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GCFA Practical Assignment Version 1.4
Submission 2nd attempt
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2 Abstract
This document is part of the GIAC GCFA certification process. According to the GCFA practical assignment version 1.4 the following options were chosen:

1. Part 1: Analysis of an unknown binary
2. Part 2: Option 1: Forensic analysis on a system
3. Part 3: Legal issues of incident handling

Part 1 analyses the given case by the GIAC Team for this practical. It deals with the usage of an unknown binary and an employee suspected to have used it on computer equipment owned by his employer.

Part 2 is the case description of a real compromised system at my company and it describes not just the forensic analysis, additionally all the things which happened around the investigation were discussed.

Part 3 discusses the legal implications of the violation of the laws concerning the illegal distribution of copyright protected material and in special the situation of illegal distribution of child pornography.

3 Part I: Analysis of an unknown binary

3.1 Floppy Disk Image Details
The image of the floppy disk was downloaded to the forensic workstation (see Part II of this Practical for a detailed description of the forensic workstation) from the GIAC web site in a ZIP file named “binary_v1_4.zip”. The following information of the seized disk is given on the GIAC web site:

Tag# fl-160703-jp1
3.5 inch TDK floppy disk
MD5: 4b680767a2aed974cec5fbcubf84cc97a
Fl-160703-jp1.dd.gz

First the downloaded Zip file was unzipped to receive the compressed dd image of the disk mentioned in the evidence list above.
To uncompress the zip file the `unzip` command with the `–X` option was used. This option stands for the extraction of a zip archive and additionally it preserves the UID and GID of the extracted files. This is done surely having in mind that this is unimportant in this case because it could only reveal the UID and GID of the administrator or investigator who made the image of the floppy disk. After that the md5 checksum of the uncompressed ZIP file was generated to proof that the downloaded file was not altered. This is done by using the `more` command to view the content of the file “fl-160703-jpl.dd.gz.md5” which is the md5 checksum of the floppy disk image generated by the investigator seizing the evidence. Additionally I generated an md5 sum of the uncompressed file “fl-160703-jpl.dd.gz” using the `md5` command. An md5 checksum comparison\(^1\) is a very powerful and simple method to proof that compared files are the same or not. The basic principle relies on a mathematical function which generates on an input a unique number as the result of the function. This unique number will always stay the same if the input stays the same and can be reproduced endlessly. As a result you can say the following. If two inputs result in the same unique number the input must had been equal. So in this case the input is the computer file and the unique number is the md5 hash value as shown in the above screen shot. As we can see the given md5 hash and the newly generated are the same so the files must have been received unaltered.

\(^1\) A more comprehensive description on md5 could be found at this URL
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid14_gci527453,00.html
As you can see in the screenshot I received three files. Two files with md5 hashes. One of the floppy disk image and one of the still to investigate unknown binary which still has to be extracted from the floppy disk image. In table 3-1 the names and bit sizes of the files were shown.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Filename</th>
<th>Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fl-160703-jp1.dd</td>
<td>474162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fl-160703-jp1.dd.gz.md5</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prog.md5</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-1 the give files and their file sizes

The image was uncompressed using **gunzip** because the “.gz” ending of the file indicates that this file is an archive generated by **gzip**. The result of this uncompressing activity is a file named “fl-160703-jpl.dd”. The ending “.dd” indicates that this image of the floppy disk was generated by using the **dd** command. More information on the **dd** command can be found here. After that an md5 hash of the uncompressed dd image was taken and compared against the given md5 hash to check the integrity of the file “fl-160703-jpl.dd”. As these two md5 hashes are identically it is proved that the evidence with the tag number Tag# fl-160703-jp1was not altered from the point it was seized to the point this investigation started.

---

2 A brief description of the gzip file format [http://www.gzip.org/format.txt](http://www.gzip.org/format.txt)

3.2 The Timeline

For the following investigations Sleuthkit 1.68 and Autopsy 2.0 were used. Sleuthkit and Autopsy are essential tools for a forensic computer investigator. A more detailed description of these tools can be found on the mentioned websites and in part 2 of this practical. First a new case in Autopsy was added with the name “Mr. Price”. Then the floppy disk image was added including the md5 check option which was successfully completed and by this again proofed by another system the integrity of the evidence. Now the timeline was created using the corresponding option in Autopsy. Always if available the option “generate md5 hash” of any generated output or file is activated in Autopsy. The timeline of the floppy disk image is shown beneath in table 3-2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>File</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Permissions</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mai 03</td>
<td>14:11:50</td>
<td>26843 ma.</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
<td>/Doc5/HTML-HMTL.tar.gz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai 03</td>
<td>14:13:52</td>
<td>2592 ma.</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
<td>/Doc5/HTML.tar.gz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai 03</td>
<td>14:14:13</td>
<td>100430 ma.</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
<td>/Doc5/HTML.tar.gz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai 03</td>
<td>14:15:31</td>
<td>249618 ma.</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
<td>/Doc5/HTML.tar.gz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai 03</td>
<td>14:22:36</td>
<td>1024 m.</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
<td>/Doc5/HTML.tar.gz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai 03</td>
<td>14:24:00</td>
<td>487476 m.</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
<td>/Doc5/HTML.tar.gz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai 03</td>
<td>14:43:44</td>
<td>26843 .</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
<td>/Doc5/HTML.tar.gz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai 03</td>
<td>14:43:52</td>
<td>13487 .</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
<td>/Doc5/HTML.tar.gz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai 03</td>
<td>14:43:57</td>
<td>56950 .</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
<td>/Doc5/HTML.tar.gz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai 03</td>
<td>14:45:48</td>
<td>29184 .</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
<td>/Doc5/HTML.tar.gz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai 03</td>
<td>14:46:00</td>
<td>27430 .</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
<td>/Doc5/HTML.tar.gz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai 03</td>
<td>14:46:07</td>
<td>32661 .</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
<td>/Doc5/HTML.tar.gz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai 03</td>
<td>14:47:10</td>
<td>546161 .</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
<td>/Doc5/HTML.tar.gz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai 03</td>
<td>14:47:57</td>
<td>2996 .</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
<td>/Doc5/HTML.tar.gz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai 03</td>
<td>14:48:15</td>
<td>19465 ma.</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
<td>/Doc5/HTML.tar.gz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai 03</td>
<td>14:48:53</td>
<td>20980 .</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
<td>/Doc5/HTML.tar.gz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai 03</td>
<td>14:49:25</td>
<td>1024 .</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
<td>/Doc5/HTML.tar.gz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai 03</td>
<td>14:50:15</td>
<td>19088 .</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
<td>/Doc5/HTML.tar.gz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai 03</td>
<td>14:50:15</td>
<td>1024 .</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
<td>/Doc5/HTML.tar.gz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai 03</td>
<td>14:50:15</td>
<td>19088 .</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
<td>/Doc5/HTML.tar.gz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai 03</td>
<td>14:50:15</td>
<td>1024 .</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>drwxr-xr-x</td>
<td>/Doc5/HTML.tar.gz</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-2: timeline of the disk image

Actually in the information from the investigators of the Company (respective the information on the GIAC website) no information is given in which time zone the computer had been used and therefore all times can differ to the real time of the actions. The times

4 www.sleuthkit.org
5 www.sleuthkit.org/autopsy
you can see in table 3-2 were based on the chosen setting for the investigation which is 
the CET time zone.

All files were owned by a user with the UID 502 and the GID 502. Depending on the 
investigated system this might proof if these files belong to the suspect Mr. Price or not. 
Although we do not have the corresponding system we might come to the conclusion that 
UID 502 is equivalent with Mr. Price because of another fact. There is a sub directory 
which is called “John” which is the surname of Mr. Price. This might be a first indicator for 
the proof that the questioned evidence with Tag# fl-160703-jp1 belongs to the suspect. 
But at this point of the investigation we have to have in mind that this is by now just an 
assumption.

As you can see the timeframe within actions were taken ranges from the 28th January 
2003 to the 16th of July, the day the evidence was taken. From the different file names like 
“DVD-Playing-HOWTO”, “SOUND-HOWTO”, “Kernel-HOWTO” and “prog” there is no 
clear hint in which direction the further investigation on the questioned binary “prog” 
should be directed. Nevertheless there are a few quite interesting information’s which 
later might lead to a valuable solution. A detailed analysis of the found files will follow in 
the next chapter.

The first appearance of the binary “prog” in the timeline is on Monday, July the 14th at 
14:24:00 with a size of 487476 bytes. Because of the set “m” flag in the Mactime table this 
binary was first written to the floppy disk. The binary was changed on July the 16th 
at 06:05:33 indicated by the set “c” flag and then accessed (maybe executed) at 06:12:45 
indicated by the set “a” flag. Interestingly the size did not change during the actions taken 
on July 16th at 06:05:33. Maybe the file was just opened and then saved again without 
any changes.

The other information in the timeline does not give any clue to what kind of fraud I am 
dealing with. It might have to do something with illegal distribution of copyright protected 
materials like mp3's or DVD's because of the files “DVD-Playing-HOWTO”, “SOUND- 
HOWTO” and “MP3-HOWTO-html.tar.gz”. But this is more some kind of speculation than 
knowledge. So let's continue the investigation.

3.3 Analysis of the different files from the disk image

3.3.1 The files: sectors.gif and sect-num.gif

The files “sectors.gif” and “sect-num.gif” first appearance in the timeline is on January the 
28th. The pictures were extracted from the disk image using the export option from 
Autopsy in the file analysis module. Then the md5 hashes from both files were taken as 
shown in the screenshot. Autopsy classifies the files as GIF Ver 87a image files. So I tried 
to view the files with the Netscape web browser and the corresponding option “display” in 
Autopsy. The results are shown in picture 3-1 and 3-2.

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From these pictures no further conclusion can be made at this moment. The pictures seem to show a layout of disk or hard drive and the corresponding sector layout and the dependency between “Tracks” and “Sectors” on the corresponding media. Maybe this information should be considered when investigating the unknown binary.

3.3.2 The files “DVD-Playing-HOWTO-html.tar”, “Kernel-HOWTO-html.tar.gz”, “MP3-HOWTO-html.tar.gz” and “SOUND-HOWTO-html.tar.gz”

First of all md5 hashes of the files were taken as shown in the screen shot. After that the 3 files which indicate by their file ending “.gz” that these files were compressed gzip archives were checked with the `files` command to proof they were really gzip archives. This is exemplarily shown in the following screenshot for the file “images-fl-160703-jpl.dd-Docs.Kernel-HOWTO-html.tar.gz”.

After that the files were unzipped using the `gunzip` command.
After that all tar archives were extracted as shown in the screen shot using the before named steps and procedures. After a short review of the files I can say the following: all files are HOWTO guides around the topics of playing DVD’s on Linux systems, generating MP3 files from Audio CD’s and getting sound cards working on Linux systems. There seems to be nothing unusual or illegal with these files. All documents have an author with contact information and various references to the Linux community which still work. Nevertheless the picture of what the case might deal with is getting a small focus on the topic of illegal copying or distributing music and movies.
3.3.3 The files “Letter.doc” and “Mikemsg.doc”
Again the files were extracted from the floppy disk image using Autopsy and then the md5 hashes were created. Afterwards using the file command from the Sleuthkit I checked the file type of the documents. Both were identified as normal Microsoft Word documents. Now it was time for a string analysis because Microsoft Word documents normally keep quite a lot of metadata about the document e.g. the author, creation date and other things in the file.

Here we can see some of the interesting output of the strings command to the file Letter.doc

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contemporary Letter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Price</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microsoft Word 8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microsoft Word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“System”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times New Roman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times New Roman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>..........................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times New Roman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microsoft Word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times New Roman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microsoft Word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times New Roman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microsoft Word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times New Roman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Name Here</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 July, 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Click r and type recipient's address]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- not so relevant parts cutted ----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-3-3 strings output of the file “Letter.doc”

From the strings output we get the following information. The letter was written using Microsoft Word® 8.0, the name of the document could be “Contemporary Letter” and the name of the suspect “John Price” is mentioned in the strings output twice (marked in yellow). This might be the author entry which every Microsoft Word document contains in
its properties dialog. To prove this theory I have to open the document with Microsoft Word. To ensure that nothing unwanted happens during the file opening process like macro viruses I transferred the document to a special VMware® machine with a clean installation of Microsoft Windows XP Professional® and Microsoft Office XP® running without any patches. Before doing anything I took a snapshot (functionality of VMware) of the system so I would easily be able to recover to the initial state. Additionally I disabled the network connection of the VMware machine to prevent that malicious code can spread across the network. The output of the documents properties dialog can be found in the following picture 3-3.

![Picture 3-3 properties dialog of Letter.doc](image)

And here we are. The name in the field author is John Price. This seems to be the second link between the evidence and the suspect.

---

6 www.vmware.com

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Now let’s see if I can find a third connection in the document “Mikemsg.doc”. The procedure to discover this is the same as described before for the file “Letter doc”. First let’s check the output of the *strings* command. Again we find the name of the suspect in it.

And again we make the dialog test on the VMware Machine as described above. The result is shown in the next picture. So here I have found a third connection between evidence and the suspect.
3.3.4 The file “prog”

No we come to the primarily questioned binary named “prog”. First of all the binary was extracted from the image using the corresponding option in Autopsy (File Analysis -> Extract). I received a file with the name “images-fl-16703-jpl.dd.prog”. The file is named this way because of the naming conventions of Autopsy. The received file has a byte size of 487476 bytes (as shown in table 3-5). Then I did a *file* command to the binary to detect its binary type. As shown in the screenshot it is a Linux executable for Linux systems with a 2.2.5 kernel.

```
[root@localhost Binary]#
-rw------- 1 root root 487476 Jun 23 14:02 images-fl-16703-jpl.dd.prog
[root@localhost Binary]# file images-fl-16703-jpl.dd.prog
images-fl: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), for GNU/Linux 2.2.5, statically linked, stripped
[root@localhost Binary]#
```

Table 3-5 usage of the *file* command against the questioned binary

Next I did a strings command to the binary to see if there is any interesting ASCII information in it which will lead me to the real identity of the binary. A first look at the enormous list of entries of the strings command output did not lead to any direct connection. So the only thing which could be done now is “active googling” with interesting parts of the output. First I started with the most obvious part, some kind of name and address shown beneath.

```
+45 3325-6543
+45 3112-6543
keld@dkuug.dk
Keld Simonsen
ISO/IEC 14652 11th FDCC-set
C/o Keld Simonsen, Skt. Jorgens Alle 8, DK-1615 Kopenhagen V
```

Table 3-6 first google search for information about the binary

After a few searches in combination with other found “keywords” I canceled this search pattern. I found quite an enormous amount of search results regarding the name and address but nothing in combination with the binary or something which could lead me to the searched binary or made sense in any other way.

The next interesting search pattern I found were the text parts which look like some kind of help output of the binary describing how to use it (table 3-7). I always searched with a combination of a few lines of the suspected help information of the binary. This took quite a lot of tries but then it was time for the right combination "getting from block" and "file size was". The first match for this search by Google was a link 7 to a “Linux Community's Center for Security" article about “Linux Data Hiding and Recovery” Within this article there is shown how data can be hidden and recovered in file systems with a tool called “bmap”. Also there is direct link to an ftp site where this tool could be downloaded.

---

Sorrowfully this link is dead. So again I tried Google to find another location where to download bmap to make an md5 hash of it to check if the still unknown binary is “bmap”. So I did a Google with “bmap” and a string which looks like the version of the binary “1.0.20” found in the strings output. This led me directly to a bunch of download locations. So I chose the first one and downloaded the gzipped and tared file to my forensic machine. Then I decompressed (gunzip, tar –xvf) it. It was the source code archive so I first had to compile it before I could make any comparison. After a “make” on the forensic workstation in the source code directory I received a binary called “bmap” which correctly was executable. But it did not have the same size nor was the md5 hash equivalent to the “prog” md5 hash given with the evidence floppy disk. But this was nearly expected because the chance that the compiler, the libraries and so on were the same on the forensic workstation and the machine the suspect worked with was nearly zero.

So let’s go again deeper in the analysis. First I did a strings command on the received binary and compared it to the output of the strings command against the original bmap (table 3-7 and table 3-8). There are many passages which are exactly the same and a few ones which are slightly changed. The equivalent passages could be found comparing the outputs in table 3-7 and 3-8.
Key fingerprint = AF19 FA27 2F94 998D FDB5 DE3D F8B5 06E4 A169 4E46

Target entry exit progress branch info error fatal none
logging threshold ...
log thresh be verbose verbose name useless bogus option
label write output to ...
outfile

test for fragmentation (returns 0 if file is fragmented)
check frag
display fragmentation information for the file frag
wipe the file from the raw device
print number of bytes available

test (returns 0 if exist)
wipe place data

display data
extract a copy from the raw device
list sector numbers
operation to perform on files
mode

generate SGML invocation info
sgml
generate man page and exit
display options and exit
help
display version and exit
version
autogenerate document ...

1.0.20 (07/15/03)

root
use block-list knowledge to perform special operations on files

prog
main
off, 1 too small!
07/15/03
invalid option: %s
try ' --help' for help.
how did we get here?
no filename. try ' --help' for help.
target filename: %s
Unable to stat file: %s
% is not a regular file.
% has multiple links.
Unable to open file: %s
Unable to determine blocksize
target file block size: %ld
unable to raw open %s
Unable to determine count
Unable to allocate buffer
% has holes in excess of %ld bytes...
error mapping block %d (%ld)
nul block while mapping block %d.
seek failure
read error
write error
% s fragmented between %d and %d
%ld %d
gutting from block %d
file size was: %ld
slack size: %ld
block size: %d

Seek error
# File: %s Location: %ld size: %ld
stuffing block %d
% s has slack
% s does not have slack
% s has fragmentation
% s does not have fragmentation
bmap_get_slack_block
NULL value for slack block.
Unable to stat fd
Unable to determine blocksize
error getting block count
fd has no blocks
mapping block %d
error mapping block %d, ioctl failed with %s
error mapping block %d, block returned 0
bmap_get_block_count
unable to stat fd
unable to determine filesystem blocksize
filesystem reports 0 blocksize
computed block count: %d
stat reports %d blocks: %d
Table 3-7 strings on the binary prog

So what went wrong? If the help texts are nearly the same, both binaries should have the same source and the same goal. Go back to the first paragraph of this chapter. The output of the file command said about the binaries that the necessary libraries were statically linked. This means that the necessary libraries were included in the final compiled binary. So let’s see what the file command says about the newly compiled binary on the forensic workstation.
<tt>%s</tt> invocation
<tt>%s [\&lt;OPTIONS\&gt;]
[&lt;%s -filename\&gt;]
</tt>

Where <bf>OPTIONS</bf> may include any of:
<descrip>
<tag>--%s</tag> %s
<tag>--%s [\&lt;arg\&gt;]</tag> %s
<tag>--%s [\&lt;int\&gt;]</tag> %s
<tag>--%s [\&lt;filename\&gt;]</tag> %s
<tag>--%s &lt;&gt;</tag> %s
<tag>--%s VALUE</tag> %s
</descrip>
<tag>--%s</tag> %s

<tt>%s</tt> %s

operate on ...
targ
target
entry
target entryexit
progress
branch
info
target error
target fatal

logging threshold ...
log thresh
be verbose
Verbose name
useless bogus option
label
write output to ...

outfile
test for fragmentation (returns 0 if file is fragmented)
checkfrag
display fragmentation information for the file
frag
wipe the file from the raw device
wipe
print number of slack bytes available
slackbytes
test for stack (returns 0 if file has slack)
checkslack
wipe slack
wipeslack
place data into slack
putslack
display data in slack space
slack
extract a copy from the raw device
carve
test for slack (returns 0 if file has slack)
checkslack
wipe slack
wipeslack
place data into slack
putslack
display data in slack space
slack
extract a copy from the raw device
carve
test for slack (returns 0 if file has slack)
checkslack
wipe slack
wipeslack
place data into slack
putslack
display data in slack space
slack
extract a copy from the raw device
carve
list sector numbers
operation to perform on files
mode
generate SGML invocation info sgml
generate man page and exit
help
display version and exit
version
tagenerate document ...
1.0.20 (05/29/00)
newt@scyld.com
use blocklist knowledge to perform special operations on files
bmap

main
toff too small!
05/29/00
invalid option: %s
try \"--help\" for help,
how did we get here?
no filename, try \"--help\" for help.
target filename: %s
Unable to start file: %s
% is not a regular file.
% has multiple links.
Unable to open file: %s
Unable to determine blocksize
target file block size: %d
unable to raw open %s
Unable to determine count
Unable to allocate buffer
Table 3-8 strings on the original bmap

And now we see the reason for the big difference in file size. The binary from the evidence floppy disk comes with static linked shared libraries, the one I compiled with dynamically linked ones. This leads to the conclusion that the suspect not just had altered the source code of the “bmap” file, but in addition he has altered the “Makefile” of the provided source code package.

Table 3-9 usage of the file command against the binary “prog” and “bmap”

Another try with changing the options in the “Makefile” (Adding the “-static” option to the LDFLAGS line) of the source package has the wanted effect but shows that I do not have the right version of libraries to come close to the exact file size.

Here I will stop this part of the investigation for the part of the file size. To proof this I would need the system the binary was compiled on with its libraries and further on for a total proof I will need all changes the suspect applied to the source code of it.

This all in mind I make the assumption that than an md5 hash comparison would be positive. Further on lead these new information’s to a new addition to this whole chapter (3.4). After finishing the “normal” analysis of the left files I will have to investigate the
“prog” binary in connection with all files on the disk. Maybe the tool was used for its purpose and there are hidden information’s on the evidence disk.

3.3.5 The file: nc-1.10-16.i386.rpm..rpm
The next file I am looking at is the file “nc-1.10-16.i386.rpm..rpm. It was exported from the image using the “Export” functionality of Autopsy. Its first appearance in the timeline is on July the 14th at 14:12:02. It looks like a normal rpm file despite the unusual double dot before the “rpm” file ending. From the name it could be the well known netcat. But first let’s do a file to it.

Table 3-10 file command against nc-1.10-16.i386.rpm..rpm

From the output of the file command we can now say that it is an rpm package with a program called “nc-1.10-16” to install. Still from its name it looks like netcat version 1.10 release 16. To proof if this file is the original version of netcat with the questioned version I downloaded the corresponding rpm package at rpmfind.net and made an md5 hash comparison.

Table 3-11 file command against nc-1.10-16.i386.rpm

We can see from the md5 checksum comparison of both packages that they must be identically because the generated md5 hashes were the same. So this rpm package is netcat 1.10 release 16 as mentioned on the rpmfind.net page. Additionally we get the information that this rpm package comes for redhat 8.0 systems.

3.3.6 The file: ebay300.jpg
The file was exported from the image using the “Export” functionality of Autopsy. First of all let’s do a file command against the file “ebay300.jpg” It appears first in the timeline on July the 14th at 14:12:14. The output of the file command says that the file is a normal jpeg. So let’s view it. The jpeg shows a part of a screenshot of the eBay webpage saying that the eBay webpage is temporarily down. Because of the fact that the message in the screenshot is written in English it could be the eBay webpage of a country with English as the native language e.g. USA, Canada or Great Britain. No additional information is given directly in the screenshot. At this point there is no direct connection to the suspect or any

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8 http://rpmfind.net/linux/RPM/redhat/8.0/i386/nc-1.10-16.i386.html
9 www.ebay.com
other discovered information in the case. Maybe the later investigations using the binary “prog” will discover interesting information’s in this file.

Table 3-12 file command against May03.ebay300.jpg

3.3.7 The file: .~5456g.tmp
This file first appears in the timeline on July the 14th at 14:13:52 and was exported again using Autopsy. The file command says that this file contains plain data. The output of the strings command gives no valuable information.

Table 3-13 file and strings against 5456g.tmp
3.4 Investigation of the floppy disk content with the prog binary

As we discovered in chapter 3.3.4 the binary “prog” is used to hide and unhide information in file systems. Therefore it is now necessary to go on with the investigations using the “prog” tool and check if there is any information hidden in the file system of the floppy disk of the suspect and how the program works. So first I made a floppy disk from the given dd image. Beforehand I made a copy of the given image file and renamed it to floppy.dd

```
[root@localhost Binary]# dd if=/GCFA/Binary/floppy.dd of=/dev/fdo
2880+0 records in
2880+0 records out
[root@localhost Binary]# mount -a /dev/fdo/mnt/floppy
[root@localhost Binary]# ./prog
[root@localhost floppy]# ./prog
[root@localhost floppy]# ./prog
./Docs/Letter.doc does not have slack
./Docs/Kernel does not have slack
./html.tar.gz has slack
./html.tar does not have slack
```

Table 3-14 creating a floppy disk from the disk image

To check if a file has hidden data the modified “bmap” tool found as “prog” on the evidence disk Tag# fl-160703-jp1 has to be used with the following command line “# ./prog --mode chk filename”. The knowledge of the usage of the binary “prog” was the result of executing the binary with the known help parameter (“# prog --h”) to view the help output which was already discovered during the strings analysis of the binary “prog”. If a file has so called “slack” it will give the corresponding information on the standard output as seen in the command sequence above (table 3-14).

So how does this program work? What is “slackspace” You will find this answer again in part of the case conclusion in this chapter. Every physically data carrier is before it could store any data logically divided into tracks, sectors and blocks. Blocks are the smallest logically entity and what is more important fixed in the size and set during the initialization process of a data carrier. In the Linux ext2 file system the typical block sizes are 1, 2 and 4 KB. What the “prog” binary does is the following. If a file is smaller then the fixed minimum block size there will still remain space in this block to store information which is called “slack” or “slackspace”. This information is totally transparent to normal file operations and could not be discovered without special tools or procedures and by this very, very hard to detect. The usage of the “prog” binary will not alter any of the normal information’s like used or free disk space, file size and even the mtctime attributes stay unchanged! To check the following procedure was used. I first copied the extracted binary to the /tmp directory of the forensic workstation from the GCFA path. Now I had to add the executable attribute to the file to make it executable. Afterwards I did a directory listing to show the directory and the files with their attributes like size, last date of change and so on. Then I took an already there copied file named “timeline” and checked it for available slackspace (prog -- mode sb timeline). The result says that the file “timeline” has a slackspace of 4053 bit. So now added the data “this is a test” to slack space and afterwards I did a check with the tool to see if the slack was added and then I did a
directory listing to look if something changed or not. Ay you can see in table 3-15 nothing changed. Neither the file size nor the access time has changed. So let’s now check if the injection of the information did work correctly. The entered information can be displayed using the “s” option. The last thing I did was to clear the used slackspace. This is achieved by using the “w” option on the file and the checked by using the “chk” option to check if the file has slack. At the end I again checked via doing a directory listing if anything did change. As you can see nothing changed.

```
[...]
[root@localhost tmp]# cd /GCFA/Binary
[...]
[...]# cd /GCFA/Binary
slack size: 805
getting from block 190
file size was: 4139
slack size: 4053
block size: 4096
this is a test
[...]
[...]# gunzip extract.gz
[...]# mv extract extract.gz
[...]# cp images
[...]# ll
[...]
[...]# cp images
[...]# ll
[...]# cp images
[...]# ll
[...]# cp images
[...]
```

Table 3-15 test and usage of the binary “prog”

So after I discovered how the program works it is time to operate the binary “prog” on the files on the seized evidence floppy disk. The first file with “slack” I found was the file “Sound-HOWTO-html.tar.gz”. To show or extract hidden data the “prog” tool needs the following command line “# ./prog --mode s filename”. Using this command line I extracted the hidden data and redirected the output to a new file. Now it was time to see what I had extracted. It was a gzip archive according to the test with the file command shown in table 3-16.
Table 3-16 hidden data in the file “Sound-HOWTO-html.tar.gz”

So I created a new subdirectory on the forensic workstation named “extract-1”, moved the file there, renamed it to extract.gz because of the gzip command and unzipped it. Then again I did a file command to the received file to see what kind of document I had received. As you can see in the command sequence in table 3-15 file said that it was an ASCII document so I executed the more command to it. The output can be seen in table 3-15. The given outputs were URL’s of different web pages. Because of their names it seems that they were dealing with the distribution of files. A short check if any of the mentioned web pages is still online led to no additional information. The three URL’s did not have a current DNS entry. The fourth and last entry is redirected to a URL\textsuperscript{10} of a travel agency.

Now I will continue with the remaining files to check if there is other hidden data in it. As you can see in table 3-17 none of the other files did contain any “slack”.

Table 3-17 checking files for hidden data

3.5 Conclusion

3.5.1 Case information and conclusion

Now let’s sum up what we found out. First of all the time frame within all actions on the questioned evidence the floppy disk with evidence tag # fl-160703-jp1 did take place is from January the 28\textsuperscript{th} 15:56:00 to July the 16\textsuperscript{th} 06:12:45. Most of the action within the file system is located on July the 14\textsuperscript{th}.

The user which had access to the disk, modified it, added files, accessed files and so on had the UID 502 and belongs to a user group with the GID 502. If there are any written documents, backups or any other information which contains a clear and reliable relation

\textsuperscript{10} http://www.travelnow.com/index.jsp?cid=58623&home=truedown/secret.htm
between UID, GID and real names it could be proofed if this disk belongs to the suspect Mr. John Price or not (see chapter 3.2).

In the file and directory structure of the floppy disk image a subdirectory with the name “John” was found. Because of the fact that the suspect’s first name is John this might be another indicator that the questioned disk belongs to Mr. Price. This assumption is based on the common knowledge that users often put private documents in subfolders named like themselves (see chapter 3.2).

The content of the found pictures on the disk named “sectors.gif” and “sect-num.gif” fit in the overall picture and the purpose of the binary “prog”. Additionally the other investigated files “DVD-Playing-HOWTO-html.tar”, “Kernel-HOWTO-html.tar.gz”, “MP3-HOWTO-html.tar.gz” and “SOUND-HOWTO-html.tar.gz” fit in the topic about copyright protected material. Nevertheless the files themselves do not contain any illegal content. The files “Letter.doc” and “Mikemsg.doc” (chapter 3.3.3) play a special role. First of all both files state in the document properties dialog a person called “John Price” as the author of these documents. Because of this fact and the fact that these files were found on the evidence they are a very good and clear link between the evidence and the suspect. Second the file “Mikemsg.doc” informs us that the person who wrote the letter is not working on its own. He has partner or accomplice named “Mike” which is the only known information about this person.

As shown in chapter 3.3.4 the questioned binary “prog” is a modified version of the binary “bmap”. What exactly is changed could not be evaluated without the source code of the “prog” program despite of the obvious changes to the help output. What was shown is that the functionality of both programs is the same. Both aim for the functionality to hide information or files in the file system itself. Therefore they use a special characteristic of the file system, the technically called “slack” or “slackspace”. So what is this? To understand it I will shortly jump into this part of a file system. Every physically data carrier is before it could store any data logically divided into tracks, sectors and blocks. Blocks are the smallest logically entity and what is more important fixed in the size and set during the initialization process of a data carrier. What the “prog” or “bmap” binary do is the following. If a file is smaller then the fixed minimum block size there will still remain space in this block to store information which is called slack. This information is totally transparent to normal file operations and could not be discovered without special tools or procedures as described in the next chapter 3.5.2.

Additionally the change of the source code of the bmap program, the fact that a redhat 8.0 system which was used for the compilation of the “prog” binary and the modification of the “make” file gives us a small part of the profile of the person who did this all. This person must have had access to a redhat 8.0 workstation and has brief programming skills and knowledge.

For the next found file “nc-1.10-16.i386.rpm..rpm” it was shown that this is the a regular and unchanged version of netcat, the well known Swiss army knife for networking purposes. The last two files “ebay300.jpg” and “~5456g.tmp” did not add any valuable information to the case. All 3 files have one thing in common. No additionally information could be gathered from them.

In one of the files on the floppy disk information was hidden (chapter 3.4). This was the file “Sound-HOWTO-html.tar.gz”. The content which was found there were information’s
leading the investigation to a crime related to the illegal distribution of copyrighted material. This is especially indicated by the found words “Ripped MP3s – latest releases:"

Most of the information found during this investigation lead to a crime related to the prohibited distribution of copyright protected material, especially material like MP3 files from copyright protected music. How far the distribution reaches is unknown. The possibilities range from just within the internal network owned by the company the suspect is employed at or even further up to connections up to he whole Internet. To evaluate the grade of the violation more information is needed. Especially about the network and the infrastructure of the company the suspect is employed at and the measurements which are in place protecting employees from a free connection to the Internet. If the network is protected by systems like IDS, firewalls and so on maybe in their log files interesting information could be found and the logging of the IP address of the workstation of the suspect might give additionally links between the suspect Mr. Price and the IP address of his workstation and by this a link between Mr. price and the case.

3.5.2 How to defend against the unwanted usage of slackpace

We learned during the investigation of this case that it is quite easy for someone to hide information and files in space on a data carrier which is under normal circumstances not detectable because a special kind of space is used which is “not” existent from the point of view of the file system.

So how can we defend against this? Sorrowfully it is something which can only be detected on the local workstation. So there is no centralized attempt? What else choices do we have? Why not use the tool “bmap” itself for the detection? I am using the original and not the discussed “prog” because the investigator and administrator can only use tools which he could gain access to or retrieve information about.

As we found out by the help file the command “bmap -- mode checkslack FILENAME” will give us the information about a file if it has slack or not. Sorrowfully the “bmap” tool is not capable of doing this check recursively and using wildcards either. So lets put around this command a view more commands and we receive exactly what we need. A script that recursively checks from a defined starting point in the directory hierarchy any file beneath for slack. So here is the necessary command line:

```
find / -exec ./bmap --mode checkslack {} \; 2>&1 | grep 'has slack'
```

The command line consists out of a combination of the commands “find”, “bmap” and “grep”. The command works quite simple. “find” simply recursively checks the file system. The output of find is uses as input for the “bmap” command and “grep” is used as a filter to show only the positive findings.

So additionally to make this a bit more comfortable for a company with quite a lot of workstations this script could be run on any workstation timed by a cron job e.g. every night at 12 pm and the output is transferred to an central logging server which again checks the received log files for the occurrences of “has slack” and mails the corresponding log file to the responsible administrator.
3.5.3 Interview Questions

The following interview questions were based on the information gathered during the investigation of the questioned floppy disk with the evidence tag # fl-160703-jp1 or the information given in the case description by GIAC. The questions were aiming to help to make a clear connection between the suspect Mr. Price and the floppy disk to direct him into contradictions and thereby find out the truth.

Questions:

1. Mr. Price, can you please give us a short description of your job? What role does your computer play in your daily work?
2. Mr. Price, where did you spend the afternoon of July the 14th and the morning of July the 16th? Do you have any witnesses who can testify your answers? When do you normally arrive at your workplace? When did you arrive at your workplace on July the 16th? Can you proof your answer somehow?
3. Did you ever have access to a redhat Linux system? What did you do with this system? Do you know what version of redhat was installed on that or the various systems you used?
4. Mr. Price, could you please explain how the floppy disk with evidence tag # fl-160703-jp1 did get into the floppy drive of your office PC? If you do not have any idea, do you have any explanation how this floppy disk got into your workplace computer or by whom?
5. Mr. Price, do you use email as method of communication? How often do you use it? What are the typical person’s you mail with?
6. Mr. Price, what is the normal text editing program you use for writing letters? Do you also know the version of this program? When did you last use this program?
7. Mr. Price, can you please explain the moment when the hard disk drive of your office PC crashed or was accidentally erased? Do you have any idea how this happened? Did this happen before? What kind of operating system do you use on your computer? Do you also have a computer at home? If yes, what kind of operating system do you use there?
8. Mr. Price did you ever try to write a computer program by your own? What programming language did you use? Do you have any experience programming on a Linux platform?
9. Mr. Price, on the floppy disk we found two Microsoft Word documents which clearly state you as the author of these documents. Are you the author of these documents? Furthermore one of the documents is written to a person called “Mike” and is signed with your initials “JP”. Do you know any person named Mike? Did you ever write an email to a person called Mike?
10. Mr. Price, what is the way you normally name your folders and subfolders. How do you organize your stuff? Do you have any naming convention your normally use? Do you have any idea why there is a directory on the questioned floppy disk which is named like your surname “John”?
11. Mr. Price, can you explain how the documents named “Letter.doc” and “Mikemsg.doc” got onto the questioned floppy disk and are you the author of these documents as it is shown in the corresponding Microsoft Word dialogue?
3.6 Legal implications
As I am a German citizen the whole consideration of the legal implications will be done according to the German law.

First of all depending on the fact if there is one or more Company policies which deal with the above mentioned crimes the suspect might have committed these policies have to be observed if they were violated by the employee. Normally an employee of a company is legally bound to these policies due to the fact that he signed his employment contract. Additionally within these policies the necessary procedures are declared how to react on the violation of one or more rules of the policy. This might have consequences of civil law like extraordinary cancellation of the employment, a liability law suit against the employee forcing him to face the full responsibility for all consequences of his actions and so on. These are the direct consequences which arise due to a violation of company policies between an employee and an employer.

For the assumed violation of the German copyright protection law (Urheberrecht11, UrhG) we will first have to check if music is protected by the named law. The protected work is declared in § 212 of the German UrhG. In article 2 of § 2 of the German UrhG it is said that any kind of music work is protected by that law (§ 2, article 2, Werke der Musik) and therefore we have to observe the UrhG for the investigation of the legal implications of the assumed crime.

For the fact that in this case we are dealing with the assumed illegal distribution of copyright protected material we have to consult the referring paragraphs of the law. The right of distribution of copyright protected work is defined in § 5313 of the UrhG (Vervielfältigungen zum privaten und sonstigen Gebrauch). In article 6 it is said that any distribution of protected material is illegal. Duplication of copyright protected work is just allowed for private backup reasons and only by the legitimate owner of the work. According to the UrhG § 69f14 the aggrieved party (the owner of the protected work) has the right that any illegal copy of the work is eliminated according to § 9815, article 2 and 3 of the UrhG. In § 9716 article 1 the claim for damages is defined. The amount of the damage will be decided by court. In addition to § 98, article 1 also § 10017 has to be observed because as in this case if an employee of a company commits violation according to § 53 of UrhG the aggrieved party can also claim the company for damage

11 http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/urhg/index.html
12 http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/urhg/__2.html
13 http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/urhg/__53.html
14 http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/urhg/__69f.html
15 http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/urhg/__98.html
16 http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/urhg/__97.html
17 http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/urhg/__100.html
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payments. The next paragraph which is relevant is § 99\textsuperscript{18} (Anspruch auf Vernichtung oder Überlassung der Vorrichtungen) in which is defined that the aggrieved party has the right to claim the violator for the destruction or the disposal of all used equipment in the relevant case used for the illegal duplication and distribution of the questioned material. The limitation of this crime is defined in § 102\textsuperscript{19} of the UrhG which refers to article 5 of the first book of the BGB\textsuperscript{20} (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch). Did the accused party gain any profit due to the violation of § 53 of the UrhG then § 852\textsuperscript{21} of the BGB has to be observed.

So for the company it could become very important whether there are any policies in place which Mr. Price is bound to or not. Very important in that case is an agreement that Mr. Price personally has to face all consequences of his actions. Otherwise the company itself will have to face law suit with a claim for damages according to § 100 UrhG.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18} http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/urhg/__99.html
\item \textsuperscript{19} http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/urhg/__102.html
\item \textsuperscript{20} http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/bgb/index.html
\item \textsuperscript{21} http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/bgb/__852.html
\end{itemize}
4 Part II: Analysis of a hacked system

4.1 The Synopsis

On March the 5th 2004 the responsible system administrators of an Internet/Intranet web server at our company were running a few system audits. Goal of these audits was to check the system for unwanted changes and stability. During this audit the administrators came across a view abnormal behaviors of the system. One was quite obvious, the lack of performance. First the administrators began to do online updates to the system but with no success. Than due to the fact that the output of normal system information tools like the “top” command did not show any load on the machine or any other unusual information the administrators came after a few hours of investigation to the clue that the machine might have been compromised and so decided to analyze the system by themselves. During their investigation the administrators installed quite a lot of software like system updates, Snort\(^{22}\), chkrootkit\(^{23}\) and further. With the tool chkrootkit they found out that the system was compromised with the “Sucklt” rootkit in version 1.3. Meanwhile the weekend passed by and the administrators continued “their work” on Monday, March the 8th. One of them found on the Internet a tool called “skdetect 0.4b\(^{24}\) In hope that this tool will “disable” the rootkit the software was also installed and started. After the first run the tool stated out that it found the “Sucklt” rootkit, disabled and deleted it. At this time the administrators partly began to realize that they were losing control of what they were doing. Sorrowfully what they did not realize is that they were messing up forensic evidence with enormous speed now for about three days. Nevertheless their main interest was to get the system back online with a reliable performance. So in the late afternoon on March the 8th the security team was “accidentally” informed by mail. Shortly before the administrators began a total new installation of the machine we could stop them from doing it and talked to their superior. During the talk he clearly stated out that his main goal was to bring the system back online because of the service level agreements he is responsible for, so the only thing which I was allowed was to make an online image of the machine and afterwards the machine will be rebuild immediately. This was an exclusive admission I was given. This meant I was allowed to make the image but not allowed to do anything on the console of the compromised system. This was quit a big drawback because by this order I lost a lot of forensic information’s like open network connections, running processes, memory and so on.

4.2 The forensic hardware

First of all let me describe the hardware which was used in this case. For the imaging purpose I have used a small Dell x86 workstation named Optiplex GX 260, 512 MB RAM,

\(^{22}\) http://www.snort.org/
\(^{23}\) http://www.chkrootkit.org/

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onboard Intel 10/100 Mbit Ethernet card, Intel onboard graphic card and a cdrom to boot from. The serial number of this machine is 1KGZL0J, no inventory number. As operating system on this machine I used the bootable Linux cdrom distribution fire\(^{25}\). In this case version 0.4a of the fire distribution was used. The imaging process is described in chapter 4.4.

The forensic workstation which was used is a HP x86 workstation VL Series 420, 512 MB RAM, onboard Intel 10/100 Mbit Ethernet card, ATI Rage 128 Pro graphic card, DVD ROM, 3,5" floppy drive and a 200 GB Western Digital IDE hard drive with a clean installation of RedHat Fedora Core 1\(^{26}\), Sleuthkit 1.68\(^{27}\) and Autopsy 2.0\(^{28}\). The serial number of the forensic workstation is “NL22510214” and the internal inventory number is “WS986790”. During this investigation Sleuthkit 1.69 was released on April the 20\(^{th}\) and the forensic workstation was upgraded with it. Every described step of the investigation of part II of this document was done with Sleuthkit 1.69. Part I of this practical was done with Sleuthkit 1.68.

The whole investigation takes place in our newly built up CERT lab. It is a special room which is normally and automatically locked and only selected people have access to it and the access is logged. This is also the place were the collected evidences and the corresponding case documentation will be stored in a locked cabinet.

### 4.3 Hardware of the compromised system

The hardware of the compromised system consists of a Compaq Proliant ML370 server. The serial number of the system is “8151JSS11262” and the internal inventory number is “LSY 7111538”. The system is equipped with 2048 MB of RAM, a Intel Pentium III 1,13 Ghz CPU, 1 onboard 10/100 Mbit network interface and 1 3COM TX985 10/100 Mbit network card (eth0 and eth1), 4 x 18,2 GB Ultra SCSI 320 hot swap hard disk drives, 1 x 146,8 GB Ultra SCSI 320 hot swap hard drive and a onboard graphic card. The serial numbers of the hard disk drives could not be checked because I was not allowed to take the system down by the managing directors (to check the serial numbers I would have had to pull out the hard disks out of its hot swap rack).

### 4.4 The purpose of the compromised system

The main purpose of the compromised system is as an Intranet web server which is also available via the Internet. This is quite an unusual situation for an Intranet server but because of the fact that the company has a headquarter with a centralized data center...

\(^{25}\) [http://fire.dmzs.com/](http://fire.dmzs.com/) FIRE is a bootable cdrom based distribution with the goal of providing an immediate environment to perform forensic analysis, incident response, data recovery, virus scanning and vulnerability assessment.

\(^{26}\) [http://fedora.redhat.com/](http://fedora.redhat.com/)


and many, many traveling salesman which need regularly access to the Intranet via an Internet connection. Why for better security not a VPN is used is unclear but definitely would be an over all improvement. As far as the administrators were able to tell me the system is based on a standard installation of rehat Linux 7.2. What actual patch level the system has is unknown. The used web server is an Apache with PHP installed and a connected MySQL database for information retrieval.

4.5 Imaging of the compromised system

As already said in the synopsis I was not allowed to take the system down, check the system online for interesting information’s like open network connections, memory, running processes neither make a real clone of the hard drives! So the only thing I was allowed to was to image the system online via the network. So I and the system administrator of the compromised server built up the following network configuration for the imaging purpose:

![Network configuration diagram]

**Picture 4-1 network configuration during backup**

On the compromised system the network interface eth1 was used because this one only is used for backup needs and by this the system is still online via interface eth0. First I connected two brand-new Samsung 160 GB IDE hard disk drives to the DELL workstation for the backup purpose. The serial numbers of the hard disk drives are “S01FJ10X242734” and “S01FJ10X242737”. The first hard disk (serial number S01FJ10X242734) was labeled with the evidence tag “buderus_2004_03_08_0001” and the second hard disk (serial number S01FJ10X242737) was labeled with the evidence tag “buderus_2004_03_08_0002”. Then I booted the backup workstation using the fire 0.4a CD. After the initial configuration (setting up the network) of the newly booted system I choose the command line option of the fire boot menu. Within there I first checked that the hard disks were correctly recognized and fully functional. Now I formatted the newly installed hard disks using the shown commands in table 4-1 on the DELL backup workstation using the booted Linux from the fire 0.4a CD.

---

29 [http://www.apache.org](http://www.apache.org)
Table 4-1 formatting the hard disk of the backup workstation

After formatting the hard disks I created a directory on the first hard disk called “buderus-web1-1” for the first images. Afterwards I set up a netcat server listening on port 31337. Again the netcat binary from the fire 0.4a CD was used.

Because of the fact that the compromised system was or still is rootkitted there is the possibility that some binaries are not doing what they should do. So to ensure that the imaging process is not somehow affected by compromised binaries a clean and reliable binary of netcat and dd had to be used. This was achieved by using a reliable netcat and dd binary from the fire 0.4a CD. Therefore first the binaries were copied form the fire CD to a fabric new floppy disk which is first formatted and then the “nc” and “dd” binaries were copied. The corresponding commands are shown in table 4-2.

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Table 4-2 copying a reliable version of netcat to a floppy disk

I started the imaging process using the dd and netcat command for each partition. The command sequence is shown in the table below. Important is that only the reliable versions of netcat and dd from the floppy disk mentioned above were used. This is ensured by first mounting the floppy disk to “/mnt/floppy”, changing to this directory and then via executing the binaries with the pre-sequence “./” which is a shell option that ensures that the file which is called is taken from the local directory and not via the global set path variable. For the last and biggest image I switched to the second hard disk drive and created a directory “buderus-web1-2”. As you can see one important partition is missing, the swap partition. This is quite an interesting partition and often very useful in combination with using the strings command against it for gathering information.

Sorrowfully at the point of the incident our CERT policy was not in place and between me and the responsible administrator came up a harsh discussion if imaging the swap partition might cause the running system to fail or not. He insisted that it would harm the system and therefore not allowed me to do it. I tried to convince him the best I could but even without an Internet connection and by this the possibility to show him that there is no known issue with this action I failed. The administrator called his managing director and he decided that I was not allowed to image the swap partition.

Table 4-3 imaging the hacked system

After the imaging process was finished and all partitions were copied I created md5 checksums of each image file for later checks of the integrity of the images. A comparison with the md5 sums of the hacked system at this time was not done because it would had been useless because of the fact that the system is still online and a lot of changes were made due to the fact that the system is still running and operating.
4.6 The Analysis

4.6.1 The initial tasks before the analysis can start

First of all the hard disks with the case tags #web1-0001 (Samsung IDE hard Drive # S01FJ10X242734) and #web1-0002 (Samsung IDE hard Drive # S01FJ10X242737) were installed in the forensic workstation. Afterwards the forensic system is booted. Now two directories (imagehd1 + imagehd2) were created in the mount path (/mnt) on the forensic workstation and the hard disks with the images of the partitions of the hacked system were mounted to these two directories as shown in table 4-5.

Table 4-5 mounting the hard disk images

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Image name/ partition</th>
<th>Mount point</th>
<th>Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c0d0p3.dd</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>2 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c0d0p1.dd</td>
<td>/boot</td>
<td>0.0 3 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c0d2p1.dd</td>
<td>/home</td>
<td>140 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c0d0p6.dd</td>
<td>/tmp</td>
<td>2.4 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c0d0p7.dd</td>
<td>/var</td>
<td>26 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c0d1p1.dd</td>
<td>/mnt/imagehd1</td>
<td>17 GB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-6 the partition table and the mount points

The result of opening a new case, importing all images, creating timeline and unallocated space is shown in picture 4-2.
4.6.2 The history of the hacked system

As none of the interviewed administrators were able to prove the date when the system was first installed I first tried to figure out the installation date. This could be done via checking the first appearance of the vmlinuz file in the timeline. vmlinuz is the kernel file of a Linux system. Its first appearance in the timeline indicates the date a Linux kernel was firstly copied or compiled to a system. The next interesting information to seek for is to check the version of a Red Hat system which is stored in the “redhat-release” file located in the “/etc” directory. The content of the file is shown in Table 4-7. As I know from the interview with the system administrator the system should be using a 2.4.7-10 enterprise kernel.

| Table 4-7 redhat-release file |

Now let’s check the installation date and kernel type via checking the timeline. As we can see in table 4-8 the vmlinuz file was first written and compiled to the system on September the 6th 2001 at 21:05:13 so probably the system was installed first on the 6th September 2001 because there is no earlier appearance of the vmlinuz file in the history. In the timeline you can see the first appearance of the vmlinuz files and afterwards a lot of kernel drivers were written to the system. At 21:21:09 the kernel is again touched, modified and other drivers were added to the system.
As you can also see the kernel which is created has the version number 2.4.7-10. So the information given by the system administrators is correct. A short search in the timeline for any changes to the kernel until the date of the imaging shows that the kernel from then on never was updated again.

### 4.6.3 Search for anomalies in the timeline

So first lets make a sum of what we know from the few information the administrators told me in the interview before I run across the timeline. This should lead into a bit more coordinated way of the timeline analysis because I am dealing with a timeline on about 190 GB of hard disk space and timeline file size of 155 MB! Additionally I am facing the challenge to see if still evidences have been left by the system administrator and their analysis untouched. This will be one of the main questions of this investigation.

According to the information from the administrators they noticed that something is wrong with their system on the 5th March 2004. During their investigation they used tools like chkrootkit 0.43 and skedetect-0.4b because chkrootkit found the suckit rootkit v1.3 installed. The chkrootkit was downloaded to the hard disk at 13:55:14 as a gzip compressed tar archive which was decompressed at 13:55:24 and then executed. Afterwards the administrator executed the skedetect tool and rebooted the machine at 14:40. Sorrowfully the administrator did not save any of the output he received from the tools. Than he saved a few files he found or which were identified by the used tools to a directory called "/root/quarantaene". I will come to an analysis of these files later.

After saving these files the administrator finished his work. There is no interesting activity by the next two days (a weekend, Saturday and Sunday). On Monday, March the 8th the administrator returned to the machine and tried again by to doing some kind of...
investigation. Again they used the skdetect tool. Than the administrator did something which is from a forensic point of view a disaster. He installed/updated Snort and activated it. With this action a lot of information for sure is gone because Snort is a very resource consuming tool which needs quite a lot of disk space in combination with its database (mysqld). In addition this is a very unusual constellation. Normally an intrusion detection system (e.g. Snort) is installed in front of a web server on a separate machine and not on the server itself. All the information in the above paragraph can be found within the timeline extracts in chapter 4.6.6.

So far I know the following. The system was presumably compromised and the SuckIt rootkit was installed. Nevertheless I am facing two parties destroying evidence on the system, the system administrator and if the hacker was not a total rookie he for sure also tried his best to delete his evidences.

Due to the fact that there were no evidences in the timeline around the assumed date of compromise on January the 6th 2004 which lead to a direct hint how or when the system was hacked and I was not allowed to gather any other information’s than the hard disk images I have only a few options on how to continue.

1. First I can examine the files found by the administrator in the timeline, when and how they first appeared. Maybe this will lead to a date when the system was compromised.
2. Secondly I can search the compromised system for log files of the different services running on it, for bash-history files with interesting information in it, for hidden directories and so on.
3. Thirdly I can do a check of the total timeline for any interesting anomalies. This is some kind of what I will call the last choice of a forensic analyst, because this is a very time consuming procedure; its success is quite unpredictable and in this case because of the huge amount of data in the timeline (the timeline is a 155 MB file) very, very time consuming.

4.6.4 Analysis of the files found by the system administrators
So let’s start with files the system administrators identified and saved as parts of the rootkit. These are the following files which had been saved to the locations in the file system shown in table 4-8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Name of the file</th>
<th>Description or purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/root/quarantaene/sbin</td>
<td>init-infected</td>
<td>init file of the rootkit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/root/quarantaene/usr/include/linux/modules/.lib.so</td>
<td>sniffer</td>
<td>A network sniffer or its output ?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/root/quarantaene/usr/include/linux/modules/.lib.so</td>
<td>syslogs</td>
<td>A system log file</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-9 saved files of the rootkit

Let’s have a look inside these files using Autopsy and the strings command. But first check what kind of file I am dealing with using the file command.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>File image strings c09/dp3.d.d root/quarantaene.sbin.init-infected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>images c09/dp3.d.d root/quarantaene.sbin.init-infected: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-10 file command on the init-infected

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Now the strings command is applied to the file. As shown in table 4-11 there are a lot of wording hints marked in yellow which indicate that this modified init might be some kind of rootkit, trojan, backdoor or all together because you can find entries like “backdoor”, “hiding process id’s”, “redirecting the history to /dev/null”. Additionally you can find something that looks like the version information “1.3b” which corresponds to the reported output of the chkrootkit tool which claimed that the suckit rootkit version1.3b was installed.

```bash
PATH=/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin/...:
HOME=/usr/include/linux/modules/.lib.so/
PS1='\[
\] %033[0;30m\]
\[
\] %033[0;32m\]
\[
\] u\[
\] %033[1;32m\]
\[
\] @\[
\] %033[0;32m\]
\[
\] h\[
\] %033[1;37m\]
\[
\] %033[0m\]
# Can't open a tty, all in use?
Can't fork subshell, there is no way...

use:
  - u - uninstall
  - v - make pid visible
  f [0/1] - toggle file hiding
  p [0/1] - toggle pid hiding

FUCK: Failed to uninstall (\%d)
Suckit uninstalled successfully!
FUCK: Failed to hide pid \%d (\%d)
FUCK: Failed to unhide pid \%d (\%d)
Failed to change %s hiding (\%d)

Detected version: %s
Pid \%d is hidden now!
Pid \%d is visible now!
file
  %s hiding is now %s!
  ... kmalloc
  /dev/kmem
  RW: int: 0x%08x, sc:[0x%08x]
FUCK: Can't find kmalloc()!
 kmalloc():0x%08x, gfp:0x%08x
FUCK: Out of kernel memory!
Done, \%d bytes, base=0x%08x
FUCK: Can't open %s for read/write (\%d)
FUCK: IDT table read failed (offset 0x%08x)
FUCK: Can't find sys_call_table[]
FUCK: Can't read syscall %d addr
Z: Int: Allocating kernel code memory...
core
/sbin/init/syslogs
FUCK: Got signal %d while manipulating kernel
0123456789abcdefgijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
0123456789ACDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
<br>
```
Table 4-11 strings output of the init-infected file

Now let's check the timeline for the first appearance of this file. Therefore a search in the timeline is done using the search pattern “init-infected”.

Table 4-12 first appearance of the "init-infected" file in the timeline

As you can see the file first appears on the system on Tuesday the 6th January of 2004 at 16:57:57. In combination we see the other files which were under investigation “.sniffer” and “syslogs”. So some when around this time it seems that the suckit rootkit was firstly installed or activated.

Now let’s investigate the second file “.sniffer”. Because of its file size of 1 byte it is not very likely to find anything interesting in it but let’s see what the file command says about this file. The output of the file command is shown in table 4-12. It says that it is a PCX image data file. Quite an old file format nowadays and not so often used graphic file format any more.

So the strings command does not lead to any valuable information. So let’s try to open the file with Adobe Photoshop® which is capable of the PCX file format. The file is opened, but Photoshop seems to have problems to recognize it as a valid PCX graphic file and prompts the user to create a new image. So the last chance to see if there is any information in it is...
to use a hex editor but this shows that the file just consists of just one byte in hex “0a”. Therefore the guess of the `file` command must have been false.

The first appearance in the timeline of the `.sniffer` file could be seen in table 3-13. It corresponds to the other investigated files.

Table 4-13 `file` command on `.sniffer`

So let’s check the next file, “.syslogs”. In table 4-14 you can see a typical part of the content of the “.syslog” file. As you can see there are a few passwords, also a root password for a backup server and the root password for the local machine.

Table 4-14 example of the content of the `.syslog` file

Now it is time for the last file “.syslogs”. Interestingly it has the same size as the “init-infected” file, exactly 28344 bytes. To check if these files are the same I will do an md5sum comparison. As you can see in table 4-15 the generated md5s of both files are identically so the files must be identically too.

Table 4-15 md5 comparison of the files “init-infected” and “syslogs”

Now sum up what I already found out. The system might have been compromised with a Suickt rootkit version 1.3b on Tuesday, January the 6th at 16:57:57. The rootkit was started and activated and interesting information like passwords for root users of other systems and databases have been collected in the following 3 months until March the 8th. If these information's have been transmitted to the hacker is unclear by now. Sorrowfully nothing else in a time frame of about 5 days earlier could be found what might be of interest or looks even suspicious.
4.6.5 Analysis by deleted files

Another sometimes very good source for forensic information is the analysis of deleted files on a compromised system. For the fact that I am dealing with a very large and quite long running file system the awaited number of found files would be enormous. So the usage of Autopsy for this would be very unhandy because it is only capable of producing the wanted output in html or text format and the deleted files can only be recovered and saved for an analysis by hand and only file for file. There is no possibility of a batch processing. But luckily there is a script available in the GCFA training book 8.2 by GIAC.org which fulfills that need. This script was run on each of the six partition images. For the recovered files for each partition an extra directory was created. The name of directory and its binding to the partition is shown in table 4-16.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directory name</th>
<th>Contains recovered files of partition</th>
<th>Mount point</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/GCFA/buderus-db/web1/deleted1</td>
<td>c0d1p0.dd</td>
<td>/boot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/GCFA/buderus-db/web1/deleted2</td>
<td>c0d1p1.dd</td>
<td>/home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/GCFA/buderus-db/web1/deleted3</td>
<td>c0d1p2.dd</td>
<td>/var</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/GCFA/buderus-db/web1/deleted4</td>
<td>c0d1p3.dd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/GCFA/buderus-db/web1/deleted5</td>
<td>c0d1p4.dd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/GCFA/buderus-db/web1/deleted6</td>
<td>c0d1p5.dd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-16 overview of the directories of the undeleted files

Table 4-17 the command sequence for recovering deleted files for all partitions

So let’s inspect the results. For partition “c0d0p3.dd” 169 file entries were found but only two could be recovered. The first one has a byte size of 24 bytes and is named “100886” because this is the inode number the file begins with. A strings command against this file resulted in no output. The second file is named “100890” and has a byte size of 23. Here also a strings command resulted in no output. For partition “c0d0p1.dd” one file “4083” was found and recovered. The size is 704 bytes and the strings result can be found in table 4-18. From the output it looks like a deleted configuration file of the “grub” boot loader.

```
[root@localhost deleted2]# strings 4083
# grub.conf generated by anaconda
# Note that you do not have to run grub after making changes to this file
# NOTICE: You have a boot partition. This means that
  # all kernel and initrd paths are relative to /boot, eg.
#  root(/dev/hd0,0)
# kernel /boot/vmlinuz ro root=/dev/cciss/c0d0p3
# initrd /boot/initrd.img
#boot=/dev/cciss/c0d0
default=0
```

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Table 4-18 strings against file 4083

For the partition “c0d2p1.dd” 16581 deleted files were found. From these 16581 files only 12 could be recovered. The file size of these files ranges from 40 to 22 bytes. None of these files did deliver any output when using the strings command against it. On the partition “c0d0p6.dd” 134 deleted files were found and 9 files could be recovered. These 9 files are shown in table 4-19. The files 12051 to 12055 are normal HTML files without anything special in it. The other files again did not deliver any output using the strings command.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Filename</th>
<th>Size in byte</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12051</td>
<td>12288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12052</td>
<td>12288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12053</td>
<td>12288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12054</td>
<td>12288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12055</td>
<td>12288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16073</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20083</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30123</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30122</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-19 overview of recovered files on partition c0d0p6.dd

For partition “c0d0p7.dd” 223769 files were found and 73 files could be recovered. The list of files and their sizes are shown in table 4-20. Because of their seize ranging between 40 and 8 bytes the chances of finding valuable information are very low, nevertheless I gave strings and the 73 files a try. And again after processing all 73 files I ended up with no results or better no valuable output. What might the reason for this be? One reason might be the fact that this partition is a very highly utilized one with lot of processes writing and deleting files and by this often eliminating the chance to recover deleted files. The other reason might be the time this partition is in use in combination with its size.

For partition “c0d1p1.dd” the situation gets even worse. There were found 2292 deleted files found but none if them was recoverable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Filename</th>
<th>Size in byte</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1111947</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2683721</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1111946</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261648</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261637</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261638</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261640</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261641</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261652</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261642</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>637744</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>666795</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261651</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>637746</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>666792</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1111944</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1111945</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16442</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2683722</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261647</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261650</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>637743</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>637747</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>666794</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Analysis of the Snort log file

As the shown in chapter 4.6.7 Snort was installed on the afternoon of March the 8th 2004. As this was not the best option the administrators did choose maybe something interesting might had been logged e.g. the hacker trying to get access to his system again but if he is a cautious one I do not think so. The best thing would have been if the system administrators had Snort installed when the rootkit and its backdoor still was active and not afterwards and even better on another machine. So there would have been a chance that the forensic evidences which they destroyed by installing Snort would be a bit compensated by the potential log of the intruder logging onto the machine.

But this is all theory. Let’s get back to the facts. The alert logging file of Snort is found on the partition c0d0p7 in the “/var/log/snort” directory. The file is named “alert” and has a size of 375043 byte. It was recovered using the export option of Autopsy. The logging of Snort did start on Monday the 8th 2004 at 17:36:28 as shown in table 4-21.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>IP Address</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>05:08:12:36:26:394247</td>
<td>193.24.34.212:80</td>
<td>start of the alert logging of Snort</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So what else did Snort log. For the first view hours nothing of a major interest happened despite a few IIS Web server attacks and a view but on this system normal ftp
connections. Then the next day, the 9th of March at 14:01:35 an OpenSSL worm attack began. The output of Snort is shown in table 4-22.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Source Address</th>
<th>Destination Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>03/09 14:01:35</td>
<td>193.24.34.212-443</td>
<td>FTP CWD</td>
<td>[Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic]</td>
<td>Priority: 2</td>
<td>TCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/09 14:01:35</td>
<td>193.24.34.212-443</td>
<td>URI DIRECTORY</td>
<td>[Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic]</td>
<td>Priority: 2</td>
<td>TCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/09 14:01:35</td>
<td>193.24.34.212-443</td>
<td>FTP CWD</td>
<td>[Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic]</td>
<td>Priority: 2</td>
<td>TCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/09 14:01:35</td>
<td>193.24.34.212-443</td>
<td>URI DIRECTORY</td>
<td>[Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic]</td>
<td>Priority: 2</td>
<td>TCP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-22 beginning of Snort alert log, interesting sequence

A short lookup in the Snort signature database what the SID 1887 does mean brought the following information: This event is generated when a web server infected by the slapper worm attempts to infect a web server running OpenSSL”. This attack did last until 14:04:51 or about for 3 minutes. After that moment nothing suspicious concerning this attack did appear in the log files nor did this IP address appear in any other regularly log file. If this was just random or the hacker trying to get back using the old vulnerability he did come in first could not be solved. To find out to whom this IP address is related to I used an online “whois” questionnaire. The output is shown in table 4-23.

http://www.snort.org/snort-db/sid.html?sid=1887
http://www.rogon.de/tools/whois/

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The questioned IP address is registered to a person called “Jim Dandy” and located in Melbourne or Sydney, Australia. If you follow the mentioned domain “primus.com.au” you will get to the web site of an Australian Internet Provider.

The logging itself ended as shown in table 4-24 on the 10th March 2004 at 12:05:28. This should be the time the image of the partition was taken (because I did an online backup).

Table 4-23 the result of the whois of 210.50.211.234

Table 4-24 the end of the Snort logging

4.6.7 Analysis by timeline and log files

What is clear is the fact that the system must have been compromised some when earlier than March the 5th 2004 and this will be the next direction for the investigation. Checking the timeline for interesting information’s, checking log files for errors, warnings etc. to maybe find the way the hacker got into the system.

First let’s check in the timeline again when the system administrator began with their work. The corresponding extract of the timeline is shown in table 4-25. As you can see he somehow transferred the chkrootkit.tar.gz file to a directory “/root”, extracted it and then started the installation. This whole process started on Friday, March the 5th at 13:55:24.
If you go down the timeline you will see the administrator installing the skdetect tool and directly after running it rebooting the machine. This is shown in table 4-26. 

| Fri Mar 05 2004 14:07:15 | 11015 m. | /-rw------- | root | root | 101529 | /root/skdetect -0.4b.tar.gz |
| Fri Mar 05 2004 14:07:22 | 178 .c | /-rw------- | root | root | 229775 | /root/skdetect-latest.log |
| Fri Mar 05 2004 14:07:26 | 1784 m. | /-rw------- | root | root | 229776 | /root/skdetect | 
| Fri Mar 05 2004 14:11:39 | 4200 m. | /-rw------- | apache | apache | 36439 | /root/skdetect | 
| Fri Mar 05 2004 14:38:15 | 356050 .a. | /-rw------- | apache | apache | 475834 | /home/intranet/httpd/sixcms_upload/cache/07/0b5784e9a46e1e1f32e966e6e207 |
| Fri Mar 05 2004 14:40:12 | 20 .a. | /-rw------- | root | root | 27 | /root/modinfo -> module-info-2.4.7-10 |
| Fri Mar 05 2004 14:40:18 | 3 .a. | /-rw------- | root | root | 145150 | /dev/inet/rp -> udpxx |
| Fri Mar 05 2004 14:40:30 | 3 .a. | /-rw------- | root | root | 145151 | /dev/inet/rp -> udpxx |
| Fri Mar 05 2004 14:40:31 | 10 .a. | /-rw------- | root | root | 66488 | /dev/xswip -> inet/xswip |

The next interesting action by the administrators was done on Monday, March the 8th at 10:36:19. There he moved the files identified by the skdetect tool as parts of the rootkit to a subdirectory called “/root/quarantaene”.

Table 4-26 administrator running skdetect and rebooting the system
### Table 4-27 sys admin moving files identified by himself as parts of the suckit rootkit

The next interesting and even worse thing what the administrator did is downloading the Snort rpm package and installing it on Monday, March the 8th at 15:59:32 as shown in table 4-28. So far for the actions done by the system administrators. What I left out where a few reboots initiated by the system administrators.

### Table 4-28 sys admin installing Snort as rpm package

Now let’s check what versions of potential weaknesses we have in the system. There is an Apache 1.3.22, PHP 4.1.2, phpMyAdmin 2.5.1, OpenSSL 0.9.6b, SSH 2.9p2 and MySQL 4.0.18-Standard installed. For each of the above versions exploits, hacks or other compromising information is available on the internet e.g. at sites like www.packetstormsecurity.com or others. Therefore a lot of possibilities are given how the hacker could have gained access to the investigated system.

Due to the fact of the limited possibilities I was given to save evidences because of the management decision that I was only allowed to take hard disk images and keeping the...
system still online without being allowed to even touch the console and a system administrator who did what he could do to save his system but by this he destroyed a lot of forensic information’s there are only a few chances to make a whole picture out of the case.

Maybe a lot of information would have been found in the timeline if the system administrator would not had installed so hard disk space consuming applications like Snort. About 20 % of the timeline are inodes which are not recoverable and this is a huge amount of timeline considering a timeline file size of 155 MB. This is definitely a part for a lessons learned workshop! An example of these lines of the timeline is shown in table 4-29.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File Path</th>
<th>File Type</th>
<th>Access Time</th>
<th>Access Mode</th>
<th>Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/root/chkrootkit</td>
<td></td>
<td>1000 1000 213726</td>
<td>-rw-r--r--</td>
<td>1997262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/root/chkrootkit</td>
<td></td>
<td>1000 1000 213726</td>
<td>-rw-r--r--</td>
<td>1064956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/etc/sysconfig/networking/devices/ifcfg</td>
<td></td>
<td>213730</td>
<td>-rw-r--r--</td>
<td>182309</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-29 dead inodes in the timeline

So I will continue to show a few interesting log entries found which might show some kind of interesting actions which combine with the known time of the first execution or installation of the rootkit or afterwards.

First I started to check every “.bash_history” file on the system to see if there is anything of value in it already having in mind the line from the strings output of the infected init file where is says that the bash history is redirected to /dev/null. After checking all files I just can state out that the rootkit made a perfect job. There have been no recoverable or valuable information’s left in the history files.

Second interesting bit of pieces is the shown in the timeline extract in table 4-30. Someone with UID and GID 1000 starting December the 24th extracted and compiled chkrootkit version 0.43. Here we see two very interesting things, the UID/GID and the date of the event. The 24th is Xmas time and nearly in all western countries all around the world a holiday and holidays are known as high times for hackers.
Additionally it is interesting that this whole process took about 3 days. During the investigation I did not find any hints why it took so long or what exact user had these id’s. Afterwards the seen UID disappeared. The GID “wheel” still exists as you can see in the actual output of the group file in table 4-31 (the group is marked in yellow) found on partition “/cd0p3” in path “/etc” (see also timeline extract in table 4-32). That the group still exists is quite normal because the wheel group is generated by default with every Linux installation. The wheel group has a special purpose. Only members of this group are allowed to su to root. So here someone with the UID 1000 was member of the group wheel and was able to su to root! Afterwards this UID disappeared. What is unclear is why the ownership of the files changed during the process as shown in the timeline in table 4-30.

```
network:root
bin:x:1:root.bin,daemon
daemon:x:2:root.bin,daemon
sys:x:3:root.bin,admin
adm:x:4:root.adm,daemon
bin:x:5
disk:x:6
ftp:x:7:daemon,lp
mem:x:8
mem:x:9
wheel:x:10
mail:x:12:mail
news:x:13:news
wtmp:x:14:wtmp
man:x:15
games:x:20
gopher:x:30
dlp:x:40
ftp:x:50
ls:x:54
nobody:x:99
users:x:100
slocate:x:21
floppyp:x:18
ulmp:x:22
mailnull:x:47
rpm:x:37
xfs:x:43
rpx:x:32
gdm:x:42
rtmp:x:29
nfsnobody:x:65534:
network:root
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>User</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Access Type</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>File Path</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Table 4-30 hacker checking for other rootkits?**

The UID/GID is deleted by now. Additionally it is interesting that this whole process took about 3 days. During the investigation I did not find any hints why it took so long or what exact user had these id’s. Afterwards the seen UID disappeared. The GID “wheel” still exists as you can see in the actual output of the group file in table 4-31 (the group is marked in yellow) found on partition “/cd0p3” in path “/etc” (see also timeline extract in table 4-32). That the group still exists is quite normal because the wheel group is generated by default with every Linux installation. The wheel group has a special purpose. Only members of this group are allowed to su to root. So here someone with the UID 1000 was member of the group wheel and was able to su to root! Afterwards this UID disappeared. What is unclear is why the ownership of the files changed during the process as shown in the timeline in table 4-30.
Also it was not possible to track the date of the changes because the last changes to the files "/etc/group" and "/etc/passwd" were done as shown in table 4-32 on the 8th March 2004 at 20:00:08 and in the timeline you can only find the last changes.

Table 4-32 the sys admins changing the passwd and group file

The question is now who and why did someone install chkrootkit? Maybe it was a hacker who wanted to check if the system he broke into was already rootkitted? Sorrowfully I was not able with the given material to find this out.

The next interesting thing happened on January the 7th 2004, a day after the installed rootkit was activated. The interesting output of Autopsy can be seen in picture 4-3.
The information which is very interesting is the size of the different log files. Normally the access log files are much bigger than the error log files. But on Wednesday the 7th file “07-error.log.gz” is unusual big in comparison with the other files. So I extracted this file using the corresponding option of Autopsy. Afterwards I unzipped the file using the gunzip command and received a log file of 2,1 GB!

So first let’s see what the last entries are in the file. Therefore I used the tail command. The output is shown in table 4-33.

| [root@localhost reports]# tail -c0d0p7.dd/var/log/httpd.internet.ApacheLog01_2004.07-error.log |

Table 4-33 tail on the apache error from 7th January

As you can see the log file ended at 12:42:52 on that Wednesday in middle of a line which is very unusual for a log file, despite that the corresponding service crashed or ran into unrecoverable problems. As you can also see the problem is related to a PHP.

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Now let's check when this problem started on that day. As doing a less and searching for the first PHP warning I come to that point at 12:21:27 shown in table 4-34.

|-------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

Table 4-34 beginning of the error

The problem starts with one line “Wed Jan 7 12:21:27 2004] [error] PHP Warning: OpenDir: No such file or directory (errno 2) in /home/internet/httpd/html/buderus-websttest.php on line 30” and then is repeatedly followed by millions of lines as seen in table 4-34. This logging was continued until 12:42:52 for about 21 minutes and than the logging mechanism or the service or something else crashed. This is quite interesting because in these 21 minutes about 2,09 GB of log file have been written. What happened afterwards is unclear and why. Was this the hacker trying something on this machine? Or was this another hacker trying to get on that machine using a PHP exploit? Did he know that machine was already rootkitted?

I failed again finding an answer to these questions. None of the log files nor a search in the Internet with Google brought up any information which would had helped to continue the investigations in a useful manner.

This leads to a very unsatisfying situation, especially having in mind that this investigation is the investigation documented for the practical for the GCFA assignment.

First of all I was able to show that the system might have been compromised on December the 24th 2003, but not exactly when, how and by whom and this is the sad part. The next thing which is proofed is the existence of a rootkit activated on January the 6th running until March the 5th. Maybe the hacker did try to come back on March the 9th as shown in chapter 4.6.6 using the old used OpenSSL vulnerability. Reasons why I was not able to find more information’s or better the total picture including the hacker entering the system and the vulnerability he used are discussed in chapter 4.7. Additionally there you can find a lesson learned paragraph on how to make these things better in the future.

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4.7 The conclusion

The conclusion of all this investigation is quite disillusioning. From my personal view and from the view of a forensic investigation it is always much more satisfying if a hunter gets his booty and not returns without anything.

On the other hand this investigation is a very good demonstration for what can happen if no good guidelines in a company exist on how to cope with events like the one of this case. During this investigation I came across a lot of situations and acts of involved persons which destroyed with each step of their action a part of the puzzle which maybe would have a led to a clue what had happened to the system and why.

The most important issues I wrote down for a later “lessons learned” workshop:

1. A company without any policies in place coping with the processes what to do in case of the suspicion of a computer crime has only a small chance for a fast and evident obtaining recovery process and a later necessary prosecution. This is one of the biggest challenges which my company will have to deal with in the future! Building up a computer incident handling team and establishing the fundamental policies and processes.
2. The investigated system is quite a good demonstration for a Linux system which is installed, stable running and never patched! It was installed on September the 6th 2001 and from then on only new software was applied to it if it was necessary for its main purpose, as Intranet and Internet web server. Security updates were not maintained. Why is unclear.
3. Actually it is unclear if the audit of the system administrators just happened “accidentally” or by a routine schedule. Because of the information from the interview it seems that it happened just by accident. Also something which should be changed in the future! Every running system should be audited on a regular time schedule and a fixed set of procedures added by system specific additions. Also mechanisms have to be established which make the integrity check of a system possible e.g. tools like tripwire33.
4. One of the most important things which should change in the future are the guidelines and policies how to react if someone discovers an attack, an intrusion or just entertains the suspicion that a system might have been compromised. In this case the most important rule must be “keep the hands of the keyboard” and inform the responsible division in your company e.g. an internal CERT34 team. Any other reaction will destroy important evidences.

As in this case the system was altered by the two system administrators in any

33 www.tripwire.com
34 http://www.us-cert.gov/ for more information to find out what a cert is
thinkable way. They installed Snort, they installed tools like chkrootkit, skdetect, by this deleted and deactivated the rootkit, installed a new version of mysql, rebooted thy system during 4 days a few times and by all these actions destroyed volatile evidences like history files, log files, network connections, memory and many, many other.

5. Another task would be to establish a policy or the creation of the awareness to the management that without giving the investigators the chance to collect the evidences the chances of solving a case will be very low and by this the chance of a prosecution will be reduced or vanished.

So last but not least you can say this time the hacker won. Mostly because of a lack of procedures and rules in place and people who were aware of these guidelines. Hopefully this will change in the future.
5 Part III – Legal issues of Incident Handling

5.1 Legal actions corresponding the assumption that Mr. Price is an employee of my company

The consequences of the usage of the questioned binary and the distribution of copyright protected material are discussed in depth in chapter 3.6.

If this kind of action is discovered at our company usually the following steps of action are taken:

1. The company incident handling team is informed and the supervisor of the employee is informed. Additionally the legal department will be informed too. At this time is the duty of the incident handling team is to seize as many evidences as possible for a later investigation of the case and to give a first judgment if any laws might have been violated.

2. Depending on the situation and the potential crime which has taken place the consequences for the employee range from an immediate suspension to just the collection of the evidences, storing the collected evidences in a safe and redundancy way, cleaning or restoring the questioned PC or hardware and an entry in his employee file.

3. Decision of an internal council depending on the facts if our company is confronted with one of the following scenarios:
   - local or international law was or might have been broken
   - none of the found information’s direct to a committed crime, just to a violation of company internal rules and policies
   - were are dealing with a false alarm

Depending on the evaluation of the internal council what kind of incident the company is dealing with the next steps are taken. In case that there is just any hint that law might have been violated the case is automatically passed on to law enforcement and the next steps depend on them.

If we are “just” dealing with an internal affair the company itself or the corresponding council can decide what actions have to be taken between the company and the employee. These actions are based on the employment contract between the employee, the violation of internal policies which was committed and the civil law (BGB\textsuperscript{35} in Germany).

In any of the above two scenarios the following additional steps are taken even if the case stays internal to prevent the company from any possible monetary or justice harm. This is done by involving the company lawyers, information of the management about the ongoing investigations, starting the internal investigations

\textsuperscript{35} BGB Bürgeliches Gesetzbuch (german book of the civil law)
by the incident handling team and the computer forensics team. If during the investigation it is discovered that the whole thing was a false alarm all information is documented. Afterwards all seized evidence and the case documentation is stored in a secure cabinet for 5 years for the situation that the case has to be investigated again or new evidences arrive from elsewhere or from law enforcement. The last action which is taken is that the case is closed. Additionally all informed persons were given an all-clear notice.

4. Doing a “lessons learned workshop” with the necessary parties from the company to make sure that in the future most possible actions were taken to prevent this kind of crime to happen again or in case that it was a false-negative to enhance in future the discovery mechanisms.

5.2 **Legal consequences if Mr. Price is a company employee and used company facilities to distribute child pornography**

In the case that Mr. Price is an employee of the company I work for and it would have been discovered that he is involved in the crime of distributing child pornography the following actions would have been taken:

1. Immediately at the point of the discovery that the investigated case is dealing with child pornography the employee would have been suspended, the management would be informed and law enforcement would be informed and further investigations were passed on to them to do a official investigation. The legal basis will be discussed in detail in chapter 5.2.1.
2. Depending on the company’s policies and the employment contract also justice actions were taken between the company and the employee.
3. Further actions were decided by law enforcement.
4. Our legal department will strictly analyze the case in close connection with the law enforcement to prevent the company from any harm.

5.2.1 **Legal basis for crimes facing child pornography**

The legal basis for prosecution of child pornography is based on the “6. Reform des Strafrechts” (6. StrRG, released 1.4.1998). In § 176a\(^{36}\), article 2 StGB\(^{37}\) the protection of children against any kind of sexual abuse is defined. Additionally any kind of gaining profit due to selling pornography material with children involved is prohibited and will be punished with imprisonment not less than two years.

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\(^{36}\) [http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/stgb/__176a.html](http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/stgb/__176a.html)

\(^{37}\) StGB = Strafrechts Gesetzbuch
The distribution of material which is considered as child pornography will be punished with imprisonment from 3 months to 5 years according to § 184 StGB for a single person. If the violation is committed in an organized way by a group or organization the minimum imprisonment starts with the 6 months and ends up with 10 years for each person according to § 184 StGB. Distribution also includes any kind of transfer using any kind of computer equipment or the internet (see §11 article 3 “Datenspeicher”). If the distribution was done in any kind of business behavior or to gain profit the punishment will be increased from a minimum of 6 months to 10 years for a single person.

For the distribution of child pornography over the Internet the federal supreme court of Germany had to define the legal basis and definition were the distribution over the Internet begins and by this from which point this crime can be prosecuted. This definition was given by the federal supreme court of Germany in the finding from the 27th June 2001 (1 StR 66/01). In this finding the distribution of child pornography is defined like the following:

The distribution of child pornography over the Internet starts when the questioned file is arrived in the volatile data storage of a computer (e.g. RAM) or the permanent data storage (e.g. hard disk, floppy drive etc.) of a computer. Additionally it is irrelevant if this information did arrive by just activating an Internet link or the data was pushed from a distributor to the questioned device because of a subscription.

According to § 184 StGB just the attempt of getting the property of material which is considered as child pornography will be punished with a fine or imprisonment up to 1 year.

A special situation occurs if the offense is connected to actions abroad. According to the German law actions which violate the above mentioned paragraphs will be prosecuted in Germany for German and foreign citizens and if a German citizen violates these laws abroad he will be also prosecuted in Germany. The basis for this prosecution is defined in §5, article 8b StGB and §6, article 6 StGB.

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38 http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/stgb/__184.html
39 RAM = Random Acess Memory; volatile main memory of computer
40 http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/stgb/__5.html
41 http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/stgb/__6.html
6 Timeline

Normally here you would find the complete timeline of the system investigated in part 2 of this practical. But as mentioned before in this document the timeline has an enormous size, about 155 MB! Even compressed it has a size of about 16 MB. So as this is far too much for Word to handle I decided to do the following. I deleted every line of the timeline before the 1st December 2003 and included it to the submission mail as a separate and compressed Zip file. If the grader likes to have the rest I can send in the whole timeline file as a few mails in which every mail contains a part of the timeline. Before I can send in the timeline I will need the maximum size for emails on the certify@giac.org account.
## Upcoming SANS Forensics Training

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<thead>
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<th>Event Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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