac.org/GCFA_assignment.php](http://www.giac.org/GCFA_assignment.php).

Note that the outline does not, in some cases, match the order in which the analysis steps were actually performed.

The following information from [http://www.theosfiles.com/os_windows/ospg_w95.htm](http://www.theosfiles.com/os_windows/ospg_w95.htm) was used to verify the Operating System as Windows 95 first edition. Note that the web site suggested looking at a file called “GUI.EXE.” This file was not found on this system. The text saying “Version 4.00.950” was the only identifier on the evidence image. The following Windows 95 Version identification information was found on the website listed above:
Windows 95 version identification:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First edition</th>
<th>Service Pack 1 (update)</th>
<th>OSR2</th>
<th>OSR2.5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Three major releases of Windows 95 were made. The first edition does not support FAT32, nor enhanced FAT (for support beyond 8 GB). OSR2 is a separate version, but was never provided as a free upgrade. OSR2.5 added several Y2K fixes, and is provided as a free update. All Windows 95 editions are referred to as v4.0.

1) Identification of Windows 95 version: Look at the file date and time of the GUI.EXE file in the Windows\system directory (or where you installed windows).

File date: 24-Aug-1996 11:11am = Windows 95 OSR2 (Windows 95 B)  
File date: 19-Oct-1998 3:00pm (or later) = Windows 95 OSR2.5 (Windows 95 C)

2) Go to "Start", "Settings", "Control Panel". Select the "System" icon. In the General tab (the default), it shows the product "Windows 95" and the version:

Version 4.00.950 = Windows 95 first edition  
Version 4.00.950 B = Windows 95 OSR2 or later

Windows is a GUI interface, but supports both a text-based DOS window, and can boot from a single diskette into a "DOS" prompt.

- Windows 16-bit programs (Windows 3.x type programs)  
- Windows 32-bit programs  
- Windows VxD device drivers  
- DOS programs, 100% native, while Windows is not running  
- DOS programs in a "DOS box" while Windows is running, compatibility excellent  
- DOS device drivers

Y2K Compliance

If the evidence system was not patched for Y2K issues, the validity of the MAC times could come into question. It was determined that the Windows 95 operating system on the evidence computer did not appear to be Y2K compatible. This was determined by locating the following files:

Jul 11 1995 09:50:00 27961 m.. /-rwrxrwxrwx 0 0 53219 /WINDOWS/SYSTEM/VDHCP.386  
Sep 29 1995 00:00:00 922384 m.c /-rwrxrwxrwx 0 0 53135 /WINDOWS/SYSTEM/MFC40.DLL

These files should have been updated with the Y2K upgrade. If they had been updated, they would have had more recent MAC times. It is, however, still possible, but not likely, that the system was Y2K patched and then the older versions of these files were re-installed from the original media. In view of this, there is no way to conclusively identify this system as unpatched. The safest assumption is that this
system was not Y2K patched. As a result, some research was performed to see if Y2K problems would affect the accuracy of file MAC times. See Appendix B for details about the Y2K issues. The final conclusion was that the Y2K concerns would not affect MAC times.

**MACTime Analysis**

**Operating System Installation Date**

The Windows 95 operation system was installed on July 11, 1995 at 16:50:00. This is based on the time stamps of key operating system files and the many files installed in the \WINDOWS and \WINDOWS\SYSTEM directories. The Modify times and often the Create times are set to the date and time of the installation. Research could not identify a specific method to determine exactly when the system was installed, so an installation was performed in the lab to identify installation behavior. Certain key files and most of the files in the \WINDOWS\SYSTEM directory share the time stamp of the installation date/time. Some of the key operating system files are displayed below:

Autopsy string Report (ver 1.50)

```
---------------------
File: /WINDOWS/SYSTEM/KERNEL32.DLL
MD5 of file: 2afbc67420b9c636166e49dd0cf23a5b
MD5 of strings: 187409a85cbe719946cee7f3d3480d94
Image: /home/install/hde1.img
Image Type: fat16
Date Generated: Tue Jun  4 11:47:01 2002
Investigator: Gregory Leibolt
---------------------
inode: 52836
Allocated
uid / gid: 0 / 0
mode: -rwxrwxrwx
size: 411136
num of links: 1
Written: 07.11.1995 16:50:00 (MDT)
Accessed: 02.08.2002 00:00:00 (GMT)
Created: 12.31.1969 17:00:00 (MST)
Name: KERNEL32.DLL
```

Autopsy string Report (ver 1.50)

```
---------------------
File: /COMMAND.COM
MD5 of file: ea923fa01468598ff2c54c90620fd450
MD5 of strings: 6abbaf8d072352c19c1c03958b4f6e2
Image: /home/install/hde1.img
Image Type: fat16
Date Generated: Tue Jun  4 11:49:24 2002
Investigator: Gregory Leibolt
```
Autopsy string Report (ver 1.50)

File: \WINDOWS\SYSTEM\USER.EXE
MD5 of file: 792a3017d2967929187b151e1d6dc7d8
MD5 of strings: 61de333a6d3649bbfe4e71fc9345e2c2
Image: /home/install/hde1.img
Image Type: fat16
Date Generated: Tue Jun 4 11:48:22 2002
Investigator: Gregory Leibolt

Autopsy string Report (ver 1.50)

File: \WINDOWS\SYSTEM\USER32.DLL
MD5 of file: f88228bf978d0bee09e34b7f63a960ed
MD5 of strings: a93e1492ebae3854aae61c37c1a32447
Image: /home/install/hde1.img
Image Type: fat16
Date Generated: Tue Jun 4 11:48:01 2002
Investigator: Gregory Leibolt
Note that there were **119** system files with the same time stamp.

This is a sampling of them:

```
Jul 11 1995 16:50:00  17920 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53199  /WINDOWS/SYSTEM/MSPP32.DLL
375962 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  27960  /WINDOWS/NET.EXE
42080 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  27943  /WINDOWS/WSOCK.DLL
403 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  235112  /WINDOWS/HELP/WINPOPUP.CNT
109229 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  27961  /WINDOWS/NET.MSG
728 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  27955  /WINDOWS/HOSTS.SAM
23776 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  27947  /WINDOWS/NETSTAT.EXE
33371 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  27946  /WINDOWS/NBTSTAT.EXE
61962 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53196  /WINDOWS/SYSTEM/MSAB32.DLL
38352 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53193  /WINDOWS/SYSTEM/CIE2NDIS3.VXD
38444 m.c.  /-rwxwxrwx  235733  /WINDOWS/MEDIA/In the Hall of the Mountain King.m1 (INTHEH-1.RMI)
407 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  27957  /WINDOWS/NETWORKS
800 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  27958  /WINDOWS/PROTOCOL
414902 m.c  /-rwxwxrwx  23537  /WINDOWS/MEDIA/Bach's Brandenburg Concerto No. 3.m1 (BACHf=1.RMI)
15522 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53218  /SYSTEM/WSOCK.VXD
19129 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53215  /SYSTEM/VNETUP.VXD
5687 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53223  /SYSTEM/VTDI.386
37543 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  27945  /WINDOWS/FTP.EXE
7584 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53202  /SYSTEM/RPLTC3.DLL
20861 m.c  /-rwxwxrwx  235525  /SYSTEM/CANYON.MID
20240 m.c  /-rwxwxrwx  4733959  /PROGRAM=1/MICROS=1/EXCHING32.EXE
23437 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  27954  /SYSTEM/TELNET.HLP
8192 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53201  /SYSTEM/RPLTC1.DLL
42080 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  240171  /WINDOWS/SYSBCKUP/WSOCK.DLL
25088 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53204  /WINDOWS/SYSTEM/SECUR32.DLL
5816 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53217  /SYSTEM/WSHTCP.VXD
42080 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  240170  /WINDOWS/SYSBCKUP/EMP.000 (deleted)
50512 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  27942  /WINDOWS/NETMB1.DLL
38404 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  27956  /SYSTEM/SMHOSTS.SAM
99084 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53212  /SYSTEM/Ndis.VXD
13456 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  240166  /WINDOWS/SYSBCKUP/WFM0200.ACV
13312 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53205  /SYSTEM/SVRAP1.DLL
60416 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53197  /SYSTEM/MSNET32.DLL
27961 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53219  /SYSTEM/VDHICP.386
147968 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  240133  /WINDOWS/SYSBCKUP/PLAYER.EXE
23025 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53210  /WINDOWS/SYSTEM/FILESEC.VXD
11591 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  235113  /WINDOWS/HELP/WINPOPUP.HLP
6960 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53207  /SYSTEM/WSA3RV.EXE
9056 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  27951  /SYSTEM TRACERT.EXE
21657 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53211  /SYSTEM/MSSP.VXD
47377 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53222  /SYSTEM/MTCP.386
995 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53208  /SYSTEM/LMSCRPT.PIF
2786 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  27953  /WINDOWS/WINPOPUP.EXE
66672 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  27950  /SYSTEM/TELNET.EXE
19536 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  27944  /SYSTEM/ARP.EXE
25402 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53209  /SYSTEM/AFVXD.VXD
4785 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53206  /SYSTEM/LMSCRPT.EXE
12128 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  27948  /SYSTEM/PING.EXE
95969 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53221  /SYSTEM/VNBT.386
42080 m.-rwxwxrwx  240170  <header, EMP.000-dead-240170>
106960 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53192  /SYSTEM/NETAPI.DLL
398 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  52777  /SYSTEM/KBUS.KBD
46000 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  240168  /SYSTEM/SYSBCKUP/SB16SND.DRV
23744 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53213  /SYSTEM/NDIS2SUP.VXD
23165 m.c  /-rwxwxrwx  235526  /WINDOWS/MEDIA/PASSWORD.MID
23251 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  27949  /WINDOWS/ROUTE.EXE
23608 m.c  /-rwxwxrwx  235968  /WINDOWS/MEDIA/Drink of the Sugar-Plum Fairy.m1 (DANCEO=1.RMI)
20097 m.c  /-rwxwxrwx  27952  /WINDOWS/WINPCFG.EXE
147968 m.c  /-rwxwxrwx  27772  /WINDOWS/PLAYER.EXE
6496 m.c  /-rwxwxrwx  53195  /SYSTEM/ICMP.DLL
27221 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53214  /SYSTEM/VNETBIOS.VXD
67584 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  53198  /SYSTEM/MSNP32.DLL
42496 m.  /-rwxwxrwx  52982  /SYSTEM/VLB32.DLL
22016 m.-rwxwxrwx  53194  /SYSTEM/CHOOSUSR.DLL
```
The Registry

The registry contains information which might be useful in determining or correlating user activity. Since it is a hive structure that is a bit confusing to analyze with "strings," a useful way to view the information is with a registry viewer. To accomplish this the registry data needed to be imported into a Windows 95 registry.

1. Used Autopsy to export c:\windows\system.dat and c:\windows\user.dat, the two files that make up the registry on a Windows 95 system. These two files were taken to the lab’s Windows 95 system and loaded into the registry for viewing by...
using the following steps.

2. Copied the evidence system’s system.dat and user.dat files to C:\temp on the lab’s system.

3. Backed up the lab’s Windows 95 registry using the “Export Registry File” option in regedit.

4. Rebooted the system with a Windows 95 boot disk, went to C:\temp, then used A:\regedit /L:system.dat /R:user.dat –e Evidence.reg to create a registry file.

5. Updated the lab’s Windows 95 test system’s registry file using a:\regedit /L:system.dat /R:user.dat /C Evidence.reg to IMPORT the evidence system’s registry. NOTE: THIS DOES MIX REGISTRY DATA, BUT IT IS A HELP IN VIEWING THE EVIDENCE REGISTRY INFO. THIS INFORMATION WOULD NOT HOLD UP IN COURT IF REFERENCING ONLY THE IMPORTED REGISTRY DATA. CORRELATION MUST BE MADE BACK TO ORIGINAL “IMAGED” DATA. VIEWING REGISTRY INFORMATION THROUGH THE REGISTRY EDITOR DOES HELP ORGANIZE WHAT ONE IS VIEWING, HOWEVER.

6. Rebooted the forensic lab’s test Windows 95 system.

7. Viewed the registry for potentially useful information. Gathered history information from registry data. Unfortunately, there is now way to know when “recent” events occurred.

8. Restored the original Windows 95 test system registry using the following step:

   Re-booted test Windows 95 system with the Windows 95 boot disk.
   C: cd \temp A:\regedit /L:system.bak /R:user.bak /C backup.reg.

Interesting Registry Information

HKEY_CURRENT_USER/ Entries

NOTE: This is a list of recent files edited with Microsoft Paint.
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Applets\Paint\Recent File List]
"File1"="C:\Program Files\Accessories\DDDDDESSSSSS\XXX.bmp"
"File2"="A:\FLAG XXX.bmp"
"File3"="C:\WINDOWS\Bubbles.bmp"
"File4"="C:\CSW:\PICTURES\STREETS.BMP"

NOTE: This is a list of strings used to search for a file START/FIND/FILES.
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Doc Find Spec MRU]
"a"=""
"MRUList"="aedcbjihgf"
"b"="corporate table"
"c"="corporate  
"d"="mail list  
"e"="CorporateList1997"
"f"="0196  
"g"="corporate"
"h"=" list"
"i"="tables"
"j"="table"

NOTE: This is a list of recent commands issued through the START/RUN option.
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU]
"a"="a:/setup\1"
"MRUList"="dcab"
"b"="a:/scenery1.exe\1"
"c"="a:\setup\1"
"d"="regedit\1" (NOTE: This one line was added by the forensic investigator when regedit was used to view the registry)
"e"=""

NOTE: This is a list of recent files edited with Microsoft WordPad.
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Applets\WordPad\Recent File List]
"File1"="C:\\TEMP\\HKYsoftw.txt" (NOTE: This one line was added by the forensic investigator when an export of the registry was performed)
"File2"="C:\Program Files\Accessories\Thecampingtrip.doc"
"File3"="C:\Program Files\Accessories\The family trip.doc"
"File4"="A:\Hawaii 2001 agenda.doc"

NOTE: This is a list of recent files edited with Microsoft PowerPoint.
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\PowerPoint\7.0\Recent File List]
"File1"="A:\To XXXX From YYYY.ppt"
"File2"="A:\XXXX  PRESENT.ppt"
"File3"="C:\My Documents\DDDEESSSIII.ppt"
"File4"="A:\Hawaii back ground.ppt"
"File5"="C:\My Documents\XXXX  PRESENT.ppt"
"File6"="C:\My Documents\UII XXXX.ppt"
"File7"="C:\:\MSOFFICE\POWERPNT\WIZARDS\BADNEWS.PPT"

NOTE: This is a list of recent files edited with Microsoft Excel.
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Excel\7.0\Recent File List]
"File1"="A:\time trials.xls"
"File2"="C:\My Documents\Nominations9999.xls"
"File3"="C:\WINDOWS\Desktop\My Briefcase\1998MONIES.xls"
"File4"=""

NOTE: This is a list of recent files edited with Microsoft Network.
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Network\Recent\\AZ10FD8W\F]
"ConnectionType"="dword:00000001"
"UserName"="XXXXXX"
"ProviderName"="Microsoft Network"
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Network\Persistent]

NOTE: This is a list of recent installation source directories.
Recover Deleted Files

Autopsy’s “File Activity Time Line Analysis” functions were used to create a timeline of all the files in the image (deleted and current). Autopsy identifies deleted files in the timeline and can be used to view and recover deleted files.

- Created a list of deleted files by grep'ing “delete” from the body file and piping it through mactime:  
  ```
grep delete body | task-1.00/bin/mactime | tee deleted_files
  ```

- Began exploring the image with Autopsy.

The focus was within a time frame of 1/1/1998 to 10/23/01. Since the misuse of funds was suspected, the goal was to find anything related to funds and any list of contributors or sponsors. A concerted effort was placed in reviewing deleted files because deleted files might show an effort to cover up information. The thought that the user might try
to "clean up" incriminating evidence before returning it to the president of the organization gave credence to focusing within a date range.

It is important to note that the deleted files listed below were created, accessed or modified within the time frame of 1/1/1998 to 10/23/2001. Files that were created, accessed or modified prior to the time frame of the investigation may have been deleted within the time frame of interest, but would not be listed in the following list. That is because the Windows 95 FAT 16 file system does not change any of the MAC times when a file is deleted (see Appendix A). For example, a file which was created on 1/1/1997 and deleted on 2/1/1998 would not have appeared in the list below. That is because the MAC date associated with the file would remain 1/1/1997.

As stated above, the deleted files listed below were created, accessed or modified within the time frame of 1/1/1998 to 10/23/2001. Also, the files listed below were deleted sometime after they were created, accessed or modified. Again, as stated above, since the Windows 95 FAT 16 file system does not modify any of the MAC times when a file is deleted, there is no way to know from the MAC times of the files exactly when the deletion occurred. A forensics investigator must work with this limitation. It is also impossible to say for sure who deleted the files. For the sake of argument, however, a reasonable assumption can be made. The president assured the forensics team that he did not delete any files, and also, that the laptop was locked up securely at all times while it was in his possession. Therefore, it is likely that the files were deleted while the laptop was under the control of the treasurer. Other methods of identifying when the files were deleted need to be explored so some validation can be obtained.

These are the deleted files that looked interesting:

```plaintext
Sep 16 1998 02:00:00  11264 .a.-rwxrwxrwx  19138  /RECYCLED/_C855.DOC (deleted)
295424 .a.-rwxrwxrwx  11148305 /MSOFFICE/WINWORD/WORKSH~1/_EBELUNG.DOC (deleted)
295424 .c.-rwxrwxrwx  19148  /RECYCLED/_C865.WBK (deleted)
295424 .c.-rwxrwxrwx  11148305 /MSOFFICE/WINWORD/WORKSH~1/_EBELUNG.DOC (deleted)
295424 .c.-rwxrwxrwx  19145  /RECYCLED/_C862.WBK (deleted)
295424 .c.-rwxrwxrwx  11148326 /MSOFFICE/WINWORD/WORKSH~1/Backup of Neb (_ACKUP~3.WBK) (deleted)
295936 .c.-rwxrwxrwx  11148307 /MSOFFICE/WINWORD/WORKSH~1/Lopez.doc (_OPEZ.DOC) (deleted)
Sep 16 1998 22:10:14  295936 .m.-rwxrwxrwx  11148307 /MSOFFICE/WINWORD/WORKSH~1/Lopez.doc (_OPEZ.DOC) (deleted)
Sep 17 1998 02:00:00  295936 .a.-rwxrwxrwx  11148307 /MSOFFICE/WINWORD/WORKSH~1/Lopez.doc (_OPEZ.DOC) (deleted)
295424 .a.-rwxrwxrwx  11148309 /MSOFFICE/WINWORD/WORKSH~1/~WRD1294.tmp (_WRD1294.TMP) (deleted)
295424 .a.-rwxrwxrwx  11148318 /MSOFFICE/WINWORD/WORKSH~1/Backup of Bes (_ACKUP~1.WBK) (deleted)
2681 .a.-rwxrwxrwx  3499533 /WINDOWS/DESKTOP/MYBRIE~1/_F414000 (deleted)
2681 .c.-rwxrwxrwx  3499533 /WINDOWS/DESKTOP/MYBRIE~1/_F414000 (deleted)
Sep 26 1998 09:09:14  2681 .c.-rwxrwxrwx  3499533 /WINDOWS/DESKTOP/MYBRIE~1/_F414000 (deleted)
Sep 26 1998 09:09:16  2681 .m.-rwxrwxrwx  3499533 /WINDOWS/DESKTOP/MYBRIE~1/_F414000 (deleted)
Sep 26 1998 00:32:32  2681 .c.-rwxrwxrwx  3499532 /WINDOWS/DESKTOP/MYBRIE~1/19998MONIES.xls (998MO~1.XLS) (deleted)
2681 .c.-rwxrwxrwx  19859  /RECYCLED/ C870.XLS (deleted)
Nov 28 1999 01:00:00  268 .a.-rwxrwxrwx  4932661 /SIDEKI~1/DATA/openlist.lst (_PENLIST.L) (deleted)
626.a._-rwxrwxrwx  4931630 /SIDEKI~1/USERDATA/CTASK.SKW (deleted)
210182 .a.-rwxrwxrwx  5734954 /MSOFFICE/POWERPNT/_OWERPNT.TMP (deleted)
0 .a.-rwxrwxrwx  236600 /WINDOWS/TEMP/ DFC0B3.TMP (deleted)
Jun 25 2001 19:49:48  210182 .m.-rwxrwxrwx  5734954 /MSOFFICE/POWERPNT/_OWERPNT.TMP (deleted)
Jun 27 2001 16:15:40  353 .m._-rwxrwxrwx  367641 /WINDOWS/RECENT/Hey there bab (_EYT~1.LNK) (deleted)
Jun 27 2001 16:25:40  431 .m._-rwxrwxrwx  367666 /WINDOWS/RECENT/Deard~1/hjflufuflufudjflufuffr (_DEARD~1.LNK) (deleted)
Jun 27 2001 16:42:04  8628 .m._-rwxrwxrwx  19477  /CSW/streets. TMP (TREETS.TMP) (deleted)
Jun 29 2001 15:28:22  8628 .m._-rwxrwxrwx  5734956 /MSOFFICE/POWERPNT/ppttod.TMP (_PTTD~1.TMP) (deleted)
Jul 02 2001 18:23:54  25201 .m._-rwxrwxrwx  235115 /WINDOWS/HELP/wordpad.TMP (_ORDPAD.TMP) (deleted)
Jul 04 2001 16:30:50  568 .m._-rwxrwxrwx  367680 /WINDOWS/RECENT/DDD/DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD~1.LNK (deleted)
```

0 m.c._-rwxrwxrwx  4734497 /PROGRA~1/ACCESS~1/DDDD~1.BMP (deleted)
Interesting Files

Windows applications create many temporary files which are often copies of working documents, spreadsheets, etc. These temporary files were all reviewed with the "strings" command to see if they might contain useful information. These and some of the other interesting files are discussed below. File names have been changed to protect proprietary information.

The next step taken was to extract the files named c:\exchange\mailbox.pst and c:\exchange\mailbox.pab to see if mail data could provide information. Both files were attached to MS Outlook on a lab system and were found to be empty with the exception of the Microsoft welcome message that is part of the installation.

There were several interesting files in the \MyDOCUMENTS\ directory. The last name of the treasurer was found in \MyDOCUMENTS\ DDDEEESSSSII.PPT, with Modify, Access and Create times dated 06/29/2001. This is a very strange file name which prompted additional investigation. The file was extracted through Autopsy and viewed on a lab system. One slide of the presentation is displayed below:
Well! Surprise! Surprise! It looked like a presentation that a child created. Could the treasurer have children that used the computer?

Further investigation identified two deleted files. The first was \TEMP\~WRA3033.asd 6/25/2001 (deleted) which showed information about a young girl: (girl’s first name) (treasurer’s last name), age 9. The second was \TEMP\~WRS0260.tmp 6/25/2001 (deleted) which showed information about her sister: (sister’s first name) (treasurer’s last name), age 11.

Other documents also appeared to be written by one of the children and contained information related to the PowerPoint presentation. Specifically, these were the files named \PROGRAM FILES\ACCESSORIES\The family trip.doc and \PROGRAM FILES\ACCESSORIES\The campingtrip.doc. It was later confirmed with the president that these were the daughters of the treasurer.

On to other leads…. 

**MYDOCUMENTS/ Nominations9999.xls** with Modify, Access and Create dates of 09/10/1999 contained a list of people nominated for various positions. The treasurer’s name was not in this spreadsheet. There did not appear to be any evidence value to this file.

**MYDOCUMENTS/ OC4.doc** with Modify date of 4/6/1997 and Access and Create dates of 4/5/1997 was a deleted file, which appeared to be a list of organization supporters.
This was information that could be used to obtain financial information regarding donations. MS Word could not open the file, but the data could be read with the “strings” command. A sanitized portion of the Autopsy report of OC4.Doc is shown below.

Autopsy string Report (ver 1.50)

File: /My Documents (MYDOCU~1)/_OC4.DOC
MD5 of file: 0976c419d2fd44e6b28592949b1dd500
MD5 of strings: 54ff9f6427344e3119064497e1c4140
Image: /home/install/hde1.img
Image Type: fat16
Date Generated: Mon April 25 11:23:16 2002
Investigator: Gregory Leibolt

inode: 6038076
Not Allocated
uid / gid: 0 / 0
mode: -rwxrwxrwx
size: 29696
num of links: 0
Written: 04.06.1997 15:03:26 (MDT)
Accessed: 04.05.1997 00:00:00 (GMT)
Created: 04.05.1997 16:20:10 (MST)
Name: _OC4.DOC
Sectors:
426147 426148 426149 426150 426151 426152 426153 426154
426155 426156 426157 426158 426159 426160 426161 426162
426163 426164 426165 426166 426167 426168 426169 426170
426171 426172 426173 426174 426175 426176 426177 426178
File Type: data

U.S. XXXXXXX Chamber of Commerce
XXXX Xth St. NW, Suite XXX
Washington, DC 20005
National Institute For XXXXXXX Development
(The data continues but is cut short for brevity and sanitizing.)

\FILE0000.CHK - \FILE0005.CHK are lost clusters found during a scandisk operation. These were viewed for possible evidence. These restored clusters contained information related to organizational meetings, but did not appear to be of direct interest to this case. They all had Modify dates of 7/5/1998 and this correlated with \SCANDISK.LOG which reported scandisk activity at 10:06 7/5/1998.

Microsoft ScanDisk for Windows

NOTE: If you use an MS-DOS program to view this file, some of the characters may appear incorrectly. Use a Windows program such as Notepad instead.

ScanDisk used the following options:
Standard test
Automatically fix errors

Drive Windows95 (C:) contained the following errors:

ScanDisk found 131072 bytes of data in 6 lost file fragment(s).
Resolution: Convert the lost file fragment(s) into file(s)
Results: Error was corrected as specified above.

ScanDisk found errors on this drive and fixed them all

\MYDOCUMENTS\Sponsorsitelist\page6.dot 4/5/1997 was outside the target time frame of 1/1/1998 to 10/23/2001. It contained a table of company addresses, which could be a list of sponsors as the name suggests. It was saved as backup information relating to sponsors.

\MYDOCUMENTS\Sponsorsitelist\page7.doc 10/4/1998 was within the target time frame. It contained a table of company addresses, which could be a list of sponsors as the name suggests.

\WINDOWS\DESKTOP\MYBRIE-1\F414000 9/25/1998 (deleted) was also within the target time frame. It looked like a spreadsheet but was not readable by Excel. The suggested procedure for recovering corrupted Excel files did not work. The procedure from Microsoft Excel Help, Recover information from a damaged workbook file, did not help. Attempts to open the file with Word or WordPad did not succeed. Strings output currently provided the following information.

A sanitized portion of the Autopsy report of F41400 is shown below.

Autopsy string Report (ver 1.50)
---------------------------------------------
File: /WINDOWS/Desktop (DESKTOP)/My Briefcase (MYBRIE-1)/_F414000
MD5 of file: 11a0f6dcc5b69e99fcf53ed906598e5b
MD5 of strings: fc70ab22865cd5cb278c4f7c4f7c4f7c4f7
Image: /home/install/hde1.img
Image Type: fat16
Date Generated: Mon April 25 14:05:56 2002
Investigator: Gregory Leibolt
---------------------------------------------
inode: 3499533
Not Allocated
uid / gid: 0 / 0
mode: -rwxrwxrwx
size: 2681
num of links: 0
Written: 09.25.1998 22:09:16 (MDT)
Accessed: 09.25.1998 00:00:00 (GMT)
Created: 09.25.1998 22:09:14 (MDT)
Name: _F414000

GCFA 1.0 – Gregory Leibolt
© SANS Institute 2000 - 2002 As part of GIAC practical repository. Author retains full rights.
Sectors:
810499 810500 810501 810502 810503 810504

File Type: data

#C:\
Program Files
PROGRA~1
Accessories
ACCESS~1
Wordpad.exe
WINDOWS95
C:\Program Files\Accessories\WORDPAD.EXE
WordPad1
..\.\.\.\Program Files\Accessories\WORDPAD.EXE
C:\Program~1\Access~1
#.##0_);[Red](#.##0)
#.##0.00_);(#.##0.00)
#.##0.00_);[Red](#.##0.00)
"$"#,##0_);("$"#,##0)
"$"#,##0_);[Red]("$"#,##0)

\WINDOWS\DESKTOP\MYBRIE~\1998MONIES.xls 10/20/2001 (Deleted) was a readable Excel file. A sanitized version is shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RECEIVED</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
<th>BALANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16-Jun</td>
<td>$4,975.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-Jun</td>
<td>507.00</td>
<td>5,482.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-Jul</td>
<td>1,333.00</td>
<td>6,815.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-Jul</td>
<td>2,000.00</td>
<td>8,815.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-Aug</td>
<td>700.00</td>
<td>9,515.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-Aug</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>10,315.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-Aug</td>
<td>1,200.00</td>
<td>11,515.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-Aug</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>11,915.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-Aug</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>12,115.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Sep</td>
<td>1,200.00</td>
<td>13,315.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-Sep</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>13,415.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-Sep</td>
<td>1,000.00</td>
<td>14,415.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-Sep</td>
<td>2,000.00</td>
<td>16,415.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A sanitized portion of the Autopsy report of 1998MONIES.xls is shown below. It is important to note that “strings” does not display any of the integer data (monetary value). Excel files need to be viewed via Excel or other capable utility.
Autopsy string Report (ver 1.50)

File: C:\WINDOWS\DESKTOP\MYBRIE~1\1998MONIES.xls (_998MO~1.XLS)
MD5 of file: dfa7243bb6b55d13c4474bbe867a0ca
MD5 of strings: f44fcc0401ad2d204231d4bbcef7ced
Image: /home/install/hde1.img
Image Type: fat16
Date Generated: Mon April 25 13:42:11 2002
Investigator: Gregory Leibolt

inode: 3499532
Not Allocated
uid / gid: 0 / 0
mode: -rwxrwxrwx
size: 2681
num of links: 0
Written: 10.20.2001 06:57:14 (MDT)
Accessed: 10.20.2001 00:00:00 (GMT)
Name: _998MO~1.XLS
Sectors: 810563 810564 810565 810566 810567 810568
File Type: data

XX & XXXXXX XXXXXX
MbP?
Arial1
Arial1
Arial1
Arial1
Arial
Page &P
General
0.00
###0
###0.00
###0_):(#.#0)
###0_):[Red](#.##0)
###0.00_):(#.##0.00)
###0.00_):[Red](#.##0.00)
"$"#.#0_):("$"#.#0)
"$"#.#0_):[Red]("$"#.#0)
"$"#.#0.00_):("$"#.#0.00)
"$"#.#0.00_):[Red]("$"#.#0.00)
0.00%
0.00E+00
#. ??
#. ??/??
m/d/yy
d/-mmm/-yy
d/-mmm
mm/-yy
h:mm AM/PM
h:mm:ss AM/PM
h:mm
String Searches

When a search for data containing the treasurer's last name was performed with Autopsy's Keyword Search, 24 sectors were identified. These sectors were viewed for potentially useful evidence. They did not appear to be useful to the case. For the most part, they contained information from organization minutes and other notes. Other key words such as money, monies, dollar, corporate, sponsor and budget were used.

Regular expressions were used in the key word search field to reduce the time needed to search for several key words. One example of a regular expression used in the search field is "money|monies|dollar|corporate|sponsor|budget." All the words in this search string were examined on the same pass.

This search turned up 658 occurrences. The key word search is one way to find information in files that may have otherwise been ignored because they might have been renamed to nonstandard naming conventions. For example, a document file could be renamed "acmod.dll" or some other innocuous name. All these sectors were reviewed and, for those that looked promising, the associated inode and file name were identified for further analysis. It turned out that most of these sectors were related to application help files, application templates, installation files and meeting minutes.

Conclusions

User Activity

Viewing the timeline data showed that the computer had more MAC time activity in 1996 to 1998 and much less between 1999 to 2002. It was confirmed that the president of the organization did use the computer briefly on February 9, 2001 from 8:53 AM to 9:08 AM, to look at the recent files in Start/Documents and Excel:
Activity on the computer, prior to the president accessing it, occurred on October 20, 2001. This date was after October 12th, which was the day that the president demanded the computer be sent to him. Also, it was just three days before the president received the computer. On October 20th several key files were accessed.

The files named `\WINDOWS\DESKTOP\MYBRIE~1\1998MONIES.xls`, `\MYDOCU~1\_S$EAR$D\1-DOC`, `\MYDOCU~1\American XXXXX of the United States.doc`, `\MSOFFICE\WINWORD\PHX1295.DOC` and `\MYDOCU~1\U.doc` were viewed and possibly modified. The file named `\MYDOCU~1\1997 BUSINESS PLAN.doc` (1997BU~1.DOC) was possibly viewed.

The timeline output is shown below:

```
Oct 20 2001 00:00:00  13312 .a. -/r-rwxwrx 6038130 /MYDOCU~1/Backup of U.wbk (BACKUP~6.WBK)
12288 .a. -/r-rwxwrx 6038143 /MYDOCU~1/-WRD3362.tmp (_WRD3362.TMP) (deleted)
14336 .a. -/r-rwxwrx 6038043 /MYDOCU~1/American XXXXXXXXX of the United States.doc (AMERIC~1.DOC)
53 .a. -/r-rwxr-x-x 6038157 /MYDOCU~1/-$y there baby.doc ($YTHE~1.DOC) (deleted)
15360 .a. -/r-rwxwrx 6038037 /MYDOCU~1/1997 BUSINESS PLAN.doc (1997BU~1.DOC)
12288 .a. -/r-rwxwrx 6038135 /MYDOCU~1/Ddeardjhjdufdujutfhufxtfuefhurmd m.doc (DDEARD~1.DOC)
21504 .a. -/r-rwxwrx 6038075 /MYDOCU~1/Professional Report.doc (PROFES~1.DOC)
199380 .a. -/r-rxr-x-x-r 18440 /RECYCLED_\NFO (deleted)
2681 .a. -/r-rwxwrx 3499532 /WINDOWS/DESKTOP/MYBRIE~1/1998MONIES.xls
12288 .a. -/r-rwxwrx 6038117 /MYDOCU~1/U.doc (U.DOC)
```

To be thorough, every "*.doc, *.xls, *.ppt and *.txt" file was identified by grep'ing them out of the timeline created by Autopsy. These files were reviewed for potential evidence.

The registry provided a list of the "RECENT" files from WordPad, Excel and PowerPoint. Reviewing these files suggested that the computer was used infrequently because of the large range between the dates associated with the files. The oldest file had an access time dating back to 1997. Not all the files recorded as "RECENT" files were listed in the timeline created by Autopsy. This suggested that the file was never saved.

WordPad had two recent files listed that could be analyzed. These were "C:\Program Files\Accessories\The camping trip.doc" and "C:\Program Files\Accessories\The family trip.doc." Timeline information on the files is shown below:
WordPad also had A:\Hawaii 2001 agenda.doc" listed as a recent document which showed that the user did occasionally use the floppy drive.

PowerPoint also displayed recent files. Not all of these were found on the system.

[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\PowerPoint\7.0\Recent File List]  "File1"="A:\To XXXX From YYYY.ppt"
"File2"="A:\XXXX PRESENT.ppt"
"File3"="C:\My Documents\DDDEEESSSIII.ppt"  FOUND
"File4"="A:\Hawaii back ground.ppt"
"File5"="C:\My Documents\XXXX PRESENT.ppt"  NOT FOUND
"File6"="C:\My Documents\UI1 XXXX.ppt"  NOT FOUND
"File7"="C:\MSOFFICE\POWERPNT\WIZARDS\BADNEWS.PPT"  FOUND

Excel’s RECENT file list contained two files on drive C:

[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Excel\7.0\Recent File List]  "File1"="A:\time trials.xls"
"File2"="C:\My Documents\Nominations9999.xls"  FOUND
"File3"="C:\\WINDOWS\\Desktop\\My Briefcase\\1998MONIES.xls"  FOUND
"File4"=""

Timeline information on the files is shown below.

Jun 29 2001 17:11:54  135168 .c.-rwxrwrxw  6038138 /MYDOCU-1/DDDEEESSSIII.ppt
Jun 29 2001 18:02:54  135168 m.-rwxrwrxw  6038138 /MYDOCU-1/DDDEEESSSIII.ppt
Jun 29 2001 00:00:00  135168 a.-rwxrwrxw  6038138 /MYDOCU-1/DDDEEESSSIII.ppt

Jul 08 1994 00:00:00  27648 m.-rwxrwrxw  7516165 /MSOFFICE/POWERPNT/WIZARDS/BADNEWS.PPT
May 01 1996 13:31:40  27648 .c.-rwxrwrxw  7516165 /MSOFFICE/POWERPNT/WIZARDS/BADNEWS.PPT
Mar 03 1997 23:00:00  27648 .a.-rwxrwrxw  7516165 /MSOFFICE/POWERPNT/WIZARDS/BADNEWS.PPT

Sep 10 1999 00:00:00  17408 .a.-rwxrwrxw  6038115 /MYDOCU-1/Nominations9999.xls
Sep 10 1999 11:05:12  17408 .c.-rwxrwrxw  6038115 /MYDOCU-1/Nominations9999.xls
Sep 10 1999 15:59:10  17408 m.-rwxrwrxw  6038115 /MYDOCU-1/Nominations9999.xls

Oct 20 2001 00:00:00  2681 .a.-rwxrwrxw  3499532 /WINDOWS/DESKTOP/MYBRIE-1/1998MONIES.xls (deleted)

Software

The ACER laptop had several applications installed on the system. These applications were determined through registry entries and file system analysis. There were Microsoft applications installed and they are listed below.
MSOffice Applications:
- WinWord
- PowerPoint
- Excel
- Access (never used)
- Exchange

In addition to the Microsoft applications, the system had two other applications that were never used. The applications are listed below.

Other Applications:
- SideKick95 (never used)
- QuickBooks Pro (never used)
- CSW (Map software)

User Files

Documents were found in six different directories:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directory</th>
<th>Files</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSOFFICE\WINWORD\Workshop Letters\</td>
<td>10 .doc files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WINDOWS\Favorites</td>
<td>1 .doc file</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WINDOWS\Desktop\My Briefcase</td>
<td>2 .xls files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Files\Accessories</td>
<td>1 .bmp file, 2 .doc files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WINDOWS\RECENT</td>
<td>References 13 links to files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My Documents</td>
<td>14 .doc files and 1 .xls file</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: There were no user text (.txt) files.

Viruses

During the analysis it was noticed that there were numerous copies of a file called: \MYDOCU~1\Hey there baby.doc (HEYTHE~1.DOC). This raised questions and lead to a strings analysis to look for potential virus signatures. Since viruses frequently infect the MSOFFICE\Templates\normal.dot file, this file was inspected for unusual strings. A sanitized and shortened Autopsy string report follows with some of the suspicious strings shown in bold. These strings were searched for on the McAfee site, [http://vil.mcafee.com/dispVirus.asp?virus_k=9931](http://vil.mcafee.com/dispVirus.asp?virus_k=9931), which returned information about a virus called the WM/CONCEPT.AJ virus, also known as the WW6-Concept virus.

Autopsy string Report (ver 1.50)

```
File: /MSOFFICE/Templates (TEMPLA~1)/NORMAL.DOT
MD5 of file: f7426d7a838b2bbf8c57f027201ebc0
MD5 of strings: 8dabd5206a5b99347939e98600e9984
```
Image: /home/install/hde1.img
Image Type: fat16
Date Generated: Wed Jun 12 15:14:39 2002
Investigator: Gregory Leibolt

inode: 9505286
Allocated
uid / gid: 0 / 0
mode: -rwxrwxrwx
size: 16896
num of links: 1
Written: 02.09.2002 08:57:04  (MST)
Accessed: 02.08.2002 00:00:00  (GMT)
Created: 10.06.1995 00:00:00  (MDT)
Name: NORMAL.DOT
Sectors:
537155 537156 537157 537158 537159 537160 537161 537162
537163 537164 537165 537166 537167 537168 537169 537170
537171 537172 537173 537174 537175 537176 537177 537178
537179 537180 537181 537182 537183 537184 537185 537186
537187
File Type: data
Note: The following text, particularly what is in bold, are strings that looked questionable. They related
directly to the virus.

see if we're already installed
#i
iMacroCount
do
PayLoad
blInstalled
FileSaveAs
bTooMuchTrouble
k5add FileSaveAs and copies of AutoOpen and FileSaveAs.do
PayLoad is just for fun.do
iWW6IInstance
WW6Infector
WW6I
iWW6IInstance
iWW6IInstance
Abort
MAINdk3this becomes the FileSaveAs for the global templated/i
Global:AAAZAO
MAINdRp That's enough to prove my pointd
Global:autoOpenndRI
MacroFile$
NORMAL.DOT
globMacro$
fileMacro$do
Global:AAAZAO
Global:AAAZFS
:PayLoad
global:Payload
C:\MSOFFICE\WINWORD\TEMPLATE\NORMAL.DOT
PayLoad
FileSaveAs
AAAZFS
AAAZAO
The McAfee site explained that this virus is propagated by infecting documents in Word Versions 6 and 7. It contains the macros, AUTOOPEN, AAAZFS, AAAZAO, and PAYLOAD, which change their names to AAAZAO, AAAZFS, FILESAVEAS and PAYLOAD in Word’s Global Template NORMAL.DOT. Using Auto and System Macros activates the virus. These strings were clearly shown in the Normal.dot string output.

**Network**

Autoexec.bat, config.sys and bootlog.txt did not contain entries suggesting network devices. Since use of the computer would require network devices to be installed at boot-up, this computer, in its current state, could not be connected to a network.

**Contents Of File: /AUTOEXEC.BAT**

```plaintext
@Echo Off
Path C:\;C:\Windows;C:\Windows\System;C:\Windows\Command
Set BLASTER=A240 I5 D1 T4
C:\DOSDRVRS\MIXERSET /p /q
Set DIRCMD=/OEN/P
```
Set WinTemp=C:\Temp
Set Temp=C:\Temp
LoadHigh Doskey > nul

**Contents Of File: /CONFIG.SYS**

Autopsy string Report (ver 1.50)

-----------------------------------------------------
File: /CONFIG.SYS
MD5 of file: b3250a1c45bdf4d4bde61b13a1d7754a
MD5 of strings: 5cc3900960f2a42fe8c1c98a552d2e3a
Image: /home/install/hde1.img
Image Type: fat16
Date Generated: Mon Jun 3 15:37:56 2002
Investigator: Gregory Leibolt

inode: 8
Allocated
uid / gid: 0 / 0
mode: -rwxrwxrwx
size: 247
num of links: 1
Written: 08.26.1998 14:03:00 (MDT)
Accessed: 02.08.2002 00:00:00 (GMT)
Created: 08.26.1998 14:03:00 (MDT)
Name: CONFIG.SYS
Sectors: 698339
File Type: ASCII text
-----------------------------------------------------
Device=C:\Windows\HiMem.Sys /TestMem:Off
Device=C:\Windows\EMM386.Exe NoEms X=D000-DFFF
Rem Device=C:\Windows\EMM386.Exe NoEms X=D000-DFFF I=E000-EFFF FRAME=E000
Buffers=40
Files=20
DOS=High,UMB
Shell=C:\Windows\Command.Com C:\Windows /p

Some review of dial-up network activity was performed to determine if the system was connected to the an ISP or other dial-up service.

The Internet Explorer executable, \Program Files\PLUS!\Microsoft Internet\iexplore.exe, had an access time of 7/5/1997.

The \Program Files\PLUS!\Microsoft Internet\history directory only contained two entries that pointed to a file, A:\BARNEY.AU.

Registry entries pointed to some original Microsoft network Dialup configuration.

\Program Files\The Microsoft Network directory did not show any signs of use. The file named ccei.dll showed an access time of 2/9/2002. This is an application extension dll
which means that another application used it, which makes sense because the ccdialer.exe had a 6/17/1996 timestamp.

Access times of AT&T Mail, CompuServe and MCI Mail in the Hyper Terminal entries showed access times of 6/22/2001. This appeared to be an attempt to use them or a configuration change.

The final analysis was that the computer was not used to access an ISP or other dial-up service.

Summary

The final results of the forensic analysis showed that the user in question definitely performed a last review of documents on the system. Even though the FAT16 file system does not modify any MAC times when a file is deleted, it was still possible to prove when files were deleted by looking at the time stamps of `\RECYCLED\_NFO` and `\RECYCLED\desktop.ini`. When a file is deleted to the recycle bin, an entry is made in the `\RECYCLED\_NFO` file. When Files are removed from the recycle bin, the Modify and Create times change on the `\RECYCLED\desktop.ini` file. In the case of the `\WINDOWS\DESKTOP\MYBRIE~1\1998MONIES.xls` file, the following steps occurred:

The file was created:

```
```

The file was last accessed:

```
Oct 20 2001 00:00:00   2681 .a.-rw-rw-rw- 3499532 /WINDOWS/DESKTOP/MYBRIE~1/1998MONIES.xls (deleted)
```

The file was last modified:

```
```

The `/RECYCLED\_NFO` file was last accessed:

```
Oct 20 2001 00:00:00 199380 .a.-r-xr-xr-x 0        0        18440 /RECYCLED\_NFO (deleted)
```

The `/RECYCLED\_NFO` file was last modified:

```
Oct 20 2001 06:58:14 199380 m.-r-xr-xr-x 18440 <hde1.img-_NFO-dead-18440>
```

The `/RECYCLED\desktop.ini` file was last modified:

```
Oct 20 2001 06:59:18  65 m.-r-xr-xr-x 18438 /RECYCLED/desktop.ini (DESKTOP.INI)
```

The `/RECYCLED\desktop.ini` file was last accessed:

```
Feb 09 2002 00:00:00  65 .a.-r-xr-xr-x 0        0        18438 /RECYCLED/desktop.ini (DESKTOP.INI)
```
This clearly showed that someone using the computer, while it was in the control of the treasurer, deleted the 1998MONIES.xls file on October 20\textsuperscript{th}, 2001. This is because the Modify and Create time stamps changed on the file named \textbackslash RECYCLED\_NFO and the file named \textbackslash RECYCLED\desktop.ini. The president's activity only changed the access time of \textbackslash RECYCLED\desktop.ini file when he used the computer on February 9, 2002. Therefore, it was not possible that the president deleted this file.

The deleted 1998MONIES.xls file, which was completely recovered, contained information about funds received from sponsors. Several documents containing lists of possible sponsors were also identified. Armed with the information from these files, corporate investigators would be better able to determine conclusively whether or not the treasurer of the club mismanaged funds.
Part 2 – Analyze an Unknown Binary

Binary Details Summary

The following initial information related to the binary artifact is as follows:

Name of the program/file found on the system:
   Extracted sn.dat and sn.md5 from the zip file named sn.zip.

File/MACTime information (last modified, last accessed, and last create time):
   The artifact, sn.dat and the related MD5 sum information in a file called sn.md5 were received in a zip file. The only date associated with the artifact is a modified time stamp of 4/11/2002 09:29 AM displayed in the zip archive file. Due to the fact that the artifact was obtained in a zip file, there was no way to determine the last time the binary was accessed.

File owner(s) – (user and/or group):
   The artifact, sn.dat and the related MD5 sum information in a file called sn.md5 were received in a zip file. No owner or group information could be determined. However, this binary was determined to be a sniffer. For a sniffer program to run on a Linux system in promiscuous mode, it must be run as root.

File size (in bytes):
   399,124 bytes

MD5 hash of the file (the screen shot is printed later in this section):
   0e954f43fd73f56e812a7285f32ef1d3

Program Identification

After downloading the zip file and extracting sn.dat and sn.md5, the following steps were taken:
   • Verified that the MD5 sum of the downloaded sn.dat matched what was in sn.md5. The command used was: md5sum sn.dat.

   • The file command was used to try to determine the file type of the artifact, sn.dat. The actual command was: file sn.dat. The output of this command is shown below:

      sn.dat: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1, statically linked, stripped

The result of the file command showed that sn.dat was probably a Linux [LSB (Linux Standard Base)] 386 binary, statically linked (so no library dependencies were required) and it was stripped to remove comments.
**Strings Analysis**

The next step taken was to perform a strings analysis on sn.dat:

```
strings sn.dat > sn.strings
```

Viewed strings output with vi. Interesting clues:

```
\* The END \*/
priv 1.0
ADMsniff %s <device> [HEADERSIZE] [DEBUG]
ex : admsniff ie0
..ooOO The ADM Crew O0oo..
cant open pcap device :<
init_pcap : Unknown device type!
ADMsniff %s in libpcap we trust !
credits: ADM, mel , *pretty* for the mail she sent me
The_l0gz
```

"ADMsniff %s <device> [HEADERSIZE] [DEBUG]" appeared to be a usage string for an ADMsniff. "..ooOO The ADM Crew O0oo.. “ and the other references suggested that this, or part of this binary was ADMsniff by the ADM Crew.

Key words associated with this program were ADM, ADMsniff, Crew, priv 1.0, The_l0gz.

**Binary Duplication**

The following steps were taken:

- Downloaded ADMsniff from [http://adm.freelsd.net/ADM/](http://adm.freelsd.net/ADM/).

- Compiled ADMsniff with the Compression Log File Option (COMPFLAGS = -DCOMPRESS, COMPLIB = -lz) because it would be the most optimal way to operate a sniffer and a logical choice for the hacker to use. Log files, on a busy network can grow quickly. Someone who is trying to hide sniffer activity would wisely use compression on the log file to reduce exposure of the activity. The –static option was added to the CFLAGS section of the Makefile to statically link the libraries. This reduced potential problems of trying to run the program on a system that did not have the required libraries.

After compiling, the ADMsniff-1 the file size was 1,485,617 bytes. This was 1,086,493 bytes larger than sn.dat, which was 399,124 bytes. The output of the file command said that sn.dat was stripped, so this was also done on ADMsniff-1 and the file size was reduced to 389,912 bytes. This, however, was smaller than the artifact by 9,212 bytes.
Obviously, something was not the same. The “strings” command was used to compare the strings from sn.dat with those from the ADMsniff-1 binary.

Strings of the ADMsniff-1 file looked VERY much like those in the artifact. Much of the same information was in the strings output, but one noticeable difference was that the ADMsniff-1 file contained comments about compiling it with the Compression support. The sn.dat binary did not! The specific strings from the ADMsniff-1 binary are shown in blue below:

```
*--------*
\*       The END       */
priv 1.0
ADMsniff %s <device> [HEADERSIZE] [DEBUG]
ex : admsniff le0
..ooOO The ADM Crew OOoo..
cant open pcap device :<
init_pcap : Unknown device type!
ADMsniff %s in libpcap we trust !
credits: ADM, mel , ^pretty^ for the mail she sent me
You compiled ADMsniff with compression support, don't forget about the log flushing tricks (see README).
The
@(#) $Header: pcap-linux.c,v 1.15 97/10/02 22:39:37 leres Exp $ (LBL)
read: %s
SIOCGSTAMP: %s
malloc: %s
socket: %s
bind: %s: %s
SIOCGIFHWADDR: %s
unknown physical layer type 0x%x
SIOCGIFMTU: %s
SIOCGIFFLAGS: %s
SIOCSIFFLAGS: %s
linux socket: %s
linux SIOCSIFFLAGS: %s
@(#) $Header: savefile.c,v 1.37 97/10/15 21:58:58 leres Exp $ (LBL)
%s: %s
@(#) $Header: pcap.c,v 1.29 98/07/12 13:15:39 leres Exp $ (LBL)

The next step was to compile ADMsniff-1 without the logfile compression support. Recompiling without the compression and stripping the binary created ADMsniff-1 with a size of 346,128 bytes, which was 52,996 bytes smaller than the artifact. This was very close, but not the same, so a study of different compiling options was done to see if other compilations should be tried. The –g (debugging option) was used in another compilation to see if the byte sizes were any better. This didn’t produce any better results.

A careful review of the strings from both binaries could possibly provide some information as to what the differences were. This was performed by sorting and uniq’ing the strings of each binary. This output was then compared by using the UNIX “comm” utility.
The exact commands are listed below:

```
Sort sn.strings | uniq > sn.sort
Sort ADMsniff.strings | uniq > ADMsniff.sort
comm -3 SN.sort ADMsniff.sort
```

The following output was a small subset of the string differences only showing some of the more interesting differences. The indented (blue) strings were in ADMsniff.sort and the strings on the left side were in the artifact sn.sort.

Some of the more identifiable strings were noted (highlighted in bold) in case they could be used in future string searches of binaries. The ANSI references and some of the other strings appeared to be from libraries.

```
%a %b %e %H:%M:%S %Z %Y
ANSI_X3.4-1986// ANSI_X3.4-1968//
ANSI_X3.4// ANSI_X3.4-1968//
cannot load auxiliary '%s' because ofempty dynamic string token substitution
CP367// ANSI_X3.4-1968//
CSASCII// ANSI_X3.4-1968//
ELF file class not 32-bit
ELF file class not 64-bit
ELF file machine architecture does not match
```

```
Filters not supported with LD_TRACE_PRELINKING
```

```
glibc-ld.so.cache1.1
```

```
GNUC_nonoption_argv_flags_=
```

```
HOSTALIASES
IBM367// ANSI_X3.4-1968//
ISO_646.IRV:1991// ANSI_X3.4-1968//
ISO646-US// ANSI_X3.4-1968//
ISO-IR-6// ANSI_X3.4-1968//
LD_AOUT_LIBRARY_PATH
LD_AOUT_PRELOAD
LOCALDOMAIN
only ET_DYN and ET_EXEC can be loaded
RESOLV_HOST_CONF
```

Assuming that different libraries or library versions were used, ADMsniff was compiled on a different system running Redhat 7.2 using the 2.4.7-10 kernel. The Makefile was edited to use the “-static” option on the CFLAGS section to statically link the libraries. Log file compression was not used. After compiling, the binary was stripped, which produced an exact copy of the artifact, sn.dat, the same size and MD5 sum. Finally, it was confirmed that the artifact, sn.dat was indeed, ADMsniff-1!
MD5 sum values for SN.DAT and ADMsniff-1:

Program Description

As stated before, sn.dat and the related MD5 sum information in a file called sn.md5, were received in a zip file from the following URL: http://www.giac.org/gcfa/sn.zip. Due to the fact that the artifact was obtained in a zip file, there was no way to determine the last time it was used. Since the file was not on an actual system when it was obtained, no actual MAC times were available for the file. The only date associated with the artifact was a modified time stamp displayed in the zip file of 4/11/2002 at 09:29 AM.

Neither owner nor group information could be determined. However, for a sniffer program such as ADMsniff-1 to run on a Linux system in promiscuous mode, it must be run as root. This could be done by setting the SUID bit on the file, which would require that the file be owned by root. It could also be run directly by the root ID. The permission flags of sn.dat were not available from the zip archive file, so there was no way to know exactly how the program was set up to run. However, it must have had the execute bit set to run on the system.

The sole purpose of the sn.dat program was to gather TCP network packet data, specifically, when the source port or destination port matches one of the ports listed in a list that the author calls “coolports.” The actual services that usually run on these ports all use IDs and password authentication mechanisms. In other words, an ID and a password must be supplied in order to use the service. By logging the data packets from these ports, IP addresses, IDs and passwords can be obtained and used on the associated systems. The IP addresses listed in the log file used by sn.dat, must be investigated as leads to potentially compromised systems.
List of “coolports” used by ADMsniff:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port Number</th>
<th>Usual service provided on the port</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>FTP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Telnet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>pop-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>pop-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143</td>
<td>Imap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>512</td>
<td>Exec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>513</td>
<td>Login</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>514</td>
<td>Shell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1521</td>
<td>Oracle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31337</td>
<td>BackOrifice and many other hacker tools</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Forensic Details

Analysis of the ADMsniff-1 source code showed that when run, a log file called “The_l0gz” was created in the working directory of the user who started the program. This means that the user could be in an obscure directory when sn.dat was started. The whole system must be searched to find the log file(s). The user could have started and stopped sn.dat numerous times, placing the log file in different locations. On a live system, the “find” command could be used. On a forensic image, a “body” file, or better yet, a MAC timeline file could be grep’ed. Since sn.dat was compiled without log file compression, the log file would be readable using cat or vi.

If the artifact, sn.dat used shared libraries in any way, it would be important to know. Since an ADMsniff-1 was made to be an exact copy of sn.dat, it was used to evaluate interaction with shared libraries. To verify that ADMsniff-1 did not use dynamically linked libraries, the gdb debugging tool was used. ADMsniff-1 was first compiled with the –g and –static options to support debugging statically linked libraries. After compilation, the program was not stripped. Gdb was started and the file to run was specified at the gdb prompt using the command “file ADMsniff-1.” ADMsniff-1 required an interface name as an argument. This was specified using the command, “set args eth0.” The command, “show confirm” was then issued to confirm potentially dangerous operations. A breakpoint at the function “main” was set up using the command “break main.” The program was then run using the command “run,” which started ADMsniff-1 and stopped it at the break point, main(). The command “info functions” was then used to see what functions were loaded into memory. This clearly showed all the library functions and files that were incorporated into ADMsniff-1 at compile time. The command “show sources” was also very helpful in displaying similar information. To verify that no shared libraries were loaded, the command “info sharedlibrary” was run, which stated “No shared libraries loaded at this time.” To be 100 percent sure that this meant no shared libraries were used, the ADMsniff-1 program was recompiled using shared libraries (without the –static option).
The exact same procedure was followed and when the command “info sharedlibrary” was run, it stated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Syms Read</th>
<th>Shared Object Library</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x40020000</td>
<td>0x4002d330</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>/usr/lib/libz.so.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4002e000</td>
<td>0x401522e8</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>/lib/libc.so.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x40000000</td>
<td>0x40016c50</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>/lib/ld-linux.so.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The tests with the gdb debugger confirmed that ADMsniff-1 did not interact with or modify any system files including shared libraries.

**Legal Issues**

There is no administrative reason to have ADMsniff running. It was designed to gather data specifically to help a “hacker” gain entry into systems. It is also important to note that the artifact was named sn.dat, not ADMsniff-1, the default name used when compiling the program. This suggested some attempt was made to hide the true nature of the sniffer program.

**Proof that ADMsniff was run**

If proof was obtained that the artifact was run, for example, a snapshot of the process table (ps) or the actual log file, “The_l0gz” with associated MAC times was collected as evidence, then this proof could be used in court to possibly prosecute under both federal and state laws.


This law discusses issues (all of which may pertain to the activity surrounding the use of ADMsniff) such as:

1. **Exceeding authorized access**
   The user gained access to the system to run sn.dat. More than likely, this would have been unauthorized access and punishable by law.

2. **Causing loss or damage**
   Damage could be caused by running sn.dat. This could be the filling up of partitions because the log file grew so large, or someone else may have found and used the program as well to cause other damage.

3. **Reckless disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk from the action**
   If the hacker was an outsider (no authority to access)
The hacker may not have intended to cause problems with the use of the program, but the process of placing the program on the system and using it without thought of the consequences could be proved reckless.

4. Negligent conduct if the hacker was an outsider (no authority to access)
   The hacker could possibly be charged with negligent conduct because the use of a tool like sn.dat, even if its purpose was unknown to the hacker, would be negligent action.

5. Causing the loss of $5,000 or more within a 1 year period
   The costs of forensic investigation of the system running sn.dat and all the systems possibly identified in log files, along with the clean-up or restoring from backups could possibly cost $5,000 or more. If the cost was not at least $5,000 dollars, legal charges would not be filed.

6. Traffics in any password or similar information
   Finally, the hacker may have shared ID and password information, thus adding on another charge.


A unauthorized, non employee, hacker caught running sn.dat would definitely be charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2511 because there are no exceptions that could apply. If the hacker was an employee or had other legal permission for being on the system, then certain exceptions may apply.


Similar to the Wiretap Act, if the hacker did not have legal access to the system, they may also be charged under the ECPA.

Note that the Wiretap Act has many exceptions that allow use of sniffers and must be taken into account when reviewing the actions and intent of someone using sniffers such as ADMsniff. Particulary, if the hacker had legal access to the system, three key exceptions that may apply in this case are:

- The Consent Exception, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(c), and
The (ECPA) also has exceptions which must also be taken into account, but do not appear as directly related in this case.

Florida law also has statutes, which would apply and also has exceptions to be addressed. It is available under chapter 934 at:
http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?mode=View%20Statutes&SubMenu=1&App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=CH0934/Ch0934.HTM

No Proof that ADMsniff was run

Without proof that ADMsniff was run on the system the hacker could still be prosecuted, depending on the circumstances, under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 available at:

This law discusses the following:
1. Exceeding authorized access
   Even though the program was not run, the hacker had to gain access to the system, which in itself, is possibly illegal.

2. Causing loss or damage
   Though it is not likely in the case of sn.dat, it might have been possible for the hacker to have caused damage in the process of implementing the program.

3. Reckless disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk from the action if the hacker was an outsider (no authority to access)
   Once again, the attempt to install a program such as sn.dat is likely to fall under reckless disregard of the risks involved in this action.

4. Negligent conduct if the hacker was an outsider (no authority to access)
   Even if the hacker did not know the purpose of the sn.dat program, the attempt to install the program could be viewed as negligent conduct.

5. Causing the loss of $5,000 or more within a 1 year period
   It may be hard to imagine that the installation of the sn.dat program could cause $5,000 in damage if the program was not used. However, a fair amount of investigation may need to performed to determine that the program was not used. This could be costly.

Employee use of ADMsniff

If the person who installed ADMsniff was an employee and no laws were broken, then the company would have to handle the case according to company policy. In our
company, the policy documentation clearly allows “monitoring” by system or network administrators under certain conditions.

Sanitized excerpts of the corporate policy that permits monitoring is shown below:

Audit section:

…..as well as session and network activity, is critical in preventing and detecting intrusions that could disrupt business operations on Company networks. This monitoring process also allows administrators to retrace an intruder’s activity and may help correct any damage caused by the intrusion.

Network Administration section:

Network administrators who monitor data traffic as part of an assigned job responsibility are not to disclose the content of that traffic to anyone who is not authorized to have it.

Banners are also used extensively in the company, which explicitly state that monitoring is performed for administrative and security reasons. An example is shown below:

  Warning:  This system is restricted to “Company Name” authorized users for business purposes. Unauthorized access is a violation of the law. This service may be monitored for administrative and security reasons. By proceeding, you consent to this monitoring.

If the person who installed ADMsniff was not allowed to, per job function, the company could administer appropriate punishment. In this case, ADMsniff is not a very useful tool for most administrative purposes. An employee would have a difficult time arguing that it was used for a valid purpose.

Interview Questions

During an interview with the person suspected of installing and running sn.dat, the following questions might lead to proof of culpability.

1. How did you manage to identify where the network problems were coming from? The suspect may divulge information only the actual user of ADMsniff would know.

2. Do you have a favorite sniffer utility? The suspect may mention ADMsniff.

3. Do you know what kind of sniffers hackers use? The suspect may mention ADMsniff which would be suspicious, since there are so many sniffer utilities available on the Internet. Any mention of ADMsniff would be warrant further questioning.
4. How did you know that running this program would not adversely affect the system? The suspect may divulge information about the log file: “The_l0gz.”

5. What file contains the information you used to evaluate the network problems? The suspect may divulge information about the log file: “The_l0gz.”

6. When were you last on the computer and what did you do? The suspect may provide information which gives clues as to IDs and times the person was on the system, thus placing the person on the system at specific dates and times that could possibly correlate to the use of ADMsniff.

7. Have you downloaded any files from the Internet recently? What were they? The suspect may divulge incriminating information.

8. Do you have any idea what this sn.dat file is and would it be safe to run? The suspect may divulge information that only the actual user of ADMsniff would know.

Additional Information

For additional information the reader may wish to access the following sites:

- ADMsniff available at: http://adm.freelsd.net/ADM/

Summary

In cases where artifacts are found on systems, the only way to truly know the exact nature of the actions performed by the hacker, is to know exactly what the programs in question do. In the example provided for this exercise, proper binary analysis identified the artifact as a sniffer, which used log files to store captured ID and password data. This fact would automatically lead one to look for other compromised systems in the
likelihood that the hacker used the authentication information to further exploit the environment. Had the binary analysis not been performed, the intent and methodology of the hacker may not have been realized and compromised systems may not have been identified.
Part 3 – Legal Issues of Incident Handling – Wiretap Statute

This section is a discussion of federal law, definitions of the word “incident,” the use of banners, the 2001 Patriot’s Act, and state law related to the monitoring of network traffic. Every time a network analyzer or “sniffer” tool is used, the Wiretap Statute governs their legal use. Misuse could have dire consequences.

Federal Law

The wiretap statute, Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 covers real-time interception of electronic communications. When system administrators monitor network communications with sniffers, this federal law (as well as related state laws) govern them.

The federal law, available at: [http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/usc2511.htm](http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/usc2511.htm) states that unless an exception applies, the interception of electronic communication is illegal. Excerpts from the law are as follows:

**Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibited**

(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who—

(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication;

The law also explains that disclosing information knowingly obtained through interception of electronic communication is illegal, again, unless an exception applies. Subsections (c), (d), and (e) of this same section 1 of the law says that anyone who:

(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection;

(d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection;

(e) (i) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, intercepted by means authorized by sections 2511(2)(a)(ii), 2511(2)(b) to (c), 2511(2)(e), 2516, and 2518 of this chapter, (ii) knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of such a communication in connection with a criminal investigation, (iii) having obtained or received the information in connection with a criminal investigation, and (iv) with intent to improperly obstruct, impede, or
interfere with a duly authorized criminal investigation, shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) or shall be subject to suit as provided in subsection (5).

It must be noted that for those in positions as system administrators, certain exceptions do apply! Section 2 of this law, subsection (a) says:

(2) (a)

(i) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or an officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication service, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service, except that a provider of wire communication service to the public shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring except for mechanical or service quality control checks.

It is very important to note the conditions in which the exceptions apply. The defining words that are used are: “to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service.” This means that there must be a specific reason to intercept and/or use intercepted data. This reason must be related to a necessary incident pertaining to a service or in order to “protect” rights or property. In particular, this language permits interception and disclosure during the ordinary course of business when the interception is unavoidable. The example given in the SANS Institute Track 8.4 course text is a switchboard operator or a repairman hearing snippets of conversation during normal operations. This would suggest that a system administrator would see snippets of intercepted electronic communications during normal maintenance or repair work.

Definitions of the Word “Incident”

It would be useful to discuss the meaning of the word “incident.” The word “incident” is defined by the online Merriam-Webster dictionary available at: http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary as:

Main Entry: 1'in-ci-dent
Pronunciation: 'in(t)-s&d&nt, -"dent
Function: noun
Etymology: Middle English, from Middle French, from Medieval Latin incident-, incidens, from Latin, present participle of incidere to fall into, from in- + cadere to
fall -- more at CHANCE
Date: 15th century
1: something dependent on or subordinate to something else of greater or principal importance
2a: an occurrence of an action or situation that is a separate unit of experience:
HAPPENING b: an accompanying minor occurrence or condition:
CONCOMITANT
3: an action likely to lead to grave consequences especially in diplomatic matters:<a serious border incident>

It is the definition “2a” above that applies the best to what is discussed in this paper. The only computer related definition of “incident” is from the CERT web site available at: http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/incident_reporting.html#1.A, which states:

The CERT/CC’s incident definition
The CERT Coordination Center is interested in receiving reports of security incidents involving the Internet. A good but fairly general definition of an incident is:

The act of violating an explicit or implied security policy.

Unfortunately, this definition relies on the existence of a security policy that, while generally understood, varies between organizations. We have attempted to characterize below the types of activity we believe are widely recognized as being in violation of a typical security policy. These activities include but are not limited to:

- attempts (either failed or successful) to gain unauthorized access to a system or its data
- unwanted disruption or denial of service
- the unauthorized use of a system for the processing or storage of data
- changes to system hardware, firmware, or software characteristics without the owner’s knowledge, instruction, or consent

Naturally, there are a wide variety of “incidents” that might occur on a network or in a computer that could warrant the use of interception of electronic communication to obtain information important to resolution. For example, network congestion, performance analysis, network tuning and statistical reporting are some of the many valid “incidents.” It should be kept in mind, however, that in court a prosecutor might challenge the definition of the word “incident.” Basically, the wording means that the “provider exception 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(a)(i), does not permit providers to perform unlimited monitoring. Monitoring must be tailored to minimize the interception and disclosure of private communications unrelated to the investigation.
The Use of Banners

Many companies use a technique called a “banner” to notify users of the legal implications related to the use of various computer services. Typically, a banner is displayed to the user, and the user is required to validate that the messages was seen by pressing the enter key. It is usually a message which specifically states that constant monitoring can be performed for administrative and security reasons. The banner advises the user that by proceeding, the user is consenting to this monitoring, and the user has given permission to be monitored.

This situation is covered under the “consent” exception in the federal law 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(c) available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/usc2511.htm, which states:

(2)

(c) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.

The use of banners provides expanded abilities for authorized system administrators and security specialists to monitor network and system activity. The use of these banners comes with some technical difficulties, which must be considered. Specifically, difficulties relate to the ability to place banners on all appropriate ports and services. There are 65,535 TCP ports and another 65,535 UDP ports. Technically and logistically, it is impossible to place banners on all these ports.

For example, the REXECD service listens on port 512. It would be difficult to place a banner on this service and even more difficult to require acknowledgment. Therefore, if this was the only means by which a hacker accessed a system, it could possibly be argued that no banner was seen and that access to the system was “open to the public.” This could raise related legal questions and should be evaluated with corporate attorneys.

The 2001 Patriot’s Act

The new 2001 USA Patriot’s Act, which was passed in the fall of 2001, expanded federal law 18 U.S.C. § 2511 to include SEC. 217. Interception of Computer Trespasser Communications. It is available at: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c107:1.:/temp/~c1073E99HG:e64245:

The section deals with what is termed a “computer trespasser” and states:

Chapter 119 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--

'(21) ‘computer trespasser'--
¨(A) means a person who accesses a protected computer without authorization and thus has no reasonable expectation of privacy in any communication transmitted to, through, or from the protected computer; and

¨(B) does not include a person known by the owner or operator of the protected computer to have an existing contractual relationship with the owner or operator of the protected computer for access to all or part of the protected computer.¨

Therefore, a system administrator may monitor all activity related to a “trespasser.” Law enforcement may also be called in to assist in this activity.

18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(i) further states:

¨(i) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to intercept the wire or electronic communications of a computer trespasser transmitted to, through, or from the protected computer, if--

¨(I) the owner or operator of the protected computer authorizes the interception of the computer trespasser's communications on the protected computer;

¨(II) the person acting under color of law is lawfully engaged in an investigation;

¨(III) the person acting under color of law has reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of the computer trespasser's communications will be relevant to the investigation; and

¨(IV) such interception does not acquire communications other than those transmitted to or from the computer trespasser.¨

State Law

In addition to the federal laws, systems administrators must be sure that their activity complies with state laws. In the state of Florida, for example, the laws that apply are under chapter 934. These laws read very much like the federal laws as shown by descriptions of two of the exception clauses displayed below from 934.03 available at: http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?mode=View%20Statutes&SubMenu=1&app_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=CH0934/Ch0934.HTM

(2)(a)1. It is lawful under ss. 934.03 - 934.09 for an operator of a switchboard, or an officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication service whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of his or her employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his or her service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service, except that a provider of wire
communication service to the public shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring except for mechanical or service quality control checks.

(d) It is lawful under ss. 934.03 - 934.09 for a person to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication when all of the parties to the communication have given prior consent to such interception.

Summary

Administrators definitely need tools such as network sniffers to help debug network problems and to ensure that systems are operating correctly. This being said, it becomes the responsibility of each administrator to understand when it is legal to use these tools. Sniffing on the wrong network interface could easily be an illegal act. The same applies to constant or long term network monitoring. It is recommended that system administrators do not share private information that they obtain through monitoring. They should only perform network monitoring with sniffers when absolutely necessary. The interpretation of the specific wording or meaning of many laws is often challenging to understand and frequently argued in court. It, therefore, behooves administrators to seek legal counsel when questionable situations arise. By doing so, system administrators would reduce their exposure to potentially breaking the law.
List of References

PART 1:
GIAC Certified Forensic Analyst (GCFA) Practical Assignment Version 1.0:
http://www.giac.org/GCFA_assignment.php

Windows OS version available at:
http://www.theosfiles.com/os_windows/ospg_w95.htm

WM/CONCEPT.AJ Virus available at:
http://vil.mcafee.com/dispVirus.asp?virus_k=9931

How the Recycle Bin Stores Files (Q136517) available at:
http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;EN-US;q136517

Windows 95 Y2K available at:
http://www.microsoft.com/windows/downloads/bin/w95/y2kw95.txt

PART 2:
Assignment files sn.dat and sn.md5 available in a zip file at:
http://www.giac.org/gcfa/sn.zip

ADMsniff available at:
http://adm.freelsd.net/ADM/

Federal Law 1030 available at:
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/1030_new.html

Federal Law 2511 available at:
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/usc2511.htm

Federal Law 2701 available at:
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/usc2701.htm

Florida State Law available at:
http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?mode=View%20Statutes&SubMenu=1&App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=CH0934/Ch0934.HTM

PART 3:
Federal Law 2511 available at:
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/usc2511.htm

SANS Institute Track 8.4 Textbook:

Definition of Incident available at:
http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary

Computer Related Definition of Incident available at:
http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/incident_reporting.html#I.A

2001 Patriot’s Act available at:
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c107:1:./temp/~c107E99HG:e64245:

Florida State Law available at:
http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?mode=View%20Statutes&SubMenu=1&App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=CH0934/Ch0934.HTM
Appendix A: Windows 95 file attribute tests

In order to understand and correlate the behavior of MAC times in the fat16 filesystem and Windows 95, a test system was created by installing Windows 95 and performing some tests creating and deleting files. The table below shows various steps at various times and one can see how Windows 95 and the file system behave during these operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME STAMP</th>
<th>FILE ACTIVITY</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 08 2002 17:28:00</td>
<td>May 08 2002 17:28:00 268 m. -rwxrwxrwx 897542 /WINDOWS/STARTM-1/PROGRAMS/ACCESS-1/Notepad .lnk (NOTEPAD.LNK)</td>
<td>5/8/02 Started NotePad at 17:28:00 PM EDT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 08 2002 17:29:00</td>
<td>May 08 2002 17:29:00 245 ..c -rwxrwxrwx 2509322 /WINDOWS/RECENT/testfile2.txt (TESTFI<del>1.LNK) (TESTFI</del>1.TXT)</td>
<td>5/8/02 Saved testfile2.txt at 17:29:00 PM EDT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 08 2002 17:29:02</td>
<td>May 08 2002 17:29:02 52 ..c -rwxrwxrwx 23 /testfile2.txt (TESTFI~1.TXT)</td>
<td>5/8/02 Related activity to saving testfile2.txt at 17:29:00 PM EDT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 08 2002 17:30:00</td>
<td>May 08 2002 17:30:00 245 ..c -rwxrwxrwx 2509322 /WINDOWS/RECENT/testfile2.txt (TESTFI<del>1.LNK) (TESTFI</del>1.TXT)</td>
<td>5/8/02 Related activity to saving testfile2.txt at 17:29:00 PM EDT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 08 2002 17:30:02</td>
<td>May 08 2002 17:30:02 61 ..c -rwxrwxrwx 25 /testfile3.txt (_ESTFI~2.TXT) (deleted)</td>
<td>5/8/02 Saved testfile3.txt at 17:30:00 PM EDT (To delete later)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Note: On 5/9/02, testfile3.txt was deleted to the recycle bin at 11:36:00 AM EDT, BEFORE THIS IMAGE WAS TAKEN ON 5/9/02 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NOTE: There is no way of knowing when the file was deleted. It was actually deleted on 5/9/02 at 11:36 (To the recycle bin) and 11:37 deleted from the recycle bin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5/8/02 Related activity to saving testfile3.txt at 17:30:00 PM EDT Note Link created here.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5/9/02 Deleted testfile3.txt to recycle bin at 11:36:00 AM EDT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5/9/02 Emptied recycle bin at 11:37:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Related activity to deleting file to recycle bin at 11:36:00 AM EDT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 08 2002 17:30:04</td>
<td>May 08 2002 17:30:04 61 ..c -rwxrwxrwx 25 /testfile3.txt (_ESTFI~2.TXT-dead-25&gt;</td>
<td>Related activity to deleting file to recycle bin at 11:36:00 AM EDT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Related activity to deleting file to recycle bin at 11:36:00 AM EDT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Related activity to deleting file to recycle bin at 11:36:00 AM EDT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 08 2002 17:34:00</td>
<td>May 08 2002 17:34:00</td>
<td>1..c-./rwxwxwx 1542&lt;br&gt;&lt;testwin95的形象_S3401.TMP-dead-1542&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 08 2002 17:34:02</td>
<td>May 08 2002 17:34:02</td>
<td>1..c-./rwxwxwx 1542&lt;br&gt;&lt;testwin95的形象_S3401.TMP-dead-1542&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 09 2002 00:00:00</td>
<td>May 09 2002 00:00:00</td>
<td>271..a-./rwxwxwx 2509318&lt;br&gt;/WINDOWS/RECENT/Readme.lnk (README.LNK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 09 2002 11:36:00</td>
<td>May 09 2002 11:36:00</td>
<td>300..a-./r-x-x-r-x 256520&lt;br&gt;/RECYCLED/_INFO (deleted)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 09 2002 11:37:00</td>
<td>May 09 2002 11:37:00</td>
<td>65..c-./r-x-x-r-x 256518&lt;br&gt;/RECYCLED/_INFO (deleted)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 09 2002 11:37:06</td>
<td>May 09 2002 11:37:06</td>
<td>65..c-./r-x-x-r-x 256518&lt;br&gt;/RECYCLED/desktop.ini (DESKTOP.INI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 09 2002 11:39:52</td>
<td>May 09 2002 11:39:52</td>
<td>83682..m-./r-x-x-r-x 409219&lt;br&gt;/WINDOWS/ShellIconCache (SHELL1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B: Y2K Windows 95 Issues

This document on the Microsoft Web site, discusses issues relating to Y2K problems and patches for Windows 95.

The complete document is available at:
http://www.microsoft.com/windows/downloads/bin/w95/y2kw95.txt

The following information is just the highlights of the document, which explains the Y2K issues with Windows 95.

The issues listed below are resolved by installing this Update.

1. Find "File or Folders" Dialog (shell32.dll)
2. Windows File Manager (winfile.exe)
3. Command Interpreter (command.com)
4. Date/Time Picker (comctl32.dll).
5. Phone Dialer applet (dialer.exe)
6. Time and Date Control Panel applet (timedate.cpl)
7. DHCP Virtual Driver (vdhcp.386)
8. Microsoft Foundation Class Library file (mfc40.dll)
9. DOS Xcopy (xcopy.exe, xcopy32.exe)
10. Microsoft Run Time Library file (msvcr40.dll)
11. OLE AUTOMATION (oleaut32.dll, olepro32.dll, stdole2.tlb, asycfilt.dll)
## Upcoming SANS Forensics Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Platform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SANS Brussels April Live Online 2020</strong></td>
<td>Brussels, Belgium</td>
<td>Apr 20, 2020 - Apr 25, 2020</td>
<td>CyberCon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SANS London April Live Online 2020</strong></td>
<td>London, United Kingdom</td>
<td>Apr 20, 2020 - Apr 25, 2020</td>
<td>CyberCon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructor-Led Training</td>
<td>Apr 27</td>
<td>Baltimore, MD</td>
<td>Apr 27, 2020 - May 02, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructor-Led Training</td>
<td>May 4</td>
<td></td>
<td>May 04, 2020 - May 09, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live Online - FOR500: Windows Forensic Analysis</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>May 06, 2020 - Jun 12, 2020</td>
<td>vLive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANS Security West 2020</td>
<td>San Diego, CA</td>
<td>May 11, 2020 - May 16, 2020</td>
<td>CyberCon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong SE Asia Live Online 2020</td>
<td>Hong Kong, Hong Kong</td>
<td>May 11, 2020 - May 22, 2020</td>
<td>CyberCon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructor-Led Training</td>
<td>Mid-May</td>
<td>Alexandria, VA</td>
<td>May 17, 2020 - May 22, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autumn Australia Live Online 2020</td>
<td>Sydney, Australia</td>
<td>May 18, 2020 - May 29, 2020</td>
<td>CyberCon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live Online - FOR508: Advanced Incident Response, Threat Hunting, and Digital Forensics</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>May 19, 2020 - Jun 06, 2020</td>
<td>vLive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live Online - FOR578: Cyber Threat Intelligence</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>May 27, 2020 - Jun 26, 2020</td>
<td>vLive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructor-Led Training</td>
<td>Jun 1</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>Jun 01, 2020 - Jun 06, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANSFIRE 2020</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Jun 13, 2020 - Jun 20, 2020</td>
<td>CyberCon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANS Asia Pacific Live Online 2020</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Jun 22, 2020 - Jun 27, 2020</td>
<td>CyberCon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber Defence Australia Online 2020</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Jun 22, 2020 - Jul 04, 2020</td>
<td>CyberCon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFIR Summit &amp; Training 2020</td>
<td>Virtual - US Eastern,</td>
<td>Jul 16, 2020 - Jul 25, 2020</td>
<td>CyberCon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructor-Led Training</td>
<td>Jul 27</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>Jul 27, 2020 - Aug 01, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live Online - FOR578: Cyber Threat Intelligence</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>Jul 28, 2020 - Aug 27, 2020</td>
<td>vLive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructor-Led Training</td>
<td>Aug 3 MT</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Aug 03, 2020 - Aug 08, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South by Southeast Asia Online 2020</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Aug 03, 2020 - Aug 08, 2020</td>
<td>CyberCon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>