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Forensic Analysis of a USB Flash Drive

GIAC Certified Forensic Analyst (GCFA)
Practical Assignment Version 2.0 (November 18, 2004)

Option 1 – Analyse an image provided to you from this web site

SANS Canberra, Australia – 18th to 23rd October 2004

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Abstract

This assignment intends to show the methodology and tools used to forensically examine a file system image, in relation to an investigation as to the claims of a Leila Conlay, against a Robert Lawrence. During the course of the forensic examination we will show how the chain of custody of evidence is kept, what evidence is discovered on the file system image, identify and examine what computer programs may have been used, and piece together the steps that Robert Lawrence may have taken, in order to prove or disprove the claims made against Robert Lawrence. The results of this investigation will then be used to determine what offences Robert Lawrence may have committed according to the Australian Commonwealth (Federal) and NSW State laws, and provide a summary of this information for jury to examine and understand.
Executive Summary

On Friday 29th October 2004, Leila Conlay contacted the security department of CC Terminals after an incident the previous evening on the 28th October, where she had been meeting with an associate Sam Guarillo at the Starbucks Coffee shop on the corner of McCadden and Hollywood at 7:00 pm, where the altercation with Robert Lawrence took place.

Leila Conlay informed the security department that she also had been receiving emails (electronic letters) from Robert Lawrence to her personal email address prior to the incident.

Mark Mawer from CC Terminals discovered a USB flash drive (a USB flash drive is a device that can be connected to a computer for storing information) at Robert Lawrence’s desk on the evening of the 29th, which he thought may have some information on it relating to Leila Conlay’s claim.

Mr Mawer had provided us with an image of this USB device for examination – when we say image, we mean a copy of the information that was on the storage device.

To be sure the copy of the information we received was not tampered with prior to receiving it, Mark Mawer provided us with integrity check information, which we used to confirm that we did indeed receive the same copy of the information that Mr Mawer had taken from the USB flash drive found at Mr Lawrence’s desk.

On examination of the information, we found three documents that were authored by Mr Lawrence. These documents appear to be authored in the style or format that one would normally used when sending a letter or an email.

Two of these documents were created on the 25th and 26th October, around the time of Leila Conlay’s claim of receiving emails prior to the incident of October 28th. These two documents both contain what one could interpret as advances towards Leila Conlay, asking to meet with her. The third was created on the 28th October after the incident had occurred, and indicates the fact that Mr Lawrence was at the coffee shop on Thursday 28th October. This last document also contains threatening connotations in regarding the physical harm of Leila Conlay. Having sent this document alone to Leila Conlay would constitute an offence under Part 3, Division 4, section 31 of the NSW Crimes Act 1900 of Documents containing threats.

Other information was also recovered from the USB flash drive which had been deleted – a computer program or software known as “windump”, some information generated by this program and a map showing the location of the coffee shop.
Executive Summary

The “windump” program can be used to listen and record communications or messages sent from one computer to another and vice versa. Generally a communication is directed from the sending computer and addressed to a specific receiving computer, other computers may see this message but will ignore it as it is not addressed to them. The “windump” program however allows the person using a computer to examine and record the information in the communications which are not directed to their own computer.

The information which such a “windump” program generated was also recovered, and provides evidence that Mr Lawrence used the “windump” program to record the personal email Leila Conlay was sending without her knowledge, specifically in this instance, the case of meeting her associate Sam Guarillo at the coffee shop on the day, place and time the incident occurred.

The map recovered is similar to that one would find in a street directory. It has a key marked on it, indicating the location of the corner of McCadden and Hollywood – the location of the coffee shop.

The sequence of events, shown by the dates and times recorded when each piece of information found on the USB flash drive was created or used, indicate that Mr Lawrence used the “windump” program to record Leila Conlay’s email, then after reading the email, proceeded to find out how to get to the coffee shop by obtaining a street directory map of it’s location, prior to actually going to the coffee shop at the time of the incident.

The information found to be on the USB flash drive support Leila Conlay’s claims that she was being harassed by Mr Lawrence. Under the laws of Australia, Mr Lawrence may be found guilty of sexual harassment under Part 2A section 22B of the NSW Anti-Discrimination Act and of the offence of stalking under the Part 15A, Division 1, section 562AB, subsection 6 of the NSW Crimes Act 1900.

Having used the “windump” computer program to obtain personal information without Leila Conlay’s consent, with the intention of harassing and stalking her, would constitute an offence against section 308C of the NSW Crimes Act 1900 (NSW State law) – unauthorised access to information with the intent of committing an offence. It would also constitute an offence against section 7(1) of the Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 – the interception of a communication with out the knowledge of the parties communicating.

Having possession of the “windump” program with the intent to use it to gain unauthorised access also constitutes an offence against section 308F of the NSW Crimes Act 1900 (Nsw State law) – the possession of a program or software with intent to commit a computer offence.
Examination Details

The following chain of custody details were provided to us by Mark Mawer:

Tag #: USBFD064531026-RL-001
Description: 64M Lexar Media Jump Drive
Serial #: JDSP064-04-5000C
Image: USBFD064531026-RL-001.img
MD5: 338ecf17b7fc85b5b2d5ae2bbc729dd5

From the chain of custody details provided by Mark Mawer, the first step was to ensure that the image we received was the same as that which Mark Mawer had created. To do this we compared the MD5 checksum given to us by Mark Mawer with the MD5 checksum of the image we were given to ensure they were both the same. For this we used the “md5sum” command.

As we can see the checksum of the image we received is 338ecf17b7fc85b5b2d5ae2bbc729dd5 which is the same as that provided to us by Mark Mawer, which means our image is the same as that of the original taken by Mark Mawer.

The next step was to see the type of file the image was of, here we use the “file” command.

Here we see that the image file “USBFD064531026-RL-001.img” is an “x86 boot sector”. This tells us that the image file contains partitions.

To examine what partition information may be in the image, we can use the “mmls” command. (Carrier, The SleuthKit Informer – Issue 12 – Splitting the Disk with mmls) This provides us with details about the size and positions of the partitions.
Examination Details

[Command Output]
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# mmls -t dos USBFD-64531026-RL-001.img
DOS Partition Table
Units are in 512-byte sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Slot</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00:</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>0000000000</td>
<td>0000000000</td>
<td>Primary Table (#0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01:</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>0000000001</td>
<td>0000000031</td>
<td>Unallocated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02:</td>
<td>00:00</td>
<td>0000000032</td>
<td>0000121950</td>
<td>DOS FAT16 (0x04)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3 – Partition information on USB device image

From the “mmls” output we can see that there is a DOS FAT16 partition which starts at unit 32 from the beginning of the image file, and is a length of 121919 units, where each unit is a 512 byte sector.

Using this information we can now extract the file system image from the USB flash drive image.

To extract the image, we can use the “dd” command, specifying the block size as 512 bytes, the number of blocks to skip as 32 and a count of 121919 blocks.

[Command Output]
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# dd if=USBFD-64531026-RL-001.img bs=512 skip=32 count=121919 of=dos.img
121919+0 records in
121919+0 records out

Figure 4 – FAT 16 partition extraction from USB device image

We now have an image of the FAT16 file system from the USB flash drive image.

If we run an “ls” on the image we can check the size of the file – it shows 62422528 bytes which when divided by 512 is 121919 – the number of blocks we specified for the count in the “dd” command.

Running the “file” command against this new image shows us that the image is of a FAT16 file system and gives us some drive geometry.
In examining the details returned by the “file” command – specifically the OEM-ID which is returned as “MSWIN4.1”, a web search via http://www.google.com.au/ returned the following interesting sites.


From the Microsoft web site, the OEM-ID is “a string of characters that identifies the name and version number of the operating system that formatted the volume.” An OEM-ID of “MSWIN4.1” tells us the USB Flash memory stick was formatted with Windows 95 OEM Service Release 2 (OSR2), Windows 98, or Windows Me. (Microsoft Corporation, Boot Sectors on MBR Disks). As there is no USB support for Windows 95, the operating system which formatted the USB Flash drive must be Windows 98 or Windows Me. Looking at Lexar Jump Drives in general however, this is their default factory formatting anyway so it does not provide us with any indication of the computer being used by Mr. Lawrence.

We can run the “md5sum” command against this new image, and record it’s value, so that if we pass these files along to someone else, we will have details for the chain of custody that can be used to verify the files someone else may receive are the same as the original file we created.

The MD5 checksum of the file “dos.img” which we have created is 5f839a763e2144483f78113a8844ad52. We can also use this MD5 checksum to ensure we haven’t damaged or modified the image while we were examining it – especially in the case where we may mount the image as a file system.

Alternatively we could have used the “dcfldd” command to extract the file system image and at the same time generate a hash value for the extracted image.

At this point we can move in two directions – we can mount the image of the file system and examine the contents which are available or we can further examine
the image file we have generated.

We now have an image of the FAT16 file system from the USB Flash drive. We can now mount this image with the "mount" command. We need to ensure that we do not make any modifications, so we need to mount the file system in read only mode, and have also selected the "noexec" and "noatime" options.

```bash
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# mount -o loop,ro,noexec,noatime -t msdos dos.img /images/Assignment/windows_mount/
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# ls -al windows_mount
 total 80
 drwxr-xr-x  2 root  root  16384 Jan 1 1970 .
 drwxr-xr-x 25 root  root  4096 Mar 12 06:37 ..
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root  root  19968 Oct 28 2004 coffee.doc
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root  root  19968 Oct 25 2004 her.doc
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root  root  19968 Oct 26 2004 hey.doc
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]#
```

Figure 7 – mounting FAT partition which was extracted

Once we have mounted the image we can examine what is on the disk. Using the "ls" command for the top level directory of the mounted file system, we can see that there appear to be three documents – "coffee.doc", "her.doc" and "hey.doc". This at least shows us there are files still on the USB Flash drive which have not been deleted.

As we can also see from the "ls" output, the dates of the files are 28th October 2004, 25th October 2004 and 26th October 2004 respectively. These dates correspond to around the time of the incident which prompted Leila Conlay to contact Corporate Security at CC Terminals.

If we run "fsstat" on the file system image, we can see that there are three files listed as existing – each having the same size, which corresponds to what we saw in the output of the "ls" command on the mounted file system.

```bash
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# fsstat -f fat16 dos.img
FILE SYSTEM INFORMATION
--------------------------------------------
File System Type: FAT
OEM Name: MSWIN4.1
Volume ID: 0x0
Volume Label (Boot Sector): NO NAME
Volume Label (Root Directory): 
File System Type Label: FAT16
Sectors before file system: 32
File System Layout (in sectors)
Total Range: 0 - 121918
  * Reserved: 0 - 0
  ** Boot Sector: 0
  * FAT 0: 1 - 239
  * FAT 1: 240 - 478
  * Data Area: 479 - 121918
  ** Root Directory: 479 - 510
  ** Cluster Area: 511 - 121918
```
Though the output shows 40 sectors, 39 are actually used. If we take the first file from the fsstat output sector 550 – 511 = 39 (+1 to include sector 511) = 40 sectors. With a sector size of 512 bytes, 40 * 512 = 20480 bytes, but the file sizes are 19968 bytes – which is the size shown the “ls” output. Dividing 19968 by 512 gives us 39 sectors – so why does “fsstat” say 40. This is because FAT16 has slack space, and the cluster size is 1024 with 2 sectors per cluster. So the number of clusters used is 39 sectors / 2 sectors per cluster = 19.5 clusters. As we can’t have a partial cluster – 20 clusters are used. 20 clusters * 2 sectors per clusters results in the 40 sectors for each file shown, so the extra sector for the last cluster is just slack space.

We can see if there is any file layer information about deleted files in our file system image by running the “fls” command.

The output of the “fls” command which was run with the options to recurse the directories and show path information, shows that there are 7 files which has been deleted, and 3 files which still exist – which relate to the three files we found earlier.

If there had not been any information at the file system layer about the deleted files, we could have used the “ils” command to determine if there was any inode
Examination Details

information on the file system.

```
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# ils -f fat16 dos.img
class|host|device|start_time
ils|LinuxForensics|dos.img|1078924277
st_ino|st_alloc|st_uid|st_gid|st_mtime|st_atime|st_ctime|st_mode|st_nlink|st_size|st_block
0|st_block1
7|f|0|1098858236|1098799200|1098858234|100777|0|0|0|0
10|f|0|1098858230|1098858600|1098858234|100777|0|485810|42|0
12|f|0|1098858246|1098799200|1098858244|100777|0|0|0|0
14|f|0|1098858242|1098858600|1098858244|100777|0|450560|517|0
15|f|0|1098925860|1098858600|1098925704|100777|0|53056|957|0
16|f|0|1098926266|1098858600|1098926264|100777|0|0|0|0
17|f|0|1098926266|1098858600|1098926264|100777|0|8814|1009|0
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]#
```

Figure 10 – inode information for files on image using “ils”

Now we have the image of the file system, we can do MAC time analysis of it, in order to generate a timeline.

Both the “fls” and “ils” commands can be used to build a timeline analysis of the file system. For the “fls” command we need to specify that the output be in a MAC time output format. For this we run the “fls” command with the “-m” flag and will redirect the output to a file. We also use the “-m” flag for the “ils” command.

```
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# fls -m / -r -f fat16 dos.img > dos.fls
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# cat dos.fls
0|/her.doc|0|3|33279|-/-rwxrwxrwx|1|0|0|0|19968|1098626400|1098657128|1098657126|512|0
0|/hey.doc|0|4|33279|-/-rwxrwxrwx|1|0|0|0|19968|1098712800|1098744490|1098744486|512|0
0|/WinPcap_3_1_beta_3.exe (_INPCA~1.EXE) (deleted)|0|7|33279|/-rwxrwxrwx|0|0|0|0|0|1098799200|1098858236|1098858234|512|0
0|/WinDump.exe (_INDUMP.EXE) (deleted)|0|10|33279|/-rwxrwxrwx|0|0|0|0|485810|1098885600|1098858230|1098858234|512|0
0|/WinDump.exe (_INDUMP.EXE) (deleted)|0|12|33279|/-rwxrwxrwx|0|0|0|0|0|1098799200|1098858246|1098858244|512|0
0|/_apture (deleted)|0|15|33279|/-rwxrwxrwx|0|0|0|0|0|1098885600|1098926266|1098926264|512|0
0|/_ap.gif (deleted)|0|18|33279|/-rwxrwxrwx|0|0|0|0|8814|1098885600|1098926266|1098926264|512|0
0|/coffee.doc|0|18|33279|/-rwxrwxrwx|1|0|0|0|19968|10989855488|1098955488|1098955486|512|0
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]#
```

Figure 11 – converting file name layer information to MAC time format
Examination Details

Figure 12 – converting inode information into MAC time format

If we now concatenate the “fls” and “ils” command outputs into one file, we can run the “mactime” tool to obtain a timeline output for analysis.

```
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# cat dos.{i,f}ls >> dos.mac
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# cat dos.mac
```

We run the command “mactime” to convert the “dos.mac” file into a human readable timeline analysis.

```
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# mactime -b dos.mac > dos.mactime
```

Figure 13 – The fls MAC time and ils MAC time information is combined to form final input to mactime program
Examination Details

Figure 14 – converting MAC time details to human readable form for timeline analysis

The resultant output of the command can be found in the next section *Image Details*, along with the analysis of the MAC time line output.

After extracting the file system image, we run the “strings” command on it to produce a file containing a list of all the text strings in the file image. We can then use this to search for certain “dirty” words. From the information we know about the case some of the dirty words in our search will include – Leila, Conlay, Robert, Lawrence, and coffee. We will also be looking for email addresses. Once extracting the strings we can then search the strings file with “grep”. i.e. `grep -i “[a-z0-9]@[a-z0-9]”` to look for email addresses.

If we use the “--radix=d” option with the strings command, we can get a byte offset of the string within the image. Using this we can then examine or find sector which may contain the string by dividing the byte offset by the sector size, which in this case is 512. Once we get the sector the string is in, we can then match or compare this with the “istat” output checking the sectors belonging to inodes, to then find out what file the string is in.

Figure 15 – generating string files containing strings from image

Once the strings file has been created we search the file. In the instance below we find contents of one of the documents on the file system.

```
Hey I saw you the other day. I tried to say "hi", but you disappeared???. That was a nice blue dress you were wearing. I heard that your car was giving you so me trouble. Maybe I can give you a ride to work sometime, or maybe we can get dinner sometime?
Have a nice day
Hey I saw you the other day
Robert Lawrence
Normal.dot
Robert Lawrence
Microsoft Word 10.0
Hey I saw you the other day
Title
Microsoft Word Document
MSWordDoc
Word.Document.8
i:VJ
```

Figure 16 – examination of strings file reveals a letter or document

Viewing the strings file, we find a number of interesting strings. The first strings that come up which appear to be of interest and are at the beginning of the file are strings relating to what look like letters or documents, that have been written
by Robert Lawrence and are directed to Leila Conlay. The next significant strings
appear to be some header information for a program – “tcpdump” is listed in the
headers.

**Figure 17 - examination of strings file reveals header looking files from “tcpdump”**

After that there are a lot of strings which relate to function calls or error
messages – which look like they are part of a program. Finally near the end of
the strings file, there appears to be some HTTP headers which look like some
web pages.
Figure 18 – strings which appear to be part of a program, followed by some HTML files

We notice both from the time line analysis and from the “fls” output (figure 9) that there are several deleted files. These files are:

- WinPcap_3_1_beta3.exe (_INPCA~1.EXE)
- Windump.exe (_INDUMP.EXE)
- _apture
- _ap.gif

It is interesting to note that WinPcap_3_1_beta3.exe, Windump.exe and _ap.gif are all associated with 2 inodes.

We can separate the unallocated blocks from the image file, to create a new image file containing only the unallocated blocks. To do this we use the “dls” command.

We then create a string file with a radix index next to each string and search for strings which may be in deleted files – because the image is reasonably small compared to disk sizes of machines, we can probably search the files by hand to find interesting strings. However if it had been a large system, we would want to generate a dirty word list to search against.

Figure 19 – creating unallocated data block image then generating a strings file for it.

Because the FAT16 file system has slack space, we should also create an image for the slack space. We again use the “dls” command, but with “-s” as the option for slack space.
After creating the slack space image, we create a strings file for it as well – we use the “--radix=d” option to obtain the byte offset in the file where the string is located. When we examine the size of the string file for slack space it is quite small, so we list the contents to see if there are any interesting strings. However there is no useful information in this string file.

To recover files we can then try to use the “icat” command on each of the file inodes shown in the initial “fls” output. “icat” lists the contents of an inode, thus one would think that one would be able to recover the deleted files, by using “icat”.

```
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# fls -f fat16 dos.img
```

```
[r/r 3: her.doc
[r/r 4: hey.doc
[r/r * 7: WinFcapan_3_1_beta_3.exe (_INPCA~1.EXE)
[r/r * 10: WinFcapan_3_1_beta_3.exe (_INPCA~1.EXE)
[r/r * 12: WinDump.exe (_INDUMP.EXE)
[r/r * 14: WinDump.exe (_INDUMP.EXE)
[r/r * 15: Capture
[r/r * 16: _ap.gif
[r/r * 17: _ap.gif
[r/r 18: coffee.doc
```

```
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# icat -f fat16 dos.img 7 > icat.inode7
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# icat -f fat16 dos.img 10 > icat.inode10
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# icat -f fat16 dos.img 12 > icat.inode12
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# icat -f fat16 dos.img 14 > icat.inode14
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# icat -f fat16 dos.img 15 > icat.inode15
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# icat -f fat16 dos.img 16 > icat.inode16
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# icat -f fat16 dos.img 17 > icat.inode17
```

```
icat.inode10: Microsoft Office Document
icat.inode12: empty
icat.inode14: MS-DOS executable (EXE), OS/2 or MS Windows
icat.inode15: tcpdump capture file (little-endian) - version 2.4 (Ethernet, capture length 4096)
icat.inode16: empty
icat.inode17: GIF image data, version 89a, 300 x 200
icat.inode7: empty
```

```
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# ls -al icat.*
```

```
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 20480 Feb 23 02:23 icat.inode10
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Feb 23 02:23 icat.inode12
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1024 Feb 23 02:23 icat.inode14
```
From the results of the “icat”, it looks as though some files were recovered. If we try to open the files however, such as the file recovered via inode 14 corresponding to “Windump.exe”, the file does not run – we renamed the file “icat.inode14” to “inode14.exe” to test this. Similarly trying to open the file corresponding to inode 17, “_ap.gif” and try to open it with an image viewer there is no image visible.

If we compare the file sizes of the inodes recovered with icat and the corresponding file sizes from the timeline analysis we see that none of the inodes recovered have the same size as those shown with the corresponding inodes.

We should check the inodes more closely, so we run the “istat” command on each of the inodes shown in the “fls” output (figure 9). We first run “istat” on the files which are not deleted.
Directory Entry Times:
Written: Tue Oct 26 08:48:10 2004
Accessed: Tue Oct 26 00:00:00 2004
Created: Tue Oct 26 08:48:06 2004

Sectors:
551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558
559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566
567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574
575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582
583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# istat -f fat16 dos.img 18
Directory Entry: 18
Allocated
File Attributes: File, Archive
Size: 19968
Num of links: 1
Name: coffee.doc

Directory Entry Times:
Accessed: Thu Oct 28 00:00:00 2004
Created: Thu Oct 28 19:24:46 2004

Sectors:
591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598
599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606
607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614
615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622
623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]#

Figure 23 – istat output for inodes 3, 4 and 18

After running istat on inodes 3, 4 and 18 – these inodes seem correct (each having 40 sectors in size), which corresponds to the “fsstat” output shown in figure 8.

Now let us look at inode 7.

[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# istat -f fat16 dos.img 7
Directory Entry: 7
Not Allocated
File Attributes: File, Archive
Size: 0
Num of links: 0
Name: _INPCA~1.EXE

Directory Entry Times:
Accessed: Wed Oct 27 00:00:00 2004

Sectors:

Recovery:
File recovery not possible
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]#

Figure 24 – istat for inode 7 shows file size of zero bytes

There is no information relating to the file, it has a file size of 0 and no sector
information. As a result we cannot recover inode 7.

Let us now examine inode 10.

```
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# istat -f fat16 dos.img 10
Directory Entry: 10
Not Allocated
File Attributes: File, Archive
Size: 485810
Num of links: 0
Name: _INPCA~1.EXE

Directory Entry Times:
Accessed: Thu Oct 28 00:00:00 2004

Sectors:
591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598
599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606
607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614
615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622
623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630

Recovery:
File recovery not possible
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]#
```

Figure 25 – istat of inode 10 shows same sectors used as inode 18

If we look at the starting sector for inode 10, we see that is actually pointing to the same sectors as inode 18. It appears that inode 10 is not recoverable as we don't have the starting sector for it.

Now let us look at inode 12.

```
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# istat -f fat16 dos.img 12
Directory Entry: 12
Not Allocated
File Attributes: File, Archive
Size: 0
Num of links: 0
Name: _INDUMP.EXE

Directory Entry Times:
Accessed: Wed Oct 27 00:00:00 2004
Created: Wed Oct 27 16:24:04 2004

Sectors:

Recovery:
File recovery not possible
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]#
```

Figure 26 – istat of inode 12 shows file size of zero bytes

There is no information relating to the file, it has a file size of 0 and no sector information. As a result we cannot recover inode 12.
The next inode to look at is inode 14.

The istat information for inode 14 is very long as there are a large number of sectors associated with it. We see that it has a file size of 450650 bytes and goes from sector 1541 to sector 2420.
Using this information, we can calculate the number of sectors used for the file:

\[2420 - 1541 = 879 \quad (+1 \text{ to include sector 1541}) = 880 \text{ sectors}.

From the “fsstat” output, we also know that the sector size = 512 bytes.

We can check the number of sectors by dividing the file size by the sector size:

\[450560 \text{ bytes} / 512 \text{ bytes per sector} = 880 \text{ sectors}.

This corresponds to the number of sectors we calculated from the “istat” output.

With this information we can now extract these sectors from the file system image. We can use “dd” or “dcfldd” to do this.

![Figure 28 - recovery of “windump.exe” file with file type and MD5 checksum](image)

![Figure 29 - recovery of the “windump.exe” file using dcfldd](image)

As we can see from the figures, we have extracted a file of 450560 bytes which according to the “file” command is an MS-DOS executable file. The MD5 hash for the “windump.exe” file we have extracted is 79375b77975a53ab0507496107bf7.

The next inode is 15. An “istat” of inode 15 reveals the details shown in the next figure.

![istat output for inode 15](image)
The “istat” information reveals the file size is 53056 bytes, and starts at sector 2421 and finishes at sector 2524.

This gives us 2524 – 2421 = 103 (+1 to include sector 2421) = 104 sectors. We now have enough information to extract the file.

The file size returned is 53248 bytes rather than 53056 bytes. If we divide 53056 bytes by 512 bytes per sector we get 103.625 sectors. The reason for the inconsistencies is that the FAT16 system has slack space, where as UNIX file systems like ext2, etc don’t have slack space.

To get the exact image of the file we can use a block size of 1 byte, but we will need to convert the skip and count values accordingly. We will have to skip...
2421 * 512 = 1239552 bytes, and our count will be the file size 53056.

If we run a “file” on this command it shows us this file is a tcpdump capture file. (see figure 33). As a result we can assume the original file name would have been “Capture” or “capture”, so we shall rename our extracted file to “capture”.

To check the file type we can run it as an input file for tcpdump or load it up into ethereal.

It appears that the file is indeed a capture of traffic – presumably from the
Examination Details

WinDump.exe we recovered earlier.

The next inode is inode 16.

```
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# istat -f fat16 dos.img 16
Directory Entry: 16
Not Allocated
File Attributes: File, Archive
Size: 0
Num of links: 0
Name: _ap.gif

Directory Entry Times:
Written: Thu Oct 28 11:17:46 2004
Accessed: Thu Oct 28 00:00:00 2004
Created: Thu Oct 28 11:17:44 2004

Sectors:
Recovery:
File recovery not possible
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]#
```

From the "istat" output, there is no information regarding inode 16 apart from the file name, so inode 16 cannot be recovered.
Finally we examine the last inode - inode 17.

```
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# istat -f fat16 dos.img 17
Directory Entry: 17
Not Allocated
File Attributes: File, Archive
Size: 8814
Num of links: 0
Name: _ap.gif

Directory Entry Times:
Written: Thu Oct 28 11:17:46 2004
Accessed: Thu Oct 28 00:00:00 2004
Created: Thu Oct 28 11:17:44 2004

Sectors:
2525 2526

Recovery:
2525 2526 2527 2528 2529 2530 2531 2532
2533 2534 2535 2536 2537 2538 2539 2540
2541 2542
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]#
```

Figure 38 – istat output of inode 17 – _ap.gif

The “istat” output for inode 17 shows the file was 8814 bytes in size, and used sectors 2525 to 2542.

The number of sectors used is 2542 – 2525 = 17 (+1 for sector 2525) = 18 sectors. However as with the case of inode 15, when we check the size of the file, 8814 bytes, divided by the number of bytes per sector, 512, we get 17.21484375 sectors. Again this is a case of the FAT16 file system having slack space.

To get the original image we will use “dcfldd” with a block size of 1, skip value of 2525 * 512 = 1292800, and count of 8814.

```
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# dcfldd if=dos.img skip=1292800 count=8814 bs=1 hashwindow=0 of=_ap.gif
8704 blocks (0Mb) written.
Total: 8bc3923cf8c72fd405d7cea8c8781011
8814+0 records in
8814+0 records out
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# ls -al _ap.gif
  r-xr-xr-x 1 root root 8814 Feb 23 17:06 _ap.gif
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]# file _ap.gif
_ap.gif: GIF image data, version 89a, 300 x 200
[root@LinuxForensics Assignment]#
```

Figure 39 – using dcfldd to recover _ap.gif file using a block size of 1 byte
If we view the image with “xview” or “gimp” under Linux, we see that the image is a map. Thus we should rename the file appropriately to “map.gif”.

Moving all the files into another directory, we list their file sizes. If we add up all the file sizes, we get 572334 bytes. This still leaves a lot of the file system image we haven’t looked at.

We can try and run “foremost” or “lazarus” (SANS Institute, Track 8 – System Forensics, Investigation & Response, Volume 8.2 & 8.3, pp. 143-153) against the image – we could run it against the unallocated blocks, however as there is slack space, which will not be listed in the unallocated blocks with “dls” by default, we could run it against the entire file system image.

The foremost program was able to extract the word documents along with some gif images, one of which was the map.gif – one of the files we extracted using “dcfldd” with information from the “istat” output. However it did not initially extract any executable files. The foremost configuration file needed to be modified to search for executable types. An examination of an executable with a hex editor shows that executables start with “4d 5a xx 00 xx 00 00 04 00 xx 00 ff ff 00 00 b8”, where xx are different hex values for different executable types. After running foremost again with just “4d 5a” several “exe” files were generated, but only one was a real “exe” file. Modifying the configuration file to be more specific reduced this just to one executable. The final configuration file used is in Appendix II.

Win32 Portable Executable File Format), and a utility “pedump.exe” (Peitrek, PEDUMP.EXE) which generates information from the Execution header information. As we could not recover the winpcap file from inode information, we searched the Internet and downloaded a copy. Using a hex editor on the WinPcap_3_1_beta_3.exe file downloaded from the web revealed different header information from that of a standard executable file. This was used for entering information into the foremost configuration file to specifically look for “winpcap”, but as we found, it was not in the file system image. The maximum file size to capture with foremost, can be set to the largest file in the timeline analysis. Setting the size to exactly 450650 bytes would get the exact “windump.exe” file (as the WinPcap file header was not found). Alternatively using a utility like “pedump.exe” would provide information leading to the size of the actual executable file.

Examination of the strings revealing HTTP traffic in the capture file either via just using “strings”, or using “tcpdump” with the “-X” option to display ASCII info, or using “ethereal” reveals a mail message from Leila Conlay to Sam Guarillo describing the meeting at the coffee shop which is where the incident with Robert Lawrence eventually occurred. In this message Leila’s personal email flowergirl96@hotmail.com is revealed, along with the person she is meeting.

```
%2aTBu%2apX7tN2Ymw6n4bzSUMtIXi6f
AP),
curmbbox=F000000001&HrsTest=&_HMaction=Send&FinalDest=&subaction=&plaintext=&logi
n=flowergirl96@hotmai l.com&encodedcc=encodedbcc=&deleteUponSend=0&importance=&sigflag=

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 2004 19:10:54 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
```

Figure 41 – strings from capture file – shows email message captured and time of the capture

The HTTP headers also reveal information about Leila Conlay’s computer – It shows the time she sent the message Oct 28 19:10:54 GMT as well as the type of operating system her machine was using and her browser information – MSIE 6.0 WINNT5.1 – which is internet explorer 6.0 running on Windows XP. (Microsoft Corporation - HttpBrowserCapabilities.Platform Property (.NET Framework)).

A search for Hollywood & McCadden shows Starbucks Coffee in Los Angeles to be on the corner (Starbucks Coffee) (DiscoverYourOwnTown.Com). The time zone for Los Angeles is Pacific Time (-8:00 GMT) (Chaos Software Group –
worldtime.com). If we look at the capture file and the time the WEB server shows, 19:10 GMT on October 28th, then the actual time Leila Conlay sent her email was 11:10 am on October 28th. This corresponds to the time we see the windump capture file was created from the time line analysis in the Image Details section.

Analysis of the capture file when run through “tcpdump” also shows that Mr Lawrence knew Leila Conlay’s IP address, as this was the only local computer IP address shown in the capture. If Mr Lawrence had not specifically specified a filter for this, then traffic from other machines would also have been captured.

**Summary**

The analysis of Robert Lawrence’s USB flash drive reveals several documents which appear to be messages to Leila Conlay from Mr Lawrence, some of which appear to be threatening. Also recovered from the USB flash drive was a program called “windump.exe” which is a network traffic capture tool. Also recovered from the USB flash drive was a network traffic capture file which appears to have been generated by a windump.exe/tcpdump program, as well as a map – which shows the location of the coffee shop where Leila Conlay was meeting Sam Guarillo. Also found were traces of a program called winpcap – which is a set of libraries and drivers which are required to be installed in order to use the “windump.exe” application.

It appears that Mr Lawrence has been capturing the network traffic to and from Leila Conlay’s work machine in order to gain personal information regarding Leila Conlay’s personal activities and associations. Mr Lawrence has intercepted an email which Leila Conlay had sent to Sam Guarillo in regard to meeting and having a coffee at the coffee shop on the corner of Hollywood and McCadden –Starbucks Coffee from a Google search (Starbucks Coffee). Mr Lawrence has read this and then proceeded to find the location of the coffee shop as can be seen by the fact he has saved a copy of a map showing the shops location.
**Image Details**

**Files in image**
There were three files which existed in the image, and three files which were recovered.

The three files which existed on the file system were three word documents:
- hey.doc
- her.doc
- coffee.doc

The three files recovered were:
- windump.exe – an executable program
- capture – a file containing a network traffic capture from windump/tcpdump of an email embedded in HTTP messages.
- map.gif – a map showing the location of the corner of Hollywood and McCadden.

There was also evidence of another program/installer for WinPCap – WinPcap_3_1_beta_3.exe – from the “fls” output as seen in the *Examination Details* section.

**True names**
From searches on the internet it was found that the version of Windump Robert Lawrence was using was "Windump 3.8.3 beta". From the web site where this version of windump is located ([http://windump.polito.it](http://windump.polito.it)) it also shows that the version of WinPcap required by Windump 3.8.3 beta is WinPcap_3_1_beta_2 or WinPcap_3_1_beta_3. The “fls” information (from figure 9 in *Examination Details* section) tells us the filename was WinPcap_3_1_beta_3.exe.

**File/MAC Time Information**
The consolidation of the “fls” and “ils” outputs, when converted to MAC time format and run through the “mactime” program, produces the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date/Time</th>
<th>File Size</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Permissions</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mon Oct 25 2004 00:00:00</strong></td>
<td>19968</td>
<td>.a.</td>
<td>rwxrwxrwx 0 0 3</td>
<td>/her.doc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mon Oct 25 2004 08:32:06</strong></td>
<td>19968</td>
<td>.c.</td>
<td>rwxrwxrwx 0 0 3</td>
<td>/her.doc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mon Oct 25 2004 08:32:08</strong></td>
<td>19968</td>
<td>m..</td>
<td>rwxrwxrwx 0 0 3</td>
<td>/her.doc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tue Oct 26 2004 00:00:00</strong></td>
<td>19968</td>
<td>.a.</td>
<td>rwxrwxrwx 0 0 4</td>
<td>/hey.doc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tue Oct 26 2004 08:48:06</strong></td>
<td>19968</td>
<td>.c.</td>
<td>rwxrwxrwx 0 0 4</td>
<td>/hey.doc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tue Oct 26 2004 08:48:10</strong></td>
<td>19968</td>
<td>m..</td>
<td>rwxrwxrwx 0 0 4</td>
<td>/hey.doc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wed Oct 27 2004 00:00:00</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.a.</td>
<td>rwxrwxrwx 0 0 7</td>
<td>&lt;dos.img-_INPCA~1.EXE-dead-7&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wed Oct 27 2004 00:00:00</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.c.</td>
<td>rwxrwxrwx 0 0 12</td>
<td>&lt;dos.img-_INDUMP.EXE-dead-12&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wed Oct 27 2004 16:23:50</strong></td>
<td>485810</td>
<td>.a.</td>
<td>rwxrwxrwx 0 0 7</td>
<td>/WinPcap_3_1_beta_3.exe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wed Oct 27 2004 16:23:50</strong></td>
<td>485810</td>
<td>.c.</td>
<td>rwxrwxrwx 0 0 10</td>
<td>/WinDump.exe (_INDUMP.EXE) (deleted)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wed Oct 27 2004 16:23:54</strong></td>
<td>485810</td>
<td>.c.</td>
<td>rwxrwxrwx 0 0 10</td>
<td>/WinPcap_3_1_beta_3.exe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Author retains full rights.
Under FAT16 change and modify times include date and time, however while the access time includes the date it does not include any time of day. (Microsoft Corporation, Hardware White Paper – Microsoft Extensible Firmware Initiative FAT32 File System Specification – FAT: General Overview of On-Disk Format – Version 1.03) (Carrier, File Activity Timelines – Sleuth Kit Reference Document Specification). As a result we see that the access time will always be “00:00:00”. Also, due to the size of the time fields in the FAT file system, the time, for those fields which have it, is rounded to the nearest even second – i.e. is multiples of 2 seconds. (Erdelsky) (Microsoft Corporation, Hardware White Paper – Microsoft Extensible Firmware Initiative FAT32 File System Specification – FAT: General Overview of On-Disk Format – Version 1.03). Also, unlike other file systems, it appears that the data modification time and inode change time are not modified when a file is deleted – for example, we do not see a modify or change time on the 28th October for windump.exe, yet we know the program was run from both the capture file times and the access date on 28th October before it was deleted.
It appears on 25th Oct 2004 at 8:32 am Mr Lawrence copied over a file “her.doc” to the USB Flash drive – this is because the inode change time and the modify time are 2 seconds of each other and there is no other modify time, which indicates the file data was not changed after that. The document was accessed Oct 25th, but no time is shown – though it would have occurred after 8:32 am on Oct 25th.

On 26th Oct 2005, Mr Lawrence copied over “hey.doc” at 8:48 am and accessed it some time after this on the same day.

On 27th Oct 2004 there appears to be two instances of both WinPcap_3_1_beta_3.exe and Windump.exe copied to the USB Flash drive. At 16:23 the first instance of WinPcap (inode 7) was copied. The second instance of WinPcap (inode 10) appears to have been copied at 16:23 as well.

There are actually three files WinPcap_3_1_beta_3.exe, Windump.exe and the map.gif all which have two instances. What these files have in common is they would have been downloaded from the internet. It may be that there was some temporary file image created before the final image – thus leaving two instances of the files. This would indicate why there were access times on 27th Oct 2004 for inodes 12 and 7 (reading the file to copy it) and why there is an access time of 28th Oct 2004 for inodes 14 and 10.

At 16:24 on 27th Oct 2004 the two Windump.exe file instances (inode 12 and inode 14) were created.

On 28th Oct 2004 at 19:24 Mr Lawrence copied onto the USB Flash Drive “coffee.doc”, after which it was access sometime on 28th Oct 2004.

At 11:08am on 28th Oct 2004 the windump capture file was created by Mr Lawrence. The capture file appears to have been last written to at 11:11 am. This would coincide with the access of Windump.exe on 28th Oct 2004 – relating to the execution of the program. At 11:17 am the map.gif file is copied to the USB Flash drive.

File Owner(s)

Since the image retrieved is from a USB Flash drive with a FAT16 file system – actual file ownership details relating to users and groups cannot be retrieved from the information from the file system. However for the Microsoft Word documents found, Word fills in the Author’s detail with the name of the user who has registered the Word program. In the case of all three word documents, Robert Lawrence’s name appeared as the author.
Hey what gives? I was drinking a coffee on Thursday and saw you stop
by with some guy! You said you didn’t want coffee with me, but you’ll
go how it fits with some random guy?? He looked like a loser! Guys like
that are nothing but trouble. I can’t believe you did this to me! You
should stick to your word, if you’re not interested in going to coffee
with me then you shouldn’t be going with anyone! I heard rumors about
a “bad batch” of coffee, hope you don’t get any...

Figure 43 – coffee.doc file showing author of document

File Size (in Bytes) & MD5 Hash

The file sizes and MD5 hash sums of the files found on the USB flash image
can be seen in the following screenshot:
Figure 44 – MD5 checksums for all files found in file system image along with their file sizes

The WinPcap_3_1_beta_3.exe program file size is found in the MAC Timeline Analysis and is 485810 bytes, which is the same as the file size of the WinPcap_3_1_beta_3.exe program we downloaded from the Internet. The MD5 hash of this file can be seen in the screenshot below.

Figure 45 – MD5 checksum and size of WinPCap_3_1_beta_3.exe file downloaded from Internet

Keywords

Some of the dirty word list keywords which were compiled were able to be found within the files.

In the document files, “robert” & “lawrence” were both found. In the capture file, “leila”, “coffee” and an email search pattern were found. The email was found by passing the strings output to an “awk” command:

```
strings capture | awk -F '\n' '/[[:alnum:]]+@[[:alnum:]]+/ {print $1}' | more
```

or

```
strings capture | awk -F ' \n' '/[[:alnum:]]+@[[:alnum:]]+/ {print $1}' | more
```
strings capture | awk -F \n '/[a-zA-Z0-9]+@[a-zA-Z0-9]+/' {print $1 } | more

Similarly IP address strings were found using the awk command, similar to the following:

strings capture | awk -F \n '/[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+/' {print $1 } | more

From the “capture” file the email addresses flowergirl196@hotmail.com and SamGuarillo@hotmail.com were found. The IP address from Leila Conlay’s computer was found 192.168.2.204 along with the IP address of the various hotmail web servers.

Using the information from the “fls” and “file” outputs, the keyword string “tcpdump” matched the “windump.exe” file. The keyword “wpcap” also matched the “windump.exe” file.

The only string match with the “map.gif” file was the keyword “gif”. Other than this since it is a picture file there would be no other meaningful string information.

### Table Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File Name</th>
<th>MAC Times</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Size (bytes)</th>
<th>MD5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>her.doc</td>
<td>A: 25-Oct-2004</td>
<td>Robert Lawrenc e</td>
<td>19968 9785a777c5286738f9deb73d8bc57978</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C: 25-Oct-2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M: 25-Oct-2004 08:32:08 hrs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Keywords</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>robert, lawrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hey.doc</td>
<td>A: 26-Oct-2004</td>
<td>Robert Lawrenc e</td>
<td>19968 ca601d4f8138717dca4de07a8ec19e9d1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C: 26-Oct-2004 08:46:06 hrs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M: 26-Oct-2004 08:46:10 hrs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Keywords</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>robert, lawrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coffee.doc</td>
<td>A: 28-Oct-2004</td>
<td>Robert Lawrenc e</td>
<td>19968 a833c58689596eda15a27c931e0c76d1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Keywords</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>coffee, robert, lawrence,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Capture | A: 28-Oct-2004  
|         | C: 28-Oct-2004  
|         | M: 28-Oct-2004  
|         | 11:08:24 hrs  
|         | 11:11:00 hrs  
| Keywords | coffee, leila, gif, email search pattern (found flowergirl96@hotmail.com, SamGuarillo@hotmail.com), IP address search pattern (found 192.168.2.104 – Leila Conlay’s IP address – also shown when you run tcpdump on capture file)  
| windump.exe (Windump 3.8.3) | A: 28-Oct-2004  
|         | C: 27-Oct-2004  
|         | M: 27-Oct-2004  
|         | 16:24:04 hrs  
|         | 16:24:06 hrs  
| Keywords | tcpdump, pcap  
| map.gif | A: 28-Oct-2004  
|         | C: 28-Oct-2004  
|         | M: 28-Oct-2004  
|         | 11:17:44 hrs  
|         | 11:17:46 hrs  
| Keywords | gif  
| WinPcap_3_1 _ beta_3.exe | A: 28-Oct-2004  
|         | C: 27-Oct-2004  
|         | M: 27-Oct-2004  
|         | 16:23:54 hrs  
|         | 16:23:50 hrs  
| Keywords |  
|         |  |
Forensic Details

The filenames from the “fls” output (figure 9 in Examination Details section) provided the main hints towards what programs Robert Lawrence may have used.

From the files system image there is evidence that Mr Lawrence used two programs. The programs used were “WinDump 3.8.3 beta” and “WinPcap 3.1 beta 3”. These programs files are used in conjunction with one another. The WinDump program relies on the WinPcap program to be installed before it can be used. The WinDump and WinPcap programs are both executables. However the WinPcap is a windows executable installer, while the WinDump program is an executable program. This is seen from the hex view of the files. The “windump.exe” file found on the file system image starts with hex “4d 5a 90 00” (ASCII “MZ..”) while the “WinPcap_3_1_beta_3.exe” downloaded from the internet starts with a hex value of “4d 5a 50 00” (ASCII “MZP.”). The “file” output on for the extracted “windump.exe” file also revealed it was an executable file for a Windows based platform.

WinPcap is a packet capture library based on the UNIX libpcap for Microsoft Windows (Fenner, Risso, et al., Tools). It installs a packet-filter driver, and low-level library (packet.dll) and high-level library (wpcap.dll) which allow other programs to interface to the packet filter driver installed (Fenner, Risso, et al., WinPcap: the Free Packet Capture Architecture for Windows). The new beta version of WinPcap also has the facility for supporting remote capture – where a remote service or daemon on another machine reports back to a local client (Fenner, Risso, et al., Using WinPcap Remote Capture). The manual for WinPcap 3.0 is located at http://winpcap.polito.it/docs/man/html/index.html or http://winpcap.mirror.ethereal.com/docs/man/html/index.html.

Windump is a program for capturing network traffic and is a port of the Unix “tcpdump” program (Fenner, Risso, et al. – Tools) which is used as a network sniffer and/or analyser (Fenner, Risso, et al. – WinPcap: the Free Packet Capture Architecture for Windows). As a port of the Unix tcpdump (which uses libpcap), Windump relies on the WinPcap library in order to capture packets. The reliance on WinPcap can be seen if you try to run “windump.exe” without first installing WinPcap. If we had not known what “windump” was, this would be our first indicator when running the program. A search on the internet for the error message about “wpcap.dll” would reveal a link to “winpcap”.

![Windump.exe - Entry Point Not Found](image)
Figure 46 – running WinDump without installing WinPcap


In testing the software, because the forensic analysis platform for analysing the file system image was linux, but the operating system the tool was run on was Microsoft Windows, we have made a CD-ROM of the image files and extracted files. These files were then run off the CD on our Microsoft Windows test platform.

While tcpdump and windump are widely known with documentation available, to examine what the program does, in the event of it not being commonly known, we can use some debugging tools, such as “strace” (RAZOR Team, http://www.bindview.com/Resources/RAZOR/Files/strace-0.3.zip) or “StraceNT” (Garg, http://www.intellectualheaven.com/default.asp?BH=projects&H=strace.htm). Both are process tracing tools for Microsoft Windows like “strace” for Linux, or “truss” is for Sun Solaris.

“strace” requires a registry setting change in order to use the software, which does not exist by default under our test operating system which is Windows XP SP2, and also requires the file “strace.sys” to be copied into the “%windir%” directory.

Both tools produce similar output, but “StraceNT “ provides a better facility to filter the DLL (Dynamic Link Library) files which are trapped and also as to what functions within the DLL should be monitored. We can see which DLL files to add to the filter by running “ pedump”. This shows that “kernel32.dll, wsock32.dll and wpcap.dll” are used by “windump.exe”. From the information from the winpcap web page, we also know there is a low level packet library packet.dll. We can add these files to the filter file, “test.txt” in this case. Using the “kernel32.dll” can cause a large number of trace calls, so it has been removed from the test filter. Similarly the “wsock32.dll” file only generates an “Ordinal” output which is a bit of noise in the output. The interesting output comes from just wpcap.dll and the packet.dll libraries. The output below shows that the list of network adapters is searched, then one adapter is opened, and settings retrieved, then a buffer size is set to capture data, then the next calls are to “PacketReceivePacket” which appears just to be a call to grab all the packets – i.e. listening or sniffing the network.
Forensic Details

C:\stracent> \stracent -f test.txt e:\images\Assignment\extracted-files\WinDump.exe -i 3 -n

IntellectualHeaven (R) System Call Tracer for NT, 2K, XP, 2K3.
Copyright (C) Pankaj Garg. All rights reserved.

Tracing command: ["e:\images\Assignment\extracted-files\WinDump.exe" -i 3 -n]
[T2424] PacketGetAdapterNames(0, 12fe20, 4, 3, ...) = 0
[T2424] PacketGetAdapterNames(ad1f38, 12fe20, 4, 3, ...) = 1
[T2424] PacketGetNetInfoEx(ad1f38, 12e5f8, 12e5f0, ad1f38, ...) = 1
[T2424] PacketGetNetInfoEx(ad1f5a, 12e5f8, 12e5f0, ad1f38, ...) = 1
[T2424] PacketGetNetInfoEx(ad1f8d, 12e5f8, 12e5f0, ad1f38, ...) = 1
[T2424] PacketGetNetInfoEx(ad1fc0, 12e5f8, 12e5f0, ad1f38, ...) = 1
e:\images\Assignment\extracted-files\WinDump.exe: listening on \Device\NPF_{8F77D68A-788E-4FB9-B44A-E67F60EDB2FD}
[T2424] PacketOpenAdapter(ad3f68, ad3f9b, 0, ad3f68, ...) = 161cc8
[T2424] PacketGetNetType(161cc8, 12f000, ad3f9b, 0, ...) = 1
[T2424] PacketSetHwFilter(161cc8, 20, ad3f9b, 0, ...) = 1
[T2424] PacketAllocatePacket(ad3f9b, 0, ad3f68, 0, ...) = 160138
[T2424] PacketInitPacket(160138, 1750048, 3e800, ad3f9b, ...) = 160138
[T2424] PacketSetBuff(161cc8, f4240, 160138, 1750048, ...) = 1
[T2424] PacketSetMinToCopy(161cc8, 3e80, ad3f9b, 0, ...) = 1
[T2424] PacketSetReadTimeout(161cc8, 3e8, ad3f9b, 0, ...) = 1
[T2424] PacketGetNetInfoEx(ad3f68, 12e624, 12e620, 1, ...) = 1
[T2424] PacketSetBpf(161cc8, 12fe70, 60, 100089f0, ...) = 1
[T2424] PacketReceivePacket(161cc8, 160138, 1, ffffffff, ...) = 101
16:15:43.945577 IP 234.177.22.150.80 > 219.166.51.100.1494: P 1205098519:120509977
9(1260) ack 1730561066 win 10080
16:15:44.041884 IP 219.166.51.100.1166 > 219.38.3.8.53:  64632+ A?
something.somewhere.com.au. (44)
16:15:44.132172 IP 219.166.51.100.1494 > 234.177.22.150.80: . ack 1260 win 8820
16:15:44.304723 IP 234.177.22.150.80 > 219.166.51.100.1494: . 1260:2520(1260) ack
1 win 10080
16:15:44.352876 IP 219.166.51.10.53 > 219.166.51.100.1166:  64632 NXDomain 0/1/0 (98)
16:15:44.433132 IP 219.166.51.100.1494 > 234.177.22.150.80: . ack 2520 win 8820
16:15:44.441158 IP 234.177.22.150.80 > 219.166.51.100.1494: FP 4294967147:4294967295
9(148) ack 1 win 32760
16:15:44.441158 IP 219.166.51.100.1494 > 234.177.22.150.80: . ack 0 win 8672
16:15:44.441158 IP 234.177.22.150.80 > 219.166.51.100.1494: . ack 1 win 32760
16:15:44.441158 IP 219.166.51.100.1494 > 234.177.22.150.80: . ack 1 win 32759
[T2424] PacketReceivePacket(161cc8, 160138, 1, ffffffff, ...) = 101
16:15:44.936739 IP 234.177.22.150.80 > 219.166.51.100.1494: P 5040:6300(1260) ack
1 win 10080
16:15:45.135372 IP 219.166.51.100.1494 > 234.177.22.150.80: . ack 3780 win 8820
16:15:45.353067 IP 219.166.51.100.1166 > 219.166.51.100.1166: 64632 NXDomain 0/1/0 (98)
16:15:45.352876 IP 219.166.51.100.1166 > 219.166.51.100.1166: 55879+A?
something.somewhere.com.au. (40)
16:15:45.393195 IP 234.177.22.150.80 > 219.166.51.100.1494: . ack 3780 win 8820
16:15:45.536652 IP 219.166.51.100.1494 > 234.177.22.150.80: . ack 5040 win 8820
[T2424] PacketReceivePacket(161cc8, 160138, 1, ffffffff, ...) = 101
16:15:45.801497 IP 234.177.22.150.80 > 219.166.51.100.1494: P 5040:6300(1260) ack
1 win 10080
16:15:45.801497 IP 219.166.51.100.1494 > 234.177.22.150.80: . ack 6300 win 8820
16:15:46.248924 IP 219.166.51.100.1494 > 234.177.22.150.80: . 1260:3780(1260) ack
1 win 10080
16:15:46.439532 IP 219.166.51.100.1494 > 234.177.22.150.80: . ack 7560 win 8820
The “test.txt” filter file used with “StraceNT” can be found in Appendix II.

The MAC timeline output (see Image Details section – figure 42) provided the details about when the “windump.exe” program was last used. We can see that the “windump.exe” was copied to the USB flash drive on October 27th. We can see from the access times that both the “windump.exe” and “WinPcap_3_1_beta_3.exe” were run on October 27th as well – but we cannot tell at what time.

The last access date for the “windump.exe” shows that it was run on 28th October, but again does not show the actual time on the 28th. However the creation time of the “capture” file which was created with the windump program indicates that the “capture” file was created at 11:08 am on 28th October, and was last modified at 11:11 am. This would indicate as well, the “windump.exe” program was run at 11:08 am for at least 3 minutes. Examination of the contents of the “capture” file also confirm this time, when the time of the Hotmail web server is converted to Pacific Time (-8:00 GMT).
**Program Identification**

From the “fls” output (figure 9, *Examination Details* section) within the filenames of the deleted files, we had the filename `WinPcap_3_1_beta_3.exe`. This was the only file we could not recover from the file system image. Having used “windump” in the past we realized we needed to install “winpcap” prior to using windump. We would have found this out anyway by trying to run `windump.exe` by itself, as we get an error message about the entry point to the `wpcap.dll` as seen in *Forensic Details* section (figure 48).

Doing a Google search for the filename resulted in a few sites which provided links to a few download locations.

On choosing the [http://winpcap.polito.it](http://winpcap.polito.it) site revealed that although the Google cache version of the HTML document stated the link to the beta 3 version of WinPcap 3.1. The actual site currently showed WinPcap 3.1 beta 4.

![WinPcap homepage found through search on Internet](image)
At the time of this writing, it appears that the WinPcap 3.1 beta 4 had replaced the beta 3 version. Selecting the cached version of the document from Google and following the link to the executable, we were able to retrieve the WinPcap_3_1_beta_3.exe (http://winpcap.polito.it/install/bin/WinPcap_3_1_beta_3.exe). Similarly the source code for WinPcap_3_1_beta_3 was not listed, however it is still available from (http://winpcap.polito.it/install/bin/wpcapsrc_3_1_beta_3.zip) – after trying some possible names.

After downloading the file, we see the size of the file was the same as that shown in the MAC timeline for inodes 7 and 10 (see Image Details section, figure 42).
The software was then installed on a test machine so the “windump.exe” recovered from the file could be tested. One of the tests, on the recovered “windump.exe”, was to read in the “capture” file. This both checked that the extracted file worked, but also showed the capture file was indeed an output of such a program. The WinPcap executable was also used to get header information for use in the “foremost” configuration file to search specifically for the WinPcap file in the file system image, to see if any remnants of it could be recovered.

Next having found winpcap worked, we went back to the http://windump.polito.it site. On this site there is a link to http://windump.polito.it which contained links to a binary executable windump file, which we then proceeded to download.

In comparing the size of the downloaded file with the one recovered from the file system, we see that they are both the same.
Doing an MD5 sum (Wren) on the downloaded “windump.exe” reveals the file had the same MD5 hash as that of the “windump.exe” file we extracted from the file system image on the USB Flash drive.

The MD5 hash confirms the file we recovered on Robert Lawrence’s USB flash drive is WinDump 3.8.3 beta.

Running the program “pedump.exe” on both the extracted and downloaded versions of the “windump.exe” file confirm this as well. The compile times of the files were identical along with the other binary file information.
Once we verified this was the software used by Robert Lawrence, we then used the source code we had downloaded to investigate how the program works and also to compile the software.

The windump source code “README.Win32” file showed that in order to compile WinDump, we needed the WinPcap source code along with the Microsoft Platform SDK (Microsoft Corporation, Windows XP SP2 SDK) in order to get some header files. The only change to the downloaded source code was to add the location of the Microsoft Platform SDK to the include paths for the debug and release versions - /I “C:\Program Files\Microsoft Platform SDK for Windows XP SP2\Include”.

We initially compiled the WinDump debug version – this is useful for stepping through the code to see how the program works. The debug version is much bigger than the WinDump.exe binary we downloaded. This is due to all the symbol and debug information in the file. Compiling the release version (see figure 54) on the other hand produced a file size the same as the binary we downloaded.
An MD5 sum however of our compiled binary was different to the downloaded or extracted file. This is to be expected as the compile time date is different as can be seen from the “pedump” output of the compiled file.

![Figure 55 – compiled Windump.exe file size and MD5 checksum](image)

| C:\tcpdump\win32\prj\Release>pedump windump.exe | more |
| Dump of file WINDUMP.EXE |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File Header</th>
<th>Dump of file WINDUMP.EXE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Machine: 014C (I386)</td>
<td>Machine: 014C (I386)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Sections: 0003</td>
<td>Number of Sections: 0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TimeDateStamp: 422D2523 -&gt; Tue Mar 08 15:08:03 2005</td>
<td>TimeDateStamp: 422D2523 -&gt; Tue Mar 08 15:08:03 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PointerToSymbolTable: 00000000</td>
<td>PointerToSymbolTable: 00000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NumberOfSymbols: 00000000</td>
<td>NumberOfSymbols: 00000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SizeOfOptionalHeader: 00E0</td>
<td>SizeOfOptionalHeader: 00E0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics: 010F</td>
<td>Characteristics: 010F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELOCS_STRIPPED</td>
<td>RELOCS_STRIPPED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTABLE_IMAGE</td>
<td>EXECUTABLE_IMAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED</td>
<td>LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED</td>
<td>LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32BIT_MACHINE</td>
<td>32BIT_MACHINE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Optional Header</th>
<th>Dump of file WINDUMP.EXE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magic: 010B</td>
<td>Magic: 010B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>linker version: 6.00</td>
<td>linker version: 6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>size of code: 46000</td>
<td>size of code: 46000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>size of initialized data: FB000</td>
<td>size of initialized data: FB000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>size of uninitialized data: 0</td>
<td>size of uninitialized data: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>entrypoint RVA: 3F0EE</td>
<td>entrypoint RVA: 3F0EE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>base of code: 1000</td>
<td>base of code: 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>base of data: 47000</td>
<td>base of data: 47000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>image base: 400000</td>
<td>image base: 400000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>section align: 1000</td>
<td>section align: 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>file align: 1000</td>
<td>file align: 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>required OS version: 4.00</td>
<td>required OS version: 4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>image version: 0.00</td>
<td>image version: 0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subsystem version: 4.00</td>
<td>subsystem version: 4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Win32 Version: 0</td>
<td>Win32 Version: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>size of image: 142000</td>
<td>size of image: 142000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>size of headers: 1000</td>
<td>size of headers: 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>checksum: 0</td>
<td>checksum: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsystem: 0003 (Windows character)</td>
<td>Subsystem: 0003 (Windows character)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Figure 56 – pedump.exe of compiled windump.exe – fields same apart from the compile time](image)

The rest of the “pedump” information is the same as the downloaded and extracted version of the “windump.exe” file.

While the WinPcap_3_1_beta_3.exe file could not be extracted from the file system image for comparison. It is safe to assume the version of the file we
downloaded is most likely the same version Robert Lawrence had used – though he may have downloaded it from another mirror site. We come to this conclusion by the fact we were able to locate the same windump.exe file Robert Lawrence used, and this program and the program recovered would not work until the WinPcap_3_1_beta_3.exe file we downloaded was run and the WinPcap drivers installed. The MAC time line and “istat” output (see *Examination Details* section, figure 25) regarding the size of the file WinPcap_3_1_beta_3.exe also confirm this as it matches the file size of the file we downloaded.

From the *Examination Details* section, we saw the capture file only had Leila Conlay’s local IP address, 192.168.2.204, meaning a filter was used to capture traffic from her machine. If we look at the packet capture stream with “tcpdump” or “ethereal” we see that the entire packets were captured. This means a length of 1500 or more bytes or a value of zero must have been specified as a command line option parameter to “windump.exe”.

From the options for “windump” (Fenner, Risso, et al., Windump: tcpdump for Windows – WinDump Manual) we can conclude that Mr Lawrence would have used something similar to the following command line when running “windump”.

```
windump -s 0 -w capture host 192.168.2.204
```

Figure 56 – Possible windump command line used by Mr Lawrence
**Legal Implications**

**Introduction**

In 2001 the Australia Government passed the Cybercrime Bill 2001 to create the Cybercrime Act 2001 – Act No. 161 of 2001. This Act relates to computer offences and amends several existing Acts. It removed Part VIA of the Crimes Act 1914 and has added Part 10.7 to the Criminal Code Act 1995 and changed all references in other Acts which pointed to Part VIA of the Crimes Act 1914 to point to Part 10.7 of the Criminal Code 1995 Act (Attorney-General’s Department, Cybercrime Act 2001 – Act No. 161 of 2001). The other amendments to the Crimes Act 1914 and other Acts can be found within the Cybercrime Act 2001. The Cybercrime Act 2001 also relates to amendments to Part 6 of the Crimes Act 1900 No. 40 - NSW state law. The Criminal Code 1995 and the Crimes Act 1914 are Federal or Commonwealth laws. Both State and Commonwealth laws operate concurrently and allow prosecution to use whichever is the most suitable (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Cybercrime Bill 2001 – Revised Explanatory Memorandum p. 8). The Cybercrime Act 2001 was last amended in 2004. In general, however if an offence can be applied under both state and Commonwealth, then according to the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Attorney-General’s Department, Acts Interpretation Act 1901 - No. 2 as amended), the Commonwealth law should take precedence over the state law. As a result when examining the offences which may be applicable to Robert Lawrence we will examine the Commonwealth ones first, and only examine the state laws if we find that the offence cannot be applied under the Commonwealth law but could be under state law.

With these laws there are two main types of offences – indictable offence – an offence where there is imprisonment for more than 12 months, and a summary offence – an offence where there is imprisonment for 12 months or less or no imprisonment, apart from two of the offences in the NSW Crimes Act 1900 No. 40, all of the computer offences in both the Criminal Code 1995 Act and Crimes Acts are indictable. Extracts of the Cybercrime Act 2001, Criminal Code 1995 and the NSW Crimes Act 1900 No. 40 relating to computer offences can be found in *Appendix III – extracts of law documents* respectively.

Division 477 of Part 10.7 of the Criminal Code 1995 (Attorney-General's Department, Criminal Code 1995) defines the serious computer offences:

477.1 Unauthorised access, modification or impairment with intent to commit a serious offence. (maximum penalty is the maximum penalty of the serious offence committed, where a serious offence is life imprisonment or a term of 5 or more years)

477.2 Unauthorised modification of data to cause impairment (maximum penalty 10 years imprisonment)
477.3 Unauthorised impairment of electronic communication (maximum penalty 10 years imprisonment)

Division 478 of Part 10.7 of the Criminal Code 1995 (Attorney-General's Department, Criminal Code 1995) defines other computer offences:

478.1 Unauthorised access to, modification of, restricted data (maximum penalty 2 years imprisonment)
478.2 Unauthorised impairment of data held on a computer disk. (maximum penalty 2 years imprisonment)
478.3 Possession or control of data with intent to commit a computer offence (maximum penalty is 3 years imprisonment)
478.4 Producing, supplying or obtaining data with intent to commit a computer offence. (maximum penalty is 3 years imprisonment)

Where a computer offence for 478.3 and 478.4 a computer offence is an offence against division 477.

The NSW Crimes Act 1900 No. 40 (Attorney-General’s Department of NSW, Crimes Act 1900 No. 40) defines the following computer offences which are similar in nature to that of the Criminal Code Act 1995:

308C Unauthorised access, modification or impairment with intent to commit a serious indictable offence.
308D Unauthorised modification of data with intent to cause impairment
308E Unauthorised impairment of electronic communication
308F Possession of data with intent to commit serious computer offence
308G Producing, supplying or obtaining data with intent to commit serious computer offence
308H Unauthorised access of modification of restricted data held in computer (summary offence)
308I Unauthorised impairment of data held in computer disk, credit card or other device (summary offence)

Where for 308F and 308G a serious computer offence relates to an offence against 308C, 308D or 308E.

The following is a discussion of the computer offences and which can and cannot be applied to Mr Lawrence.

**477.1 Unauthorised access, modification or impairment with intent to commit a serious offence.**

Originally we thought this offence could be applied. However there are some aspects which prevent this. There are two main definitions of the offence in 477.1 – subsection 1 and subsection 4. They are nearly both the same in
definition, apart from subsection 1 also including the unauthorized access, modification or impairment being caused by way of a telecommunications service. The problem we encounter is that 477.1(1) can be applied to any serious offence relating to a Commonwealth or State serious offence, whereas 477.1(4) - which does not include the requirement for access, modification or impairment to have occurred by a means of a telecommunication service – can only be applied if the serious offence is a serious Commonwealth offence, not a serious State offence. As we will see the serious offences committed by Mr Lawrence were State offences, so we must turn to the NSW State offence 308C in order to convict Mr Lawrence.

**308C Unauthorised access, modification or impairment with intent to commit a serious indictable offence.**

There was evidence on Robert Lawrence’s USB stick that he had used “windump” to capture traffic from Leila Conlay’s computer which contained personal information about a meeting between Leila Conlay and Sam Guarillo, which Robert Lawrence then used in order to follow Leila Conlay to Starbucks Coffee Shop.

Using “windump” to capture data from the computer is the unauthorised access of data. Intent is shown in the fact that the software "windump" has a specific purpose to capture network traffic and was intentionally used in order to gain access to personal communications of Leila Conlay. This also shows Robert Lawrence knowingly accessed data without authorisation.

It may be possible to argue the traffic captured was not directed towards Robert Lawrence’s computer, and in the case of the email sent by Leila Conlay, was not directed to him. Thus gaining access to data which has not intended for him could constitute unauthorised access.

The hardest part of the prosecution in this case, is to determine or argue the interpretation of “access to data held in a computer”. “Data held in a computer” is defined to include “(a) data held in any removable data storage device for the time being held in a computer; or (b) data held in a data storage device on a computer network of which the computer forms a part” (Attorney-General’s Department, Cybercrime Act 2001, p. 3). On the other hand “access to data held in a computer” is defined to include “(a) the display of the data by the computer or any other output of the data from the computer; or (b) the copying or moving of the data to any other place in the computer or to a storage device; or (c) in the case of a program – the execution of the program.” (Attorney-General’s Department, Cybercrime Act 2001, pp. 2-3). If it can be shown the transmission of data (or in this case the resultant email, which Robert Lawrence captured) – while being an electronic communication - is an output of the computer then this offence can be applied.
I believe this is the essence of what this computer offence relates and should not be dismissed on an interpretation of the definition of “output”. As the Revised Explanatory Memorandum of the Cybercrime Bill 2001 states regarding offence 477.1 and 308C (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Cybercrime Bill 2001 – Revised Explanatory Memorandum, p. 10), “The proposed offence is designed to cover the unauthorised use of computer technology to commit serious crime such as fraud or stalking.”

As to what serious offences Robert Lawrence may be found guilty of there are 2 main offences, both are from the NSW Crimes Act 1900 No. 40.

- Part 3 offences against the person, Division 4 Documents containing threats, Section 31 Documents containing threats.
- Part 15A Apprehended violence, Division 1 Definitions and offence, Section 562AB Stalking or intimidation with intent to cause fear of physical or mental harm.

Part 3 offences against the person, Division 4 Documents containing threats, Section 31 Documents containing threats, of the Attorney-General’s Department of NSW Crimes Act 1900 No. 40 defines the offence as:

1. A person who maliciously, and knowing its contents, sends or delivers, or directly or indirectly causes to be received, any document threatening to kill or inflict bodily harm on any person is liable to imprisonment for 10 years.

2. It is immaterial for the purposes of an offence under this section whether or not a document sent or delivered is actually received, and whether or not the threat contained in a document sent, delivered or received is actually communicated to the person concerned or to the recipient or intended recipient of the document (as relevant in the circumstances).

The offence relating to Mr Lawrence – there were several documents found on the USB stick, with one being particular being threatening. It is possible Robert Lawrence will not be found guilty of this, as it may be the case that the most threatening document – “coffee.doc” may not have been actually sent, although it was intended to be (we are not told whether the document was sent or not - if we examine the date stamp of the document, it is dated the 28th October as being accessed – the day of the coffee shop incident). If Leila Conlay has receipted this, then it is plausible Robert Lawrence may be found guilty.

Part 15A Apprehended violence, Division 1 Definitions and offence, Section 562AB Stalking or intimidation with intent to cause fear of physical or mental harm, of the Attorney-General’s Department of NSW Crimes Act 1900 No. 40 defines the offence as:

1. A person who stalked or intimidates another person with the intention of causing the other person to fear physical or mental harm is liable to imprisonment for 5 years, or to a fine of 50 penalty units, or both.

2. For the purpose of this section, causing a person to fear physical or mental harm
includes causing the person to fear physical or mental harm to another person with
whom he or she has a domestic relationship.
(3) For the purposes of this section, a person intents to cause fear of physical or
mental harm if he or she knows that the conduct is likely to cause fear in the other
person.
(4) For the purposes of this section, the prosecution is not required to prove that the
person alleged to have been stalking or intimidated actually feared physical or
mental harm.

The offence relating to Mr Lawrence – the documents and emails that Robert
Lawrence has sent to Leila Conlay have been increasingly aggressive and
threatening. The last document “coffee.doc” gives cause for Leila to fear
physical harm, and shows there is clear intent to intimidate and cause fear on
the part of Robert Lawrence.

Robert Lawrence has also committed a third offence, not relating to a serious
offence, which is from the NSW Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (Attorney-
General’s Department of NSW, Anti-Discrimination Act 1977), Part 2A
Prohibition of sexual harassment, section 22B Harassment of employees,
commission agents, contract workers, partners, etc, subsection 6.

Part 2A Prohibition of sexual harassment, offence 22B Harassment of
employees, commission agents, contract workers, partners etc., of the Attorney-
General’s Department of NSW, Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 defines the offence
as:

(1) It is unlawful for an employer to sexually harass:
   (a) an employee, or
   (b) a person who is seeking employment with the employer.
(2) It is unlawful for an employee to sexually harass a fellow employee or a person
who is seeking employment with the same employer.
(3) It is unlawful for a person to sexually harass:
   (a) a commission agent or contract worker of the person, or
   (b) a person who is seeking to become a commission agent or contract
worker of the person.
(4) It is unlawful for a commission agent or contract worker to sexually harass a
fellow commission agent or fellow contract worker.
(5) It is unlawful for a partner in a partnership to sexually harass another partner,
or a person who is seeking to become a partner, in the same partnership.
(6) It is unlawful for a workplace participant to sexually harass another workplace
participant at a place that is a workplace of both those persons.
(7) It is unlawful for a member of either House of Parliament to sexually harass:
   (a) A workplace participant at a place that is a workplace of both the
   member and the workplace participant, or
   (b) Another member of Parliament at a place that is a workplace of both
members.
(8) it is unlawful for a workplace participant to sexually harass a member of either
House of Parliament at a place that is the workplace of both the member and the
workplace participant.

Where “sexual harassment” is defined in section 22A (Attorney-General’s Department of NSW, Anti-Discrimination Act 1977) where:

a person sexually harasses another person if:

(a) the person makes an unwelcome sexual advance, or an unwelcome request for sexual favours, to the other person, or
(b) the person engages in other unwelcome conduct of sexual nature in relation to the other person,

in circumstances in which a reasonable person, having regard to all the circumstances, would have anticipated that the other person would be offended, humiliated or intimidated.

This offence in relation to Mr Lawrence – the documents found on the USB flash drive, while of a threatening nature, are intended to make Leila Conlay form a relationship with Robert Lawrence, which Leila Conlay does not want. The maximum penalty for this offence according to the Anti-Discrimination Board of NSW after contacting them is $40,000.

Of two serious offences, only the second one, offence 562AB of the NSW Crimes Act 1900 No. 40 can be applied due to their being unauthorised access relating to obtaining person data using a computer, which Mr Lawrence then used to follow Leila Conlay. The first offence relating to threatening documents cannot be used in relation to 477.1 or 308C, as these documents were created by Mr Lawrence and do not constitute unauthorised access. However by Mr Lawrence sending these documents to Leila Conlay’s personal email address would show he had obtained her email address without authorisation.

477.2 Unauthorised modification of data to cause impairment

This is an offence if a person modifies “data held in a computer” without authorisation, and knows it is unauthorised to do so, and intends by the modification to "impair access, reliability, security or operation of any data held in a computer, or was reckless in modifying causing such impairment”. (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Cybercrime Bill 2001 – Revised Explanatory Memorandum, p. 10)

Data is defined to “include information in any form or any program or part of a program.” (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Cybercrime Bill 2001 – Revised Explanatory Memorandum, p. 6)

Since data includes a program, it could be considered the installation of “winpcap” was an unauthorised modification of data which affected the operation of data, i.e. a program. While “windump” could be run from the USB Flash drive and therefore did not modify “data held in a computer”, the “winpcap”
program must be installed to allow other software ("windump") to capture network packets. (i.e. it includes installing a driver). This could be constituted as affecting the operation of other programs or the reliability of the computer.

While we have not examined Mr Lawrence's work computer, assuming it is running Windows XP (as was Leila Conlay's – seen from the HTTP packets Mr Lawrence captured), the fact he was able to install the "winpcap" software however, would mean he had administration privileges and therefore could constitute it was lawful as he had authority to do this. As a result of this and the fact we do not have any information regarding his work computer, only the information on his USB flash disk it is unlikely this offence could be applied. The offences 478.3 and 478.4 are more applicable in relation to having the "windump" or "winpcap" software.

477.3 Unauthorised impairment of electronic communication

This is an offence for a “person to cause any unauthorised impairment of electronic communication to or from a computer, where the person knows the impairment is unauthorised, and either intends to impair electronic communication or is reckless to any such impairment” (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Cybercrime Bill 2001 – Revised Explanatory Memorandum, p. 11) and where “the electronic communication that is impaired occurs by means of a telecommunication service” (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Cybercrime Bill 2001 – Revised Explanatory Memorandum, p. 11).

Electronic communications is defined to mean a “communication of information in any form by means of guided or unguided electromagnetic energy”. (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Cybercrime Bill 2001 – Revised Explanatory Memorandum, p. 6)

At the first reading of the title of this offence, it might be thought it could be used, however 477.3 cannot be used in this case because of two elements. Firstly there was no impairment of any electronic communication, and secondly under the Commonwealth the offence relates to a telecommunications service – which is considered to be a telecommunications carrier – an organisations internal network is not considered to use a telecommunications service. (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Cybercrime Bill 2001 – Revised Explanatory Memorandum, p. 8)

In looking at the NSW state computer offence 308E, while it does not define an electronic communication to relate to a “telecommunication service”, and can be applied to an organisations internal network, we cannot used this offence as technically the electronic communication in Mr Lawrence's case was only intercepted, not impaired.
Legal Implications

In order to see if an offence has been committed in relation to an electronic communication interception, we can turn to the Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Attorney-General’s Department, Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 - Act No. 114 of 1979 – amended in 2004).

Section 6 Interception of a communication subsection 1 states “interception of a communication passing over a telecommunications system consists of listening to or recording, by any means, such a communication in its passage over that telecommunications system without the knowledge of the person making the communication.” (Attorney-General’s Department, Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 - Act No. 114 of 1979, p. 31).

Where a telecommunication system is defined (Attorney-General’s Department, Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 - Act No. 114 of 1979, p. 23), as:

(a) a telecommunications network that is within Australia; or
(b) a telecommunications network that is partly within Australia, but only to the extent that the network is within Australia;
and includes equipment, a line or other facility that is connected to such a network in Australia.

Where a telecommunications network is “a system, or series of systems, for carrying communication be means of guided or unguided electromagnetic energy or both, but does not include a system, or series of systems, for carrying communications solely by a means or radio communications.” (Attorney-General’s Department, Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 - Act No. 114 of 1979, p. 23) - radio communications are easily accessible thus this statement.

The telecommunications intercept offence defined in Part II – Interception of Telecommunications - section 7 – Telecommunications not to be intercepted subsection 1 (Attorney-General’s Department, Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 - Act No. 114 of 1979, p. 42) as:

(1) A person shall not:
   (a) intercept;
   (b) authorize, suffer or permit another person to intercept; or
   (c) do any act or thing that will enable him or her or another person to intercept;
   a communication passing over a telecommunications system.

Robert Lawrence in our case has committed an offence against section 7(1) of the Telecommunications (Intercept) Act 1979. The act of intercepting a communication in this case was carried out by Robert Lawrence via using “windump” to capture or intercept packets.

This is punishable by imprisonment for a period not exceeding 2 years, or if a court of summary jurisdiction convicts the offence then the penalty is a period of

478.1 Unauthorised access to, modification of, restricted data

This is an offence for a “person to cause unauthorised access to, or modification of, restricted data held in a computer, where the person intends to cause the access or modification and knows the access or modification is unauthorised.” (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Cybercrime Bill 2001 – Revised Explanatory Memorandum, p. 12).

Restricted data relates to “data held in a computer; and to which access is restricted by an access control system associated with a function of the computer”. (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Cybercrime Bill 2001 – Revised Explanatory Memorandum, p. 13)

This offence cannot be used in this case as the data which Robert Lawrence has obtained was “not restricted”, in the sense that Robert Lawrence did not have to circumvent any security measures in place to access the data.

478.2 Unauthorised impairment of data held on a computer disk

This is an offence for a “person to cause any unauthorised impairment of the reliability, security or operations of any data held on a computer disk, credit card or other device used to store data by electronic means, where the person intends to cause the impairment and knows that the impairment is unauthorised”. (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Cybercrime Bill 2001 – Revised Explanatory Memorandum, p. 13)

This offence is similar in nature to 477.2, however it relates to Commonwealth or Commonwealth owned or leased devices, which CC Terminals is not. In this case we would need to examine NSW state offence 308I. As with 477.2 it is unlikely that either 478.2 or 308I could be used.

478.3 Possession or control of data with intent to commit a computer offence

This is an offence for a “person to possess or control data with the intention of committing or facilitating the commission of an offence against … sections 477 by that person or another person.” (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Cybercrime Bill 2001 – Revised Explanatory Memorandum, p. 14).

Due to the serious offences committed by Mr Lawrence being state ones, the offence 477.1 (4) could not be applied. As a result no offence under the commonwealth was committed, and therefore 478.3 cannot be applied as it is dependent on 477. We need to turn to the NSW State offence 308F.
308F Possession of data with intent to commit serious computer offence

The revised explanation of the Cybercrime Bill 2001 – Revised Explanatory Memorandum says this offence is “analogous to the offence of ‘going equipped for theft’”. (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Cybercrime Bill 2001 – Revised Explanatory Memorandum, p. 14). It also says that this is “designed to cover persons who possess programs or technology designed to hack into other people’s computer systems or impair data or electronic communication.” (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Cybercrime Bill 2001 – Revised Explanatory Memorandum, p.14).

We note that the definition of data includes “a program”. In this case Robert Lawrence was found to have the “windump” program – a tool which was used by Mr Lawrence with the purpose of gaining the personal details of Leila Conlay via way of accessing the data she was transmitting from her computer. He obtained this data with the intent of stalking or following Leila Conlay – the NSW state offence defined by Path 15, Division 1, Section 562AB of the NSW Crimes Act 1900 No. 40. We also note that Mr Lawrence had in his possession the data which he had also captured using the “windump” program which was obtained without authority to do so.

478.4 Producing, supplying or obtaining data with intent to commit a computer offence

This is an offence for a person to “produce, supply or obtain data with the intention of committing or facilitating a computer offence by that person or another person.” (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Cybercrime Bill 2001 – Revised Explanatory Memorandum, p. 15). This differs from 478.3 in that it is “primarily targeted at those who devise, propagate or publish programs which are intended for use in the commission of an offence against … section 477.1, 477.2 or 477.3” (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Cybercrime Bill 2001 – Revised Explanatory Memorandum, p. 15) as opposed to having such a program in ones possession.

While Mr Lawrence has data (or programs) in his possession to facilitate a computer offence, he has not actually created or written a program to do so. As a result it is unlikely this offence would be applied to Mr Lawrence.
Summary of offences

To summarise, Mr Lawrence has committed several offences, these along with the penalties for them are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offence</th>
<th>Maximum Penalty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crimes Act 1900 No. 40: 308C Unauthorised access, modification or impairment with intent to commit a serious indictable offence</td>
<td>5 years imprisonment – relating to maximum penalty from offence 562AB of the Crimes Act 1900 No. 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimes Act 1900 No. 40: 308F Possession of data with intent to commit serious computer offence</td>
<td>3 years imprisonment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 - No. 114: Part II Interception of Telecommunications Section 7 Telecommunications not to be intercepted, subsection 1</td>
<td>2 years imprisonment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimes Act 1900 No. 40: Part 3 offences against the person, Division 4 Documents containing threats, Section 31 Documents containing threats</td>
<td>10 years imprisonment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimes Act 1900 No. 40: Part 15A Apprehended violence, Division 1 Definitions and offence, Section 562AB Stalking or intimidation with intent to cause fear of physical or mental harm</td>
<td>5 years imprisonment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Discrimination Act 1977: Part 2A Prohibition of sexual harassment, 22B Harassment of employees, commission agents, contract workers, partners etc.</td>
<td>Fine of $40,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Recommendations

From our analysis we can see the computers in the network are connected via hubs – running “windump” on a switched network would not be able to capture traffic from another computer where the traffic was not directed to the one we were using. This is one of the major problems which allowed Mr Lawrence to gain access to the communications sent by Leila Conlay. Having computers connected to the network via a hub means that all the computers connected to it share the physical media segment. As a result any computer can pick up any other transmission another computer makes. To stop or reduce this, a recommendation is that all computers be connected to the network via a switch. This would have at least reduced Robert Lawrence’s ability to sniff the network traffic as the physical network connection is no longer shared. This would not stop Mr Lawrence from using such a tool as “dsniff” (Song) (Davis) to sniff the switch. However if other measures are put in place such as turning security on in the switch to lock a port down to a specific MAC address, then any change in the MAC address advertised on the port would cause the port to be shutdown – as can be done in the case of CISCO switches.

As we can see from the captured traffic which Mr Lawrence obtained, the HTTP headers in Leila Conlay’s email show the client to be “WINNT5.1” (see figure 57) which is Microsoft Windows XP (Microsoft Corporation, HttpBrowserCapabilities.Platform Property (.NET Framework)). As a result, it is probably safe to assume that both Leila Conlay and Robert Lawrence are using the same operating systems, so Robert Lawrence would also likely to have been using Microsoft Windows XP. From running “winpcap” we know that in order for it to be installed the person using the computer (in the case of Windows NT and windows NT variants where account permissions exist – at least with an NTFS file partition), the user must have administrative rights. From our analysis for Mr Lawrence to be able to run “windump”, then “winpcap” needed to be installed. This leads to three alternatives – Mr Lawrence had access to the “Administrator” password or his account had administrative privileges. The other instance where administration privileges would not be needed is if the file system of the work computer was FAT.

POST /cgi-bin/premail/2452 HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, application/msword, */*
Refferer: http://by12fd.bay12.hotmail.msn.com/cgi-bin/compose?&curmbox=F000000001&a=27d6f510deaclbac5415e72029263c9
Accept-Language: en-us
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
Host: by12fd.bay12.hotmail.msn.com
Content-Length: 576
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
Cookie: MC1=V=3&GUID=49A9B22A05294A1A81F11881BF3C264B; y=1; MSPAuth=5Qr3f0LU3B54
Figure 57 – windump capture file showing HTTP headers and browser and operating system information

From this we determine three recommendations depending on the setup of the work computer, which may be inclusive of each other. Firstly, if the computer is running a FAT file system, this should be changed to NTFS to provide security permissions to the file systems. This will also provide the advantage of extra logging facilities on the file system. Secondly if the system is running an NTFS file system then the users should not be allowed administrative privileges to install software or components that can affect the operating system, such as drivers (which “winpcap” has as part of it’s components). Thirdly, if Mr Lawrence gained access via getting access to the “Administrator” password, some policies should be put in place in order to regularly change the administrator password and ensure the password is restricted to the system administrators who require it.

An acceptable use policy stopping use of computer network from personal use could be implemented – this would have prevented or at least reduced the likelihood of Leila sending personal emails to acquaintances. This would have prevented Mr Lawrence, at least in the workplace context, the opportunity to get personal details. Also in hand with this is the workplace would be less liable to Leila if she thought of making a claim against the company due to insufficient security of it’s computer systems.

Similarly an acceptable use policy for employees at CC Terminals should state clearly what is allowed or not allowed in terms of conduct with respect to computers. The organisation could say it reserves the right to monitor what traffic people get from the internet and say what could happen if they abused this - while it may have dissuaded Robert Lawrence or other people from downloading tools at work – they could still easily get it from home and bring it to work on some other media such as CD-ROM or USB flash sticks, such as what could have happened with Robert Lawrence and how he obtained the “winpcap” and “windump” programs.

An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) could be installed and monitor certain binary patterns that may constitute hacking type tools being downloaded and send an alert to security or system administrators.

For Leila’s part – if she is going to be using personal emails from work and the policy allows it, then maybe using SSL (Secure Socket Layer) encryption, i.e. HTTPS could be used to encrypt any messages she sends, so at least if nothing
about the computer setup changes, her personal emails will at least be unable to be read or not easily read by Robert Lawrence. This however depends on the hotmail hosts running the HTTPS protocol for email.

In summary the two main items of high priority, which should be addressed are, firstly, moving the computers from a hub topology network to a switched network to prevent or reduce the risk of network traffic monitoring. Secondly, administrator rights for normal users should be removed to prevent unauthorised installation of software which may be damaging or criminally malicious.
Additional Information

- **http://www.scaleplus.law.gov.au**
  This web site contains copies of the commonwealth law and provides a search engine to search for terms within the commonwealth law. The web site is no longer updated from January 2005, but it does contain all information and amendments up until then.

- **http://www.law.gov.au/**
  This is the new web site setup for Australian Law and replaces the **http://www.scaleplus.law.gov.au** web site.

- **http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au**
  This web site contains information regarding the NSW state law and has all the documents relating to NSW state law on-line. It also provides a search engine for searching the NSW state law. This site also has links to Case Law which can be useful in looking at precedents set by various law cases.

- **http://www.sleuthkit.org**
  This web site contains the tools that were used for the forensic analysis of the USB Flash drive image. It also contains links to various other computer forensic analysis web sites. It has a very good series of articles known as “The Sleuth Kit Informer” on using the forensic tools by Brian Carrier.

- **http://www.intellectualheaven.com/default.asp?BH=projects&H=strace.htm**
  This is the StraceNT tool used for the forensic details section. It is a very useful program for tracing system calls by programs to see what they are doing under the Microsoft Windows platforms. It is highly configurable in terms of giving the user the ability to choose the functions or system calls to examine or exclude from examining. It is written by Pankaj Garg for IntellectualHeaven (http://www.intellectualheaven.com).

- **http://l0t3k.org/security/tools/forensic/**
  This link contains a list of various forensic tools that can be used for forensic analysis.

- **http://www-inst.eecs.berkely.edu/~instcd/inst-cd/windows/c-compiler**
  This is a link to MinGW – the Minimalist GNU compiler tools for native Windows environment. It contains a gcc, GNU make, GNU debugger and GNU Binutils. Not only does it contain the compiler and linker utilities, it also contains some useful command line tools that can be used for
forensic analysis, such as "strings.exe". Other related web sites are mingw.sourceforge.net and www.mingw.org.

- **msdn.microsoft.com**
  The Microsoft Developer Network site is a very useful site for looking up information regarding technical details on Microsoft products. It has a good search engine – so finding information is quite easy. This site was used to obtain various pieces of information such as the FAT file specification, the portable execution file format and structure and information relating to some of the strings found in the boot partition and HTTP headers.

- **http://download.microsoft.com/download/8/3/f/83f69587-47f1-48e2-86a6-aab14f01f1fe/PE.exe**
  Link location to download the pedump.exe program from Microsoft.
**Contents of her.doc**

Hey I saw you the other day. I tried to say "hi", but you disappeared??? That was a nice blue dress you were wearing. I heard that your car was giving you some trouble. Maybe I can give you a ride to work sometime, or maybe we can get dinner sometime?

Have a nice day

**Contents of hey.doc**

Hey! Why are you being so mean? I was just offering to help you out with your car! Don't tell me to get lost! You should give me a chance. I'm a nice guy just trying to help you out, just because I think you're cute doesn't mean I'm weird. Perhaps coffee would be better, when would be a good time for you?

**Contents of coffee.doc**

Hey what gives? I was drinking a coffee on thursday and saw you stop buy with some guy! You said you didn't want coffee with me, but you'll go have it with some random guy?? He looked like a loser! Guys like that are nothing but trouble. I can't believe you did this to me! You should stick to your word, if you're not interested in going to coffee with me then you shouldn't be going with anyone! I heard rumors about a "bad batch" of coffee, hope you don't get any...

**Extracted email message from capture file put in an email format**

FROM: flowergirl96@hotmail.com  
TO: SamGuarillo@hotmail.com  
SUBJECT: RE: coffee

Sure! coffee sounds great. Let's meet at the coffee shop on the corner Hollywood and McCadden. It's a nice out of the way spot.

See you at 7pm

-Leila.
StraceNT filter file “test.txt”

# Sample Trace filter file for StraceNT
# Copyright (c) Pankaj Garg. All rights reserved
#
# Usage notes:
# EXCLUDES takes preference over INCLUDES. If an entry is specified in both EXCLUDE and INCLUDE, then it is excluded from the patching
# An empty entry for INCLUDES means "Patch ALL"
# An empty entry for EXCLUDES means "Exclude NONE"
#
# The diagram below shows how the modules and loaded and how import tables are specific to each module. The sample process is wordpad.exe
#
# Loaded_Module Imported_Module Imported_Functions
# -------------- -------------- ------------------
# wordpad.exe
# gdi32.dll kernel32.dll
# kernel32.dll
# ntdll.dll
#
# Entries below specifies which modules of the process that are loaded or will be loaded in future using LoadLibrary should be patched. Loaded modules usually includes process Exe and other DLLs it loads.
# For example: If notepad.exe only uses kernel32.dll then its loaded modules will be "notepad.exe" and "kernel32.dll"

LOADED_MODULES_INCLUDES=wpcap.dll;packet.dll;
LOADED_MODULES_EXCLUDES=

# Entries below specifies which imported modules should we patch.
# Any loaded module i.e. either Exe or Dll can import functions from other modules and below you can specify which imported modules to patch and which to exclude.
# For example: If notepad.exe only uses kernel32.dll then loaded module notepad.exe's Import table will contain kernel32.dll's reference and loaded module kernel32.dll's Import table will contain reference to modules on which kernel32.dll is dependent (like NTDLL.dll)
Appendix II — configuration files

IMP_MODULES_INCLUDES=wpcap.dll;packet.dll;
IMP_MODULES_EXCLUDES=

####################################################################
# It simply specifies which functions to patch and which functions
# to exclude. Function names are CASE SENSITIVE.
####################################################################

FUNCTIONS_INCLUDES=
FUNCTIONS_EXCLUDES=EnterCriticalSection;ReadProcessMemory;LeaveCriticalSection;IsBadReadPtr;
                   InterlockedIncrement;InterlockedDecrement;

####################################################################
# The sample values given above will cause only functions
# imported from kernel32.dll to be patched. Modules Kernel32.dll
# and ntdll.dll will not be patched. Also the functions
# listed in FUNCTIONS_EXCLUDES will not be patched.
####################################################################
Foremost configuration file foremost.conf

# Foremost configuration file
# The configuration file is used to control what types of files foremost
# searches for. A sample configuration file, foremost.conf, is included with
# this distribution. For each file type, the configuration file describes
# the file's extension, whether the header and footer are case sensitive,
# the maximum file size, and the header and footer for the file. The footer
# field is optional, but header, size, case sensitivity, and extension are
# not!
# Any line that begins with a '#' is considered a comment and ignored. Thus,
# to skip a file type just put a '#' at the beginning of that line
#
# Headers and footers are decoded before use. To specify a value in
# hexadecimal use \x[0-9\[0-9\], and for octal use \[0-3\[0-7\[0-7\]. Spaces
# can be represented by \s. Example: "\x4F\123\I\sCCI" decodes to "OSI CCI".
# To match any single character (aka a wildcard) use a '?' If you need to
# search for the '?' character, you will need to change the 'wildcard' line
# *and* every occurrence of the old wildcard character in the configuration
# file. Don't forget those hex and octal values! '?' is equal to 0x3f and
# \063.
# If you would like to extract files without an extension enter the value
# "NONE" in the extension column (note: you can change the value of this
# "no suffix" flag by setting the variable FOREMOST_NOEXTENSION_SUFFIX
# in foremost.h and recompiling).
# The REVERSE keyword after a footer instructs foremost to search backwards
# starting from [size] bytes in the extraction buffer and working towards the
# beginning. This is useful for files like PDFs that have multiple copies of
# the footer throughout the file. When using the REVERSE keyword you will
# extract bytes from the header to the LAST occurrence of your footer within the
# window determined by the [size] of your extraction.
# The NEXT keyword after a footer instructs foremost to search forwards for data
# that starts with the header provided and terminates or is followed by data in
# the footer -- the footer data is not included in the output. The data in the
# footer, when used with the NEXT keyword effectively allows you to search for
# data that you know for sure should not be in the output file. This method for
# example, lets you search for two 'starting' headers in a document that doesn't
# have a good ending footer and you can't say exactly what the footer is, but
# you know if you see another header, that should end the search and an output
# file should be written.
# To redefine the wildcard character, change the setting below and all
# occurrences in the foremost.conf file.
#
# wildcard ?
#extension sensitive

# Appendix II – configuration files

Foremost configuration file foremost.conf

# The configuration file is used to control what types of files foremost
# searches for. A sample configuration file, foremost.conf, is included with
# this distribution. For each file type, the configuration file describes
# the file's extension, whether the header and footer are case sensitive,
# the maximum file size, and the header and footer for the file. The footer
# field is optional, but header, size, case sensitivity, and extension are
# not!
# Any line that begins with a '#' is considered a comment and ignored. Thus,
# to skip a file type just put a '#' at the beginning of that line
#
# Headers and footers are decoded before use. To specify a value in
# hexadecimal use \x[0-9\[0-9\], and for octal use \[0-3\[0-7\[0-7\]. Spaces
# can be represented by \s. Example: "\x4F\123\I\sCCI" decodes to "OSI CCI".
# To match any single character (aka a wildcard) use a '?'. If you need to
# search for the '?' character, you will need to change the 'wildcard' line
# *and* every occurrence of the old wildcard character in the configuration
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# data that you know for sure should not be in the output file. This method for
# example, lets you search for two 'starting' headers in a document that doesn't
# have a good ending footer and you can't say exactly what the footer is, but
# you know if you see another header, that should end the search and an output
# file should be written.
# To redefine the wildcard character, change the setting below and all
# occurrences in the foremost.conf file.
#
# wildcard ?
#extension sensitive
# NONE y 1000 FOREMOST
#------------------------------------------
# GRAPHICS FILES
#------------------------------------------
# #
# # AOL ART files
art y 150000 \x4a\x47\x04\x0e \xcf\xcb
art y 150000 \x4a\x47\x03\x0e \xd0\xcb\x00\x00
# #
# # GIF and JPG files (very common)
gif y 155000000 \x47\x49\x46\x38\x71\x61 \x00\x3b
gif y 155000000 \x47\x49\x46\x39\x71\x61 \x00\x00\x3b
jpg y 200000000 \xff\xd8\xff\xe0\x00\x10 \xff\xd9
# # PNG (used in web pages)
png y 200000 \x50\x4e\x47\x0d \xff\xfb\xff
# #
# # BMP (used by MSWindows, use only if you have reason to think there are
# # BMP files worth digging for. This often kicks back a lot of false
# # positives
bmp y 100000 BM??\x00\x00\x00
# # TIF
tif y 200000000 \x49\x49\x2a\x00
# #------------------------------------------
# ANIMATION FILES
#------------------------------------------
# # AVI (Windows animation and DiVX/MPEG-4 movies)
avi y 400000 RIFF????AVI
# # Apple Quicktime
# Some users have reported that when using these headers that the
# headers repeat inside the files. This can generate lots of smaller
# output files. You may want to consider using the -q (quick mode)
# flag to avoid this problem.
mov y 400000 ????????\x6d\x6f\x76
mov y 400000 ????????\x6d\x64\x74
# # MPEG Video
mpg y 400000 \x00\x00\x01\x8a \x00\x00\x01\x8b
mpg y 400000 \x00\x00\x01\x83 \x00\x00\x01\x87
# # Macromedia Flash
# fws y 400000 FWS
# #------------------------------------------
# MICROSOFT OFFICE
#------------------------------------------
# # Word documents
# # look for begin tag and then wait until the next one (NEXT TAG) -- usually word documents
# and other Ole2 structured storage files are 'near' each other. Just make the file
# size large enough to catch our maximum size file. Look in the audit file to see if any
# were chopped.
doc y 12500000 \xdc\xcf\x11\xe0\xa1\xb1\x1a\xe1\x00\x00 \xdc\xcf\x11\xe0\xa1\xb1\x1a\xe1\x00\x00 NEXT
doc y 12500000 \xdc\xcf\x11\xe0\xa1\xb1
Appendix II – configuration files

# Outlook files
psf y 40000000 \x21\x42\x4e\xa5\x6f\xb5\x9a
ost y 40000000 \x21\x42\x4e\x44

#: Outlook Express
dbx y 4000000 \xcf\x12\xfe\x9a\x74\x6f
idx y 4000000 \x4a\x4d\x46\x39
mbx y 4000000 \x4a\x4d\x46\x36

# WORDPERFECT
wpc y 100000 ?WPC

# HTML
htm n 50000 <html </html>

# ADOBE PDF
pdf y 500000 %PDF %EOF\x0d REVERSE

# AOL (AMERICA ONLINE)
# AOL Mailbox
mail y 500000 \x41\x4f\x4c\x56\x4d

# PGP (PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY)
pgd y 500000 \x50\x47\x50\x64\x49\x4e\x60\x01

# PGP Disk Files
# Security Ring
pgp y 100000 \x99\x00
# Encrypted Data or ASCII armored keys
pgp y 100000 \xa6\x00
# (there should be a trailer for this...)
txt y 100000 -----BEGIN\040PGP

# RPM (Linux package format)
# rpm y 100000 \xed\xab

# SOUND FILES
# wav y 200000 RIFF????WAVE
Appendix II – configuration files

# Real Audio Files
ra y 1000000 \x2e\x72\x61\xfd
ra y 1000000 .RMF
#

# WINDOWS REGISTRY FILES
#
#
# Windows NT registry
dat y 4000000 regf
# Windows 95 registry
dat y 4000000 CREG
#

# MISCELLANEOUS
#
zip y 1000000 PK\x03\x04 \x3c\xac
java y 1000000 \xca\xfe\xba\xbe
#

# ScanSoft PaperPort "Max" files
#
max y 1000000 \x56\x47\x46\x1a\x00\x00\x05\x80\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00

# PINs Password Manager program
#
pins y 8000 \x50\x49\x4e\x53\x20\x34\x2e\x32\x30\x0d

tgz y 1500000 \x1f\x8b\x08?
elf y 1500000 \x7f\x45\x4c\x46
#elf y 1500000 \x7f\x45\x4c\x46 \x10\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00
shell y 1000000 \x23\x21\x2f\x62\x6e\x2f\x73\x68 \x0a\x00\x00\x00
exe y 485810 MZP
#exe y 485810 \x4d\x5a\x50
#exe y 1500000 \x4d\x5a\x50\x00\x00\x02 \x47\x49\x50\x45\x4e\x44
exe y 450560 \x4d\x5a\x90\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff
Appendix III – extracts of law documents


Part 10.7—Computer offences

Division 476—Preliminary

476.1 Definitions

(1) In this Part:

**access to data held in a computer** means:
(a) the display of the data by the computer or any other output of the data from the computer; or
(b) the copying or moving of the data to any other place in the computer or to a data storage device; or
(c) in the case of a program—the execution of the program.

**Commonwealth computer** means a computer owned, leased or operated by a Commonwealth entity.

**data** includes:
(a) information in any form; or
(b) any program (or part of a program).

**data held in a computer** includes:
(a) data held in any removable data storage device for the time being held in a computer; or
(b) data held in a data storage device on a computer network of which the computer forms a part.

**data storage device** means a thing (for example, a disk or file server) containing, or designed to contain, data for use by a computer.

**electronic communication** means a communication of information in any form by means of guided or unguided electromagnetic energy.

**impairment of electronic communication to or from a computer** includes:
(a) the prevention of any such communication; or
(b) the impairment of any such communication on an electronic link or network used by the computer;
but does not include a mere interception of any such communication.

**modification**, in respect of data held in a computer, means:
(a) the alteration or removal of the data; or
(b) an addition to the data.
telecommunications service means a service for carrying communications by means of guided or unguided electromagnetic energy or both.

unauthorised access, modification or impairment has the meaning given in section 476.2.

(2) In this Part, a reference to:
   (a) access to data held in a computer; or
   (b) modification of data held in a computer; or
   (c) the impairment of electronic communication to or from a computer;

is limited to such access, modification or impairment caused, whether directly or indirectly, by the execution of a function of a computer.

476.2 Meaning of unauthorised access, modification or impairment

(1) In this Part:
   (a) access to data held in a computer; or
   (b) modification of data held in a computer; or
   (c) the impairment of electronic communication to or from a computer; or
   (d) the impairment of the reliability, security or operation of any data held on a computer disk, credit card or other device used to store data by electronic means;

by a person is unauthorised if the person is not entitled to cause that access, modification or impairment.

(2) Any such access, modification or impairment caused by the person is not unauthorised merely because he or she has an ulterior purpose for causing it.

(3) For the purposes of an offence under this Part, a person causes any such unauthorised access, modification or impairment if the person’s conduct substantially contributes to it.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (1), if:
   (a) a person causes any access, modification or impairment of a kind mentioned in that subsection; and
   (b) the person does so under a warrant issued under the law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory;

the person is entitled to cause that access, modification or impairment.
Appendix III – extracts of law documents

476.3 Geographical jurisdiction

Section 15.1 (extended geographical jurisdiction—Category A) applies to offences under this Part.

476.4 Saving of other laws

(1) This Part is not intended to exclude or limit the operation of any other law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory.

(2) Subsection (1) has effect subject to section 476.5.

476.5 Liability for certain acts

(1) A staff member or agent of ASIS or DSD (the agency) is not subject to any civil or criminal liability for any computer-related act done outside Australia if the act is done in the proper performance of a function of the agency.

(2) A person is not subject to any civil or criminal liability for any act done inside Australia if:

(a) the act is preparatory to, in support of, or otherwise directly connected with, overseas activities of the agency concerned; and

(b) the act:

(i) taken together with a computer-related act, event, circumstance or result that took place, or was intended to take place, outside Australia, could amount to an offence; but

(ii) in the absence of that computer-related act, event, circumstance or result, would not amount to an offence; and

(c) the act is done in the proper performance of a function of the agency.

(2A) Subsection (2) is not intended to permit any act in relation to premises, persons, computers, things, or telecommunications services in Australia, being:

(a) an act that ASIO could not do without a Minister authorising it by warrant issued under Division 2 of Part III of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 or under Part III of the Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979; or

(b) an act to obtain information that ASIO could not obtain other than in accordance with section 283 of the Telecommunications Act 1997.

(2B) The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security may give a certificate in writing certifying any fact relevant to the question of
whether an act was done in the proper performance of a function of an agency.

(2C) In any proceedings, a certificate given under subsection (2B) is prima facie evidence of the facts certified.

(3) In this section:

**ASIS** means the Australian Secret Intelligence Service.

**civil or criminal liability** means any civil or criminal liability (whether under this Part, under another law or otherwise).

**computer-related act, event, circumstance or result** means an act, event, circumstance or result involving:
- (a) the reliability, security or operation of a computer; or
- (b) access to, or modification of, data held in a computer or on a data storage device; or
- (c) electronic communication to or from a computer; or
- (d) the reliability, security or operation of any data held in or on a computer, computer disk, credit card, or other data storage device; or
- (e) possession or control of data held in a computer or on a data storage device; or
- (f) producing, supplying or obtaining data held in a computer or on a data storage device.

**DSD** means that part of the Department of Defence known as the Defence Signals Directorate.

**staff member** means:
- (a) in relation to ASIS—the Director-General of ASIS or a member of the staff of ASIS (whether an employee of ASIS, a consultant to ASIS, or a person who is made available by another Commonwealth or State authority or other person to perform services for ASIS); and
- (b) in relation to DSD—the Director of DSD or a member of the staff of DSD (whether an employee of DSD, a consultant to DSD, or a person who is made available by another Commonwealth or State authority or other person to perform services for DSD).

**Division 477—Serious computer offences**

**477.1 Unauthorised access, modification or impairment with intent to commit a serious offence**

*Intention to commit a serious Commonwealth, State or Territory*
offence

(1) A person is guilty of an offence if:
   (a) the person causes:
       (i) any unauthorised access to data held in a computer; or
       (ii) any unauthorised modification of data held in a computer; or
       (iii) any unauthorised impairment of electronic communication to
            or from a computer; and
   (b) the unauthorised access, modification or impairment is caused
       by means of a telecommunications service; and
   (c) the person knows the access, modification or impairment is
       unauthorised; and
   (d) the person intends to commit, or facilitate the commission of, a
       serious offence against a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a
       Territory (whether by that person or another person) by the
       access, modification or impairment.

(2) Absolute liability applies to paragraph (1)(b).

(3) In a prosecution for an offence against subsection (1), it is not
    necessary to prove that the defendant knew that the offence was:
    (a) an offence against a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a
        Territory; or
    (b) a serious offence.

Intention to commit a serious Commonwealth offence

(4) A person is guilty of an offence if:
   (a) the person causes:
       (i) any unauthorised access to data held in a computer; or
       (ii) any unauthorised modification of data held in a computer; or
       (iii) any unauthorised impairment of electronic communication to
            or from a computer; and
   (b) the person knows the access, modification or impairment is
       unauthorised; and
   (c) the person intends to commit, or facilitate the commission of, a
       serious offence against a law of the Commonwealth (whether by
       that person or another person) by the access, modification or
       impairment.

(5) In a prosecution for an offence against subsection (3), it is not
    necessary to prove that the defendant knew that the offence was:
    (a) an offence against a law of the Commonwealth; or
    (b) a serious offence.

Penalty
(6) A person who is guilty of an offence against this section is punishable, on conviction, by a penalty not exceeding the penalty applicable to the serious offence.

*Impossibility*

(7) A person may be found guilty of an offence against this section even if committing the serious offence is impossible.

*No offence of attempt*

(8) It is not an offence to attempt to commit an offence against this section.

*Meaning of serious offence*

(9) In this section:

*serious offence* means an offence that is punishable by imprisonment for life or a period of 5 or more years.

### 477.2 Unauthorised modification of data to cause impairment

(1) A person is guilty of an offence if:

(a) the person causes any unauthorised modification of data held in a computer; and

(b) the person knows the modification is unauthorised; and

(c) the person is reckless as to whether the modification impairs or will impair:

(i) access to that or any other data held in any computer; or

(ii) the reliability, security or operation, of any such data; and

(d) one or more of the following applies:

(i) the data that is modified is held in a Commonwealth computer;

(ii) the data that is modified is held on behalf of the Commonwealth in a computer;

(iii) the modification of the data is caused by means of a telecommunications service;

(iv) the modification of the data is caused by means of a Commonwealth computer;

(v) the modification of the data impairs access to, or the reliability, security or operation of, other data held in a Commonwealth computer;

(vi) the modification of the data impairs access to, or the reliability, security or operation of, other data held on behalf of the Commonwealth in a computer;
(vii) the modification of the data impairs access to, or the reliability, security or operation of, other data by means of a telecommunications service.

Penalty: 10 years imprisonment.

(2) Absolute liability applies to paragraph (1)(d).

(3) A person may be guilty of an offence against this section even if there is or will be no actual impairment to:
   (a) access to data held in a computer; or
   (b) the reliability, security or operation, of any such data.

(4) A conviction for an offence against this section is an alternative verdict to a charge for an offence against section 477.3 (unauthorised impairment of electronic communication).

477.3 Unauthorised impairment of electronic communication

(1) A person is guilty of an offence if:
   (a) the person causes any unauthorised impairment of electronic communication to or from a computer; and
   (b) the person knows that the impairment is unauthorised; and
   (c) one or both of the following applies:
      (i) the electronic communication is sent to or from the computer by means of a telecommunications service;
      (ii) the electronic communication is sent to or from a Commonwealth computer.

Penalty: 10 years imprisonment.

(2) Absolute liability applies to paragraph (1)(c).

(3) A conviction for an offence against this section is an alternative verdict to a charge for an offence against section 477.2 (unauthorised modification of data to cause impairment).

Division 478—Other computer offences

478.1 Unauthorised access to, or modification of, restricted data

(1) A person is guilty of an offence if:
   (a) the person causes any unauthorised access to, or modification of, restricted data; and
   (b) the person intends to cause the access or modification; and
   (c) the person knows that the access or modification is unauthorised; and
(d) one or more of the following applies:
   (i) the restricted data is held in a Commonwealth computer;
   (ii) the restricted data is held on behalf of the Commonwealth;
   (iii) the access to, or modification of, the restricted data is
        caused by means of a telecommunications service.

Penalty: 2 years imprisonment.

(2) Absolute liability applies to paragraph (1)(d).

(3) In this section:

**restricted data** means data:
   (a) held in a computer; and
   (b) to which access is restricted by an access control system
       associated with a function of the computer.

### 478.2 Unauthorised impairment of data held on a computer disk etc.

(1) A person is guilty of an offence if:
   (a) the person causes any unauthorised impairment of the reliability,
       security or operation of data held on:
       (i) a computer disk; or
       (ii) a credit card; or
       (iii) another device used to store data by electronic means; and
   (b) the person intends to cause the impairment; and
   (c) the person knows that the impairment is unauthorised; and
   (d) the computer disk, credit card or other device is owned or leased
       by a Commonwealth entity.

Penalty: 2 years imprisonment.

(2) Absolute liability applies to paragraph (1)(d).

### 478.3 Possession or control of data with intent to commit a computer offence

(1) A person is guilty of an offence if:
   (a) the person has possession or control of data; and
   (b) the person has that possession or control with the intention that
       the data be used, by the person or another person, in:
       (i) committing an offence against Division 477; or
       (ii) facilitating the commission of such an offence.

Penalty: 3 years imprisonment.

(2) A person may be found guilty of an offence against this section even
if committing the offence against Division 477 is impossible.

No offence of attempt

(3) It is not an offence to attempt to commit an offence against this section.

Meaning of possession or control of data

(4) In this section, a reference to a person having possession or control of data includes a reference to the person:
   (a) having possession of a computer or data storage device that holds or contains the data; or
   (b) having possession of a document in which the data is recorded; or
   (c) having control of data held in a computer that is in the possession of another person (whether inside or outside Australia).

478.4 Producing, supplying or obtaining data with intent to commit a computer offence

(1) A person is guilty of an offence if:
   (a) the person produces, supplies or obtains data; and
   (b) the person does so with the intention that the data be used, by the person or another person, in:
      (i) committing an offence against Division 477; or
      (ii) facilitating the commission of such an offence.

Penalty: 3 years imprisonment.

(2) A person may be found guilty of an offence against this section even if committing the offence against Division 477 is impossible.

No offence of attempt

(3) It is not an offence to attempt to commit an offence against this section.

Meaning of producing, supplying or obtaining data

(4) In this section, a reference to a person producing, supplying or obtaining data includes a reference to the person:
   (a) producing, supplying or obtaining data held or contained in a computer or data storage device; or
   (b) producing, supplying or obtaining a document in which the data is recorded.
Appendix III – extracts of law documents

Extract from NSW Crimes Act 1900 No. 40

Part 6 - Computer offences

308 General definitions
In this Part:

data includes:

(a) information in any form, or
(b) any program (or part of a program).

data held in a computer includes:

(a) data entered or copied into the computer, or
(b) data held in any removable data storage device for the time being in the computer, or
(c) data held in a data storage device on a computer network of which the computer forms part.

data storage device means any thing (for example a disk or file server) containing or designed to contain data for use by a computer.

electronic communication means a communication of information in any form by means of guided or unguided electromagnetic energy.

serious computer offence means:

(a) an offence against section 308C, 308D or 308E, or
(b) conduct in another jurisdiction that is an offence in that jurisdiction and that would constitute an offence against section 308C, 308D or 308E if the conduct occurred in this jurisdiction.

308A Meaning of access to data, modification of data and impairment of electronic communication

(1) In this Part, access to data held in a computer means:

(a) the display of the data by the computer or any other output of the data from the computer, or
(b) the copying or moving of the data to any other place in the computer or to a data storage device, or
(c) in the case of a program--the execution of the program.

(2) In this Part, modification of data held in a computer means:

(a) the alteration or removal of the data, or
(b) an addition to the data.

(3) In this Part, impairment of electronic communication to or from a computer includes:

(a) the prevention of any such communication, or
(b) the impairment of any such communication on an electronic link or network used by the computer, but does not include a mere interception of any such communication.

(4) A reference in this Part to any such access, modification or impairment is limited to access, modification or impairment caused (whether directly or indirectly) by the execution of a function of a computer.

308B Meaning of unauthorised access, modification or impairment

(1) For the purposes of this Part, access to or modification of data, or impairment of electronic communication, by a person is unauthorised if the person is not entitled to cause that access, modification or impairment.

(2) Any such access, modification or impairment is not unauthorised merely because the person has an ulterior purpose for that action.

(3) For the purposes of an offence under this Part, a person causes any such unauthorised access, modification or impairment if the person's conduct substantially contributes to the unauthorised access, modification or impairment.

308C Unauthorised access, modification or impairment with intent to commit serious indictable offence

(1) A person who causes any unauthorised computer function:

(a) knowing it is unauthorised, and

(b) with the intention of committing a serious indictable offence, or facilitating the commission of a serious indictable offence (whether by the person or by another person),

is guilty of an offence.

Maximum penalty: The maximum penalty applicable if the person had committed, or facilitated the commission of, the serious indictable offence in this jurisdiction.

(2) For the purposes of this section, an unauthorised computer function is:

(a) any unauthorised access to data held in any computer, or

(b) any unauthorised modification of data held in any computer, or

(c) any unauthorised impairment of electronic communication to or from any computer.

(3) For the purposes of this section, a serious indictable offence includes an offence in any other jurisdiction that would be a serious indictable offence if committed in this jurisdiction.

(4) A person may be found guilty of an offence against this section:

(a) even if committing the serious indictable offence concerned is impossible, or

(b) whether the serious indictable offence is to be committed at the time of the unauthorised conduct or at a later time.

(5) It is not an offence to attempt to commit an offence against this section.

308D Unauthorised modification of data with intent to cause impairment
(1) A person who:
   (a) causes any unauthorised modification of data held in a
       computer, and
   (b) knows that the modification is unauthorised, and
   (c) intends by the modification to impair access to, or to impair the
       reliability, security or operation of, any data held in a computer, or
       who is reckless as to any such impairment,

is guilty of an offence.
   Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years.

(2) A conviction for an offence against this section is an alternative verdict
    to a charge for:
   (a) an offence against section 195 (Maliciously destroying or
       damaging property), or
   (b) an offence against section 308E (Unauthorised impairment of
electronic communication).

308E Unauthorised impairment of electronic communication
(1) A person who:
   (a) causes any unauthorised impairment of electronic
       communication to or from a computer, and
   (b) knows that the impairment is unauthorised, and
   (c) intends to impair electronic communication to or from the
       computer, or who is reckless as to any such impairment,

is guilty of an offence.
   Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years.

(2) A conviction for an offence against this section is an alternative verdict
    to a charge for:
   (a) an offence against section 195 (Maliciously destroying or
       damaging property), or
   (b) an offence against section 308D (Unauthorised modification of
data with intent to cause impairment).

308F Possession of data with intent to commit serious computer offence
(1) A person who is in possession or control of data:
   (a) with the intention of committing a serious computer offence, or
   (b) with the intention of facilitating the commission of a serious
       computer offence (whether by the person or by another person),

is guilty of an offence.
   Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 3 years.

(2) For the purposes of this section, possession or control of data
    includes:
   (a) possession of a computer or data storage device holding or
       containing the data or of a document in which the data is recorded,
       and
   (b) control of data held in a computer that is in the possession of
       another person (whether the computer is in this jurisdiction or
       outside this jurisdiction).

(3) A person may be found guilty of an offence against this section even if
committing the serious computer offence concerned is impossible.
(4) It is not an offence to attempt to commit an offence against this
section.

308G Producing, supplying or obtaining data with intent to commit serious
computer offence
(1) A person who produces, supplies or obtains data:
   (a) with the intention of committing a serious computer offence, or
   (b) with the intention of facilitating the commission of a serious
       computer offence (whether by the person or by another person),
is guilty of an offence.
       Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 3 years.
(2) For the purposes of this section, produce, supply or obtain data
includes:
   (a) produce, supply or obtain data held or contained in a computer
       or data storage device, or
   (b) produce, supply or obtain a document in which the data is
       recorded.
(3) A person may be found guilty of an offence against this section even if
committing the serious computer offence concerned is impossible.
(4) It is not an offence to attempt to commit an offence against this
section.

308H Unauthorised access to or modification of restricted data held in
computer (summary offence)
(1) A person:
   (a) who causes any unauthorised access to or modification of
       restricted data held in a computer, and
   (b) who knows that the access or modification is unauthorised, and
   (c) who intends to cause that access or modification,
is guilty of an offence.
       Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 2 years.
(2) An offence against this section is a summary offence.
(3) In this section:

restricted data means data held in a computer, being data to which
access is restricted by an access control system associated with a
function of the computer.

308I Unauthorised impairment of data held in computer disk, credit card or
other device (summary offence)
(1) A person:
   (a) who causes any unauthorised impairment of the reliability,
       security or operation of any data held on a computer disk, credit
       card or other device used to store data by electronic means, and
   (b) who knows that the impairment is unauthorised, and
   (c) who intends to cause that impairment,
is guilty of an offence.
Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 2 years.
(2) An offence against this section is a summary offence.
(3) For the purposes of this section, impairment of the reliability, security or operation of data is **unauthorised** if the person is not entitled to cause that impairment.
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13. 15 Feb. 2005

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### Upcoming SANS Forensics Training

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